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PREFACE
In everyday social interactions, it is essential to rapidly perceive how someone 
is feeling. !e face carries a wealth of informative cues in this respect, saying more 
than a thousand words. Speci"c facial features may communicate various emotion-
al states. For example, anger might be inferred from narrowed eyes and lowered 
eyebrows. Because  such social interaction is inherently dyadic – it involves two 
people: an expresser and a perceiver – the perception of someone’s face can be 
in#uenced by both facial input from the expresser and information the perceiver 
has about the expresser. For instance, most people might say that men are more 
o$en seen as angry than women. !is stereotypical knowledge, associated with the 
male category, may facilitate the ease of decoding the facial expression of anger on 
a male versus female faces. 
Recently, social psychologists have begun to explore how social categorization 
a%ects emotion perception (e.g. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Hugenberg, 2005). 
However, little is known about recognition of discrete emotional expressions de-
pending on the social category of the expresser. Furthermore, it is not clear what 
processes underlie emotion perception biases. !e present dissertation addresses 
these questions by clarifying which kind of associations a%ect discrete expression 
recognition. Here, we focused on associations that are either evaluative or stereo-
typic in nature. More speci"cally, I will argue across four chapters that perceivers’ 
evaluative and stereotypic associations a%ect emotion perception di%erently. In 
previous research, the in#uence of both associative processes on emotion recog-
nition was confounded. !erefore, it is not clear whether these previous results 
were due to stereotype e%ects or mere evaluative e%ects. !e research I describe 
in the current dissertation was aimed at distinguishing stereotypic from evaluative 
emotion perception e%ects by manipulating the context in which expressions are 
classi"ed.
In Chapter 1, I review research on social categorization and emotion per-
ception and subsequently provide an overview of our own research program on 
stereotype-based emotion perception. Chapters 2-4 describe this research in more 
detail and are focused on three research lines that I have conducted in collabo-
ration with my coauthors in the last couple of years. Besides being part of this 
dissertation, each of these chapters can also be read as a separate research article.
In Chapter 2, I investigated whether stereotype associations a%ect emo-
tion perception di%erently from evaluative associations. Additionally, I explored 
whether the context in which emotions were recognized, a!ect the type of associa-
tive process participants use in classifying expressions. 
Chapter 3 is focused on the underlying mechanisms of a stereotype-based 
emotion perception bias. If stereotype associations indeed in"uence emotion rec-
ognition, then the e!ect should depend on the strength of these associations. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, the boundary conditions of the application of associ-
ations between gender and emotional expressions is explored. Speci#cally, this 
chapter was aimed at investigating how spontaneous these associations are applied 
to mental representations of emotional expressions.

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL
CATEGORIZATION 
IN EMOTION PERCEPTION
1
10 The Role of Social Categorization in Emotion Perception
Please imagine what an angry face looks like. Try to visualize this angry face 
as if it is directed at you. Take a short moment to do so before reading on...
What kind of face were you thinking of? Did you imagine a face showing 
signs of narrowed eyes, compressed lips and lowered eyebrows? Now, take a mo-
ment to imagine a sad face. Again, what does this emotional face look like? Pre-
sumably typical features for a sad face, such as droopy eyes or drooping mouth 
corners came to mind. Here’s another question: To what gender did each of the two 
faces belong? Following cultural stereotypes about men and women, it is likely that 
you were thinking of an angry male and a sad female face. 
Similar to our request above, I instructed 300 students to mentally visualize 
either an angry or a sad face. !e results show that 81% of the people who were in-
structed to think of an angry face reported that they visualized a man, whereas for 
sad faces this was only 36%. !ese results suggest that people associate certain dis-
crete emotional expressions with speci"c social categories. Do these associations 
also in#uence the perception of emotional expressions? For example, does such an 
association a$ect how fast angry males or angry females are classi"ed as angry? 
!e current chapter addresses the question of whether people use associations be-
tween social categories and emotional expressions when recognizing emotional 
faces. Speci"cally, I sought to clarify what kind of associations underlie expression 
recognition in a social context. I will argue that perceivers’ associations may either 
be evaluative or stereotypical in nature. Additionally, I will discuss to what extent 
application of these associations occurs spontaneously, thereby focusing on the 
boundary conditions of category-expression application.
A large body of research has been conducted on the link between emotional 
expressions and social categories. However, previous studies have focused mainly 
on evaluative situations and the recognition of general a!ect displayed by members 
of varying social categories. As useful as perception of global evaluation of expres-
sions may be, I will argue that recognition of discrete emotional expressions in ex-
perimental research may o%en be overshadowed by this strong valence component 
in the task employed in earlier research. Consequently, by focusing only at global 
evaluation the speci"c internal emotional state of the expresser and behavioral ten-
dencies tied to discrete emotional expressions are possibly neglected. Clearly, in 
most situations it is especially important to determine what discrete expression is 
displayed in order to appropriately adjust your own behavior. I argue that stereo-
typic associations between social categories and emotional expressions a$ect the 
recognition of discrete emotional faces.
C
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                      The Role of Social Categorization in Emotion Perception 11
Within the current chapter I will review literature that was aimed at investi-
gating the role of evaluative and stereotype associations in recognizing emotional 
expressions. To that end, I will !rst brie"y discuss existing social categorization 
research, subsequently outline our perspective on evaluative- and stereotype-con-
gruency e#ects and !nally provide a review of empirical studies from our lab that 
tested how associative processes a#ect expression recognition.
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION
In order to successfully process the complexity of stimuli in daily life, a struc-
tured way of thinking is required. $is is important because perceiving every single 
detail that surrounds us is simply too costly for our cognitive system (Lippmann, 
1922). $erefore people place what and whom they observe into distinct catego-
ries. $e !nding that people mentally categorize others on the basis of group mem-
bership is referred to as social categorization (e.g. Allport, 1954; Bruner, 1957). 
Suppose, for example, that you see someone walking across the street. Instead of 
concentrating on each detail of this person, you may immediately categorize this 
person based on gender. Consequently, you instantly activate basic knowledge as-
sociated with the gender category this person belongs to (Devine, 1989), which af-
fects subsequent perception and behavior. $rough categorical thinking, the world 
is simpli!ed and the amount of information that needs to be processed drastically 
reduced (e.g. Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1988; Lippmann, 1922).
Most models that review social categorization processes di#erentiate several 
stages: (a) person perception, (b) category activation, and (c) category application 
(e.g. Allport, 1954; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). A person !rst must be per-
ceived in order to be categorized. Next, critical cues related to a speci!c social cat-
egory are extracted, sometimes based on minimal cues, and categorical processing 
is instigated (Cloutier & Macrae, 2007). Moreover, people especially engage in cat-
egorical processing when cognitive capacity is low and detailed processing di%cult 
(Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, Vermeulen, 1999). 
In the second stage, a social category is activated and knowledge that is stored 
about this category is co-activated (Devine, 1989). For example, the person you see 
walking across the street appears to be a hooligan. Based on knowledge you hold 
about hooligans the concepts of aggression and unfriendliness might become more 
accessible. Finally, the activated category and associated knowledge are applied to 
12 The Role of Social Categorization in Emotion Perception
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the person you have perceived. Consequently, your own behavior and perception 
of the hooligans’ behavior are a!ected by this process. "at is, you may tend to 
sooner interpret the hooligan’s behavior as aggressive and aim to avoid a close en-
counter with this person. "e activation of a category and associated concepts fa-
cilitates processing of expected behavior, which at the same time saves recourses. 
"ese resources can potentially be directed to processing of unexpected behavior 
(Sherman, Lee, Bessenho!, & Frost, 1998). "us, there are multiple bene#ts of this 
social categorization process, it the reduces complexity and helps in saving pro-
cessing capacity that may be useful during social interaction.
Although the research described in this chapter captures the entire process 
of social categorization, the current chapter is especially focused on processes that 
occur during category activation and category application. More speci#cally, I will 
#rst discuss di!erent types of associations that are activated the moment people 
categorize others. Secondly, I will review how these speci#c associations a!ect sub-
sequent person perception processes.
EVALUATIONS VERSUS STEREOTYPES
What kind of knowledge gets activated during social categorization process-
es? A number of studies, using a variety of research techniques, have provided 
evidence for an evaluative and a stereotypic component in group associations. For 
example, hooligans are in general evaluated negatively, but stereotypically more 
strongly associated with the negative trait of aggressiveness than negative traits 
such as stupidity or arrogance. As yet, most models assume that both types of as-
sociations re$ect semantic associations (e.g. Devine, 1989; Wittenbrink, Judd, & 
Park, 2001). A semantic network between a social category, evaluations, and ste-
reotypes is supposedly learned by repeated pairing and storage in memory. "e 
moment a category member is perceived, semantic associations are activated and 
potentially applied in subsequent perception and behavior.
With respect to general evaluations of social categories, research has demon-
strated that people automatically evaluate members of a category as being positive 
or negative (e.g. Dovidio, Evans, & Tayler, 1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, 
Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Dovidio and colleagues (1997), for example, pre-
sented participants with pictures of a person or a control prime and asked them 
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to judge, as quickly as possible, whether a subsequent word could ever describe 
the primed category. In fact, the authors were interested in how fast participants 
responded to positive and negative trait-words (e.g. good, untrustworthy) a!er a 
person prime of either a Black or White race-based category. "ey found, in line 
with the idea that White people evaluate Whites more positively than Blacks (e.g. 
Devine, 1989; Fazio et al., 1995), that people responded more quickly to positive 
words a!er White primes and more quickly to negative words a!er Black primes. 
General evaluative associations of social categories are o!en referred to as preju-
dice (e.g. Fazio et al., 1995); however, in the current chapter I prefer to use the term 
evaluative associations as opposed to stereotype associations. "ese general eval-
uations are not unique for race and have been demonstrated also in relation to for 
example gender (Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1991; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), ethnicity 
(e.g. Dotsch & Wigboldus, 2008; Wennekers, Holland, Wigboldus, & van Knip-
penberg, 2012), obesity (Sabin, Marini, & Nosek, 2012), and age (Kite, Stockdale, 
Whitley, & Johnson, 2005). In sum, people activate evaluative associations when 
perceiving members of all manner of social categories.
Building on social categorization models, as described above, these evalua-
tive associations should a#ect subsequent perception and behavior (e.g. Allport, 
1954; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Consistent with this idea Dotsch and Wig-
boldus (2008; see also Dovidio et al., 1997; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; 
Wennekers, Holland, Wigboldus, & van Knippenberg, under review) demonstrated 
a direct link between evaluative associations and behavior. "e authors showed 
that White Dutch participants’ holding relatively strong levels of negative asso-
ciations toward Moroccans1, kept more distance from a Moroccan than from a 
Dutch looking avatar in virtual reality. In a similar vein, Dovidio and colleagues 
(1997) demonstrated that an implicit measure of anti-Black evaluations predicted 
participants’ nonverbal behavior (such as eye-blinking) during an interaction with 
a Black compared to a White confederate. "e more negative these associations 
were, the more unfriendly people’s nonverbal behaviors during the interaction. 
"ese results support the idea that evaluative associations are activated and applied 
in subsequent behavior.
1 In the current thesis we use the terms ‘Moroccan’ and ‘White’ to refer to Moroccan Dutch and White 
Dutch men in the Netherlands.
C
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In addition to general evaluations, a large body of research has provided sup-
port for the activation of stereotypic associations people hold with categories (e.g. 
Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Schneider, 2004). David 
Schneider in his book on the psychology of stereotypes, de!ned stereotypes as 
“qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people” 
(p. 25). Stereotypic associations are culturally shared (Devine, 1989) and learned 
over time from (descriptions of) behavioral information (Dotsch, Wigboldus, & 
van Knippenberg, 2013) and communicated via multiple information channels 
such as newspapers, television, parents and personal experiences with category 
members (Schneider, 2004; Stangor & Schaller, 1996; see also Wigboldus, Semin, 
& Spears, 2000). Consequently, semantic networks linking traits to behavior rele-
vant for speci!c social categories are formed. For example, most people would say 
that professors are intelligent (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998), women are 
limited in their parking skills (Wolf et al., 2010), and a surgeon is expected to be 
a man (Stoeger, Ziegler, & David, 2004). Independent of the actual truth value of 
stereotypes, most people have and may apply this knowledge during social catego-
rization processes.
Like evaluative associations, stereotype associations have been shown to af-
fect perception and behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg, 1998; Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000). Di-
jksterhuis and van Knippenberg, for example, demonstrated a perception-action 
link when presenting participants with the stereotype of professors. "at is, par-
ticipants in their research were primed either with the stereotype of professors or 
with a category unrelated to intelligence. Subsequently they were asked to answer 
Trivial Pursuit questions. "eir results showed that participants in the professor 
condition had a higher percentage of correct answers, suggesting that activated 
stereotype knowledge (i.e. intelligence, knowledgeability) a#ected participants’ 
stereotype-congruent behavior.
As stereotypic associations frequently have a strong evaluative connotation, 
general evaluative associations and stereotypical associations are o$en confound-
ed. Speci!c behavior may therefore be associated with a category for both stereo-
typic and evaluative reasons. Rioting, for example, is stereotypical behavior for a 
hooligan and strongly negatively evaluated at the same time. From a semantic net-
work perspective, one would say that both types of associations are learned simi-
larly and may therefore be functionally similar. However, although stereotypic and 
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evaluative associations are o!en related, these associations can also be treated as 
distinct constructs (Amodio & Devine, 2006; see also Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van 
Knippenberg, 2011). Amodio and Devine argued that evaluative and stereotype 
associations originate from di"erent learning processes, which stem from distinct 
brain processes. Evaluative associations are supposedly learned via an a"ective 
route in which the amygdala plays an important role (e.g. Hart, Whalen, Shin, 
McInerney, Fischer, & Rauch, 2000), whereas stereotype associations probably 
re#ect semantic memory processes associated with higher order brain regions 
(Squire & Zola, 1996).
In several studies, amygdala activation has been associated with evaluation of 
social stimuli (e.g. Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Adams, Gordon, Baird, Am-
bady, & Kleck, 2003; Engell, Haxby, & Todorov, 2007; Hart et al., 2000; Phelps et 
al., 2000). Phelps and colleagues, demonstrated that amygdala activation interacts 
with perceivers’ level of evaluative association with the Black and White category. 
In this research, the authors $rst measured White participants’ amygdala activa-
tion when viewing pictures of Black and White neutral faces. Next, participants’ 
implicit evaluation of Blacks versus Whites was measured using a response laten-
cy-based method, the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), which 
was designed to index the association between target concepts (e.g. two social cate-
gories) and an attribute dimension (e.g. positive versus negative). In line with prior 
research they found that participants in general evaluated Blacks relatively more 
negatively than Whites. Additionally, evidence was found that participants’ eval-
uation of the two categories was correlated with their amygdala activation, such 
that participants with higher levels of negative association with Blacks (compared 
to Whites) showed a stronger activation of the amygdala when viewing pictures of 
Black compared to White faces.
As yet, not much research has been performed on brain processes involved in 
stereotype acquisition (Quad#ieg & Macrae, 2011). However, Amodio and Devine 
(2006) argued that brain structures underlying learning and memory processes 
for stereotype associations correspond to those of semantic priming. %e priming 
literature provides evidence that priming e"ects are related to higher order (corti-
cal) brain regions (Squire & Zola, 1996). However, we should be careful in making 
strong conclusions about speci$c brain processes that underlie stereotype e"ects 
in person perception. Nevertheless, when evaluative and stereotypic associations 
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are learned di!erentially and involve di!erent brain areas, they may also be func-
tionally distinctive. 
Do evaluative and stereotype associations also have di!erent consequences? 
Amodio and Devine (2006) initially demonstrated the dissociation between evalu-
ative and cognitive processes in race bias. In three studies they provided evidence 
for a dissociation between evaluative and stereotypic associations. To minimize 
the in"uence of valence, stereotype associations were investigated in a neutral va-
lence context. Participants’ evaluative and stereotypic associations with Blacks and 
Whites, as indexed with two separate IAT’s, did not correlate and each were pre-
dictive of distinct consequences. Stereotypic associations predicted participants’ 
stereotype expectancy judgments. Participants who held strong implicit stereo-
types about African Americans ascribed traits that were associated with Black ste-
reotypes more strongly to an African American essay writer. In contrast, implicit 
evaluative association scores were related to interpersonal behavior, such as seating 
distance. Seating distance between participants and a chair believed to belong to 
a Black co-participant increased when implicit negative associations got stronger.
SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND EMOTION PERCEPTION
#e distinction between evaluative and stereotype associations is also relevant 
when thinking about the link between a!ect and categories. As outlined above, 
someone may in general associate positivity or negativity with a speci$c social cat-
egory. Interestingly, besides general evaluations, discrete emotions could also be 
stereotypically associated with a speci$c category (e.g. Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
Going back to the example of the rioting hooligan, most people clearly evaluate 
this category as being negative. However, you may also experience a discrete neg-
ative emotion (fear) when observing a rioting hooligan, or associate hooligans 
especially with the expression of anger (and not with other negatively valenced 
emotions such as sadness or disgust) because you repeatedly perceived examples of 
hooligans with this facial expression. Conversely, a di!erent social category, for ex-
ample females, is stereotypically associated with the expression of sadness and not 
anger (e.g. Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000). #us, some discrete emotional 
expressions are stereotypically associated with a speci$c category while other emo-
tional expressions may not have such a link with that category.
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In the last few decades, an extensive body of research has demonstrated the 
link between emotional expressions and social categories. Research in the in-
tergroup relations domain, for example, focused on experienced emotions when 
perceiving someone of a stereotyped category (e.g. for an overview see, Mackie 
& Smith, 1998; or a recent application in con!ict situations: U"es, Otten, van der 
Zee, Giebels, & Dovidio, 2012). According to appraisal theories (Frijda, Kuipers, & 
Ter Schure, 1989) and intergroup emotion theory (Smith, 1993), behavior towards 
social category members is a#ected by emotions that are experienced in a speci$c 
intergroup context. Along similar lines, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) demonstrat-
ed that qualitatively di#erent threats related to social categories elicit qualitatively 
di#erent emotional experiences. %ey argue that general evaluation alone does not 
capture the richness of underlying emotional associations people may have with 
speci$c categories. For example, people evaluated both African Americans and 
gay men as negative compared to their own European American category. How-
ever, they were found to hold stronger feelings of fear than disgust towards Afri-
can Americans, whereas the opposite is true for experienced emotional reactions 
towards gay men. Di#erentiating between these discrete emotional experiences is 
of importance because discrete emotional expressions are tied to distinctive physi-
ological, cognitive and behavioral consequences. For example, although anger and 
sadness both hold a negative valence, someone experiencing anger is most likely to 
show approach behavior, whereas sadness o&en leads to avoidance behavior (Ad-
ams & Kleck, 2003).
Only in the last two decades have social psychologists begun to study the 
perception of emotional expressions displayed by di#erent social category mem-
bers. Here, it has been demonstrated that, in general, people are better in recogniz-
ing expressions of ingroup than outgroup members (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). 
More recently, emotion perception research has started to focus on how fast dis-
crete emotional expressions are classi$ed, depending on the social category of the 
expresser. %is research sought to clarify the role of classifying emotional faces on 
the basis of social category membership, such as race (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 
2004; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008) or gender (Becker et al., 2007; Hess, Adams, 
Grammer, & Kleck, 2009); as well as classifying social category faces on the basis 
of emotional expressions, such as anger, happiness, and sadness (e.g. Becker et al., 
2007; Hugenberg 2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 
2006; Kang & Chasteen, 2009). In the remainder of this chapter I will focus on 
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the in!uence of category membership in recognizing emotional expressions. I will 
"rst review studies on general evaluative associations and subsequently present 
our own recent "ndings regarding stereotype associations and emotion recogni-
tion that are described in the current dissertation.
EVALUATIVE ASSOCIATIONS
Do people use evaluative category-expression associations when recognizing 
emotional faces? In answering this question several studies employed research par-
adigms containing displays of positive and negative expressions (e.g. Hugenberg, 
2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006). Hugenberg 
(2005), for example, demonstrated that evaluative connotations of social categories 
a#ected emotion recognition. White participants were instructed to complete a 
speeded categorization task wherein they saw a series of images of Black and White 
faces. $ey were tasked with recognizing each face by expression as quickly as 
possible. $e two expressions participants were presented with in this experiment 
always contained one with a positive (happiness) and the other with a negative 
(anger or sadness) valence. Participants more quickly classi"ed a positive expres-
sion on White than on Black faces. In contrast, negative expressions were more 
quickly classi"ed on Black than on White faces. Importantly, no di#erences were 
found between recognition of the stereotypic related expression of anger and the 
non-stereotypic expression of sadness. 
Moreover, Hugenberg & Bodenhausen (2003) demonstrated that participants’ 
level of implicit prejudice, re!ecting evaluative associations with the Black and 
White categories, predicted expression decoding of dynamically displayed emo-
tional faces. $e authors provided evidence that the tendency to decode the nega-
tive expression anger on Black, but not on White faces was in!uenced by general 
evaluations of these social categories. Perceivers holding more negative implicit 
evaluations of African Americans more quickly decoded anger on Black than on 
White faces. Together, these studies provide strong evidence for evaluative-con-
gruency e#ects in race-based emotion perception.
In a similar vein, Hugenberg and Sczesny (2006) found evidence for di#erenc-
es in emotion recognition as a function of gender. Previously, research has shown 
that both men and women are evaluated positively, however, women in general are 
evaluated more positively than men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). Consistent with 
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this, Hugenberg and Sczesny found a greater ‘happy face advantage’ (e.g. Kirita & 
Endo, 1995; Leppänen & Hietanen, 2003) for female faces than male faces. Par-
ticipants in their study more quickly classi!ed positive expressions than negative 
expressions, especially when displayed by female faces. "e authors concluded that 
these e#ects are best explained by the spreading of evaluative associations: the va-
lence of the target face, as triggered by the category, served as a prime for recogniz-
ing emotional expressions independently of the discrete emotion being expressed.
Investigating the reverse link, Hutchings and Haddock (2008; see also Hugen-
berg and Bodenhausen, 2004) demonstrated that race categorization of race ambig-
uous faces was in$uenced by facial expression displays. In this study participants 
were instructed to categorize happy, angry and neutral faces of Black, White, and 
race ambiguous computer generated men on de basis of race (as well as emotion 
and emotional intensity). As expected, the race unambiguous faces were nearly 
100% correctly categorized as either Black or White. For the race ambiguous fac-
es angry displays were more o%en categorized as Black, compared to the neutral 
and happy faces. Furthermore, the authors found that implicit evaluation of the 
employed categories moderated this main e#ect. For participants scoring high on 
prejudice this e#ect was stronger than for those participants scoring low on preju-
dice. In sum, this demonstrates that evaluative-congruency can be found not only 
in recognizing emotional expressions of category members, but also in categoriz-
ing emotion faces on the basis of race (for a similar process see, Ruys, Dijksterhuis, 
& Corneille, 2008).
STEREOTYPE ASSOCIATIONS
As insightful as these studies on perception of positive and negative a#ect of 
category members are, this valence component employed within the experimen-
tal task may actually overshadow stereotype e#ects in the recognition of discrete 
emotional expressions. Consequently, the discrete emotion displayed and behav-
ioral tendencies tied to discrete emotional expressions are possibly neglected in 
experimental research on emotion recognition. In the current thesis, I argue that 
di#erentiating between discrete emotions is especially important since they have 
been shown to elicit speci!c behavioral tendencies (e.g. Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) 
that are not necessarily captured by general evaluation only. Speci!cally, I propose 
that stereotypic associations between social categories and emotional expressions 
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in!uence recognition of discrete emotional faces. "erefore, the research question 
asked in Chapters 2 and 3 was: Do stereotypic associations between social categories 
and discrete emotions in!uence emotion perception? Furthermore, if stereotype as-
sociations indeed a#ect recognition of discrete emotional expressions, the question 
rises of when emotion recognition e#ects are a#ected by either evaluative or ste-
reotype associations. "is was investigated by systematically manipulating the task 
context in which emotion recognition was completed. Finally, I will explore the 
boundary condition of category-expression associations application. In Chapter 4 
we investigated the extent to which people spontaneously apply category-expres-
sion associations.
As described above, until recently social categorization and expression recog-
nition research was aimed predominantly at evaluative category-expression asso-
ciations and not at stereotype e#ects. One way to test whether stereotype associa-
tions a#ect emotion recognition is by manipulating the context in which emotions 
are perceived. Previously studied evaluative-congruency e#ects (e.g. Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003; Hugenberg, 2005) are solely investigated in a context which 
especially made salient the valence of expressions by explicitly contrasting positive 
emotions with negative emotions. Reducing the impact of valence, in line with 
Amodio and Devine (2006), might help in investigating the in!uence of stereo-
type associations in expression recognition processes. In fact, although Amodio 
and Devine used a neutral context to investigate stereotype e#ects, I propose that 
employing a negative (or single) valence context in which only negative emotions 
are compared to each other, may serve a similar purpose. "eoretically, a sin-
gle-valence context with positive expressions only would also be appropriate for 
this goal; however, several issues arise. First of all, there are probably fewer positive 
than negative emotions. Furthermore, most positive expressions share one speci$c 
facial characteristic, namely a form of smiling, which makes positive expression 
fairly di%cult to distinguish from each other (Ekman, 1992a). Conversely, of the 
six basic emotions as described by Ekman (1992b; see also Langner et al., 2010) 
four negative expressions (anger, sadness, disgust, & fear), one neutral expression 
(surprise) and one positive expression (happiness) can be distinguished. Moreover, 
some negative expressions elicit approach and other avoidance related behavior. 
Such important distinction in behavioral consequences is not captured when con-
centrating solely on negative evaluations. Second, and more practically, stimulus 
materials of di#erent social category members in the positive emotional expression 
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domain (e.g pictures of discrete emotional expressions other than happiness and 
pride) are not available at the moment. Taken together, I argue that for multiple 
reasons negative expressions are the strongest candidate for our single-valence ma-
nipulation.
Consistent with this rationale, we (Bijlstra, Holland, & Wigboldus, 2010; 
Chapter 2) provided !rst evidence for the context dependency of stereotypic versus 
evaluative associations in recognizing emotional expressions. In two studies par-
ticipants were asked to quickly classify faces of two social categories (Moroccan vs. 
White men, Study 2.1; men vs. women, Study 2.2) in two emotion categories. "e 
comparative context in which participants completed this task di#ered between 
conditions. In a dual-valence condition, identical to prior evaluative-congruency 
studies, we presented participants with a positive (happiness) and a negative (anger 
or sadness) facial expression. In contrast, in a single-valence condition only nega-
tively valenced expressions (anger and sadness) were shown. 
"e results in both dual-valence conditions replicated previously obtained 
evaluative-congruency e#ects (e.g. Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006), 
represented by a two-way interaction between expression valence and social cate-
gory membership. Furthermore, we found novel and consistent evidence that ste-
reotype-congruent expressions were classi!ed faster when valence was not made 
salient (single-valence context). For example, in line with common cultural ste-
reotypes about men and women (e.g. Plant et al., 2000), the negative emotional 
expression anger was classi!ed faster on male than female faces, whereas sadness 
was more quickly classi!ed on female than male faces. "e dissociation in results 
between the dual- and single-valence conditions is nicely illustrated by respons-
es towards sad faces. In the dual-valence comparative context sadness was clas-
si!ed more quickly when displayed by male faces than when displayed by female 
faces, supposedly because of the relatively negative evaluation of males compared 
to females (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). In contrast, in the single-valence compara-
tive context the exact same sad pictures were classi!ed more quickly for females 
than males, re$ecting stronger stereotypic associations between sadness and fe-
males than sadness and males (Plant et al., 2000). Presumably in this context the 
face primes stereotype associations, which are subsequently used in recognizing 
emotional expression. Furthermore, we found that emotional expressions were in 
general classi!ed faster in a dual-valence than single-valence comparative context.
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A subsequent set of studies by Bijlstra, Holland, Dotsch, Hugenberg, and Wig-
boldus (under review, Chapter 3) conceptually replicated the context dependency 
of stereotypes in expression recognition biases for dynamic facial expressions. 
Extending prior stereotype-congruency results to dynamic displays of emotional 
expressions is important in light of the growing evidence that the time course of 
facial expressions plays a potent role in decoding and responding to expressions 
(e.g., Recio, Sommer, & Schacht, 2011; Sato, Fujimura, & Suzuki, 2008). Further-
more, dynamic facial expressions are more ecologically valid than static expres-
sions (see Niedenthal, Halberstadt, Margolin, & Innes-Ker, 2000). 
First, we conducted a pilot study in which a modi!ed morph movies task (see 
Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2000) was employed. In this 
task, perceivers viewed and responded to !lm clips of emotional faces changing 
over time from one expression to another. Participants’ task was to indicate when 
they thought the !rst expression had changed into the second expressions. Us-
ing this technique in combination with the context manipulation of Bijlstra and 
colleagues (Chapter 2), we replicated previously found evaluative- and stereo-
type-congruency e"ects. In a dual-valence context, participants saw happiness ap-
pearing sooner on White than Moroccan faces, whereas they saw anger/sadness 
expressions appearing sooner on Moroccan than White faces. When no valence 
di"erence was present in participants’ emotion classi!cation task (single-valence), 
they saw anger appearing earlier on Moroccan than White faces, and showed no 
di"erence in classifying sadness on either category. #ese !ndings con!rm our 
predictions that both evaluative and stereotype e"ects in emotion recognition can 
also be discriminated when processing dynamically displayed expressions.
More importantly, if stereotype associations in$uence emotion recognition 
then the e"ect should depend on the strength of these associations. In Chapter 
3 we provide direct evidence for e"ects of stereotype associations on expression 
recognition biases. Indeed, Chapter 2 and our pilot study (Chapter 3) only indi-
rectly demonstrated this, by inferring the di"erential in$uence of category-based 
stereotypes and evaluations from participants’ di"erential responses to faces based 
on comparative context (Chapter 2). By using an individual di"erence measure 
of perceiver’s prejudice, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen have provided direct evi-
dence for evaluative-congruency e"ects (2003, 2004). However, as yet, no one has 
demonstrated a direct relationship between individual di"erences in stereotype as-
sociations of target groups, and stereotype-based biases in expression recognition 
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on these target group faces. To that end, participants !rst completed a single-va-
lence emotion recognition task (morph movies task, Study 3.1; speeded catego-
rization task, Study 3.2) and then performed an emotion implicit association test 
(eIAT). In this newly developed eIAT we assessed participants’ individual associa-
tive strengths between social categories (Moroccan and Dutch), and two discrete 
emotional expressions (anger and sadness). "us, we replaced the evaluative di-
mension of the original IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) with the discrete expression 
attributes of anger and sadness. Measuring implicit associations within a single 
valence domain (or neutral valence, see Amodio & Devine, 2006) might be better 
suited to tap into these speci!c stereotype associations. Additionally in Study 3.2, 
we included a traditional evaluative IAT, which was used to index participants’ 
general valence evaluation of the Moroccan versus Dutch category, to test whether 
our measure of stereotypes is discriminable from evaluative associations.
"e results of these studies provided direct evidence that a stereotype-con-
gruency e#ect is correlated with individuals’ stereotype associations between dis-
crete emotional expressions and social categories. In both studies we found the 
predicted stereotype e#ect, represented by the interaction between ethnicity of the 
expresser and the emotional expression displayed. In Study 3.1 participants saw 
anger appearing earlier than sadness on Moroccan faces, whereas they saw sadness 
appearing earlier than anger on White faces. Study 3.2 replicates the stereotype 
results of our Chapter 2 results. Importantly, both studies demonstrated that the 
eIAT signi!cantly predicted participants’ stereotype e#ect. Perceivers’ level of Mo-
roccan-anger and Dutch-sadness associations (compared to the opposite) predict-
ed their tendency to decode anger more readily on Moroccan faces and sadness 
on White faces. Additionally, Study 3.2 extended this !nding by showing evidence 
that stereotype associations (eIAT) predict the biasing e#ects of stereotypes on ex-
pression recognition, even when controlling for overall evaluations (IAT) of social 
categories.
In sum, previous studies found evidence for evaluative-congruency between 
emotion recognition and social categorization (e.g. Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 
2003, 2004; Hugenberg, 2005; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008). "e valence of a target 
person (emotion) serves as a prime for recognizing the target expression (catego-
ry). In contrast, our studies were aimed at showing evidence for stereotype-con-
gruency e#ects. We provided !rst evidence that recognition of discrete emotions 
is in$uenced by the expressers’ social category (Chapters 2 & 3). Moreover, we 
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provided !rst evidence that these e"ects are indeed driven by people’s stereotypic 
associations between certain social categories and discrete emotions.
#e above discussed e"ects illustrate the dissociation between evaluative and 
stereotype processes in emotion recognition. Importantly, they also demonstrate 
how task context in$uences whether evaluative- or stereotype based category-ex-
pression associations are activated. Using a direct comparison of task context, we 
showed that a dual-valence context employed in previous tasks resulted in evalu-
ative-based emotion recognition e"ects, whereas a single-valence context resulted 
in stereotype-based emotion recognition e"ects. #e crucial impact of task context 
for the application of associative processes in emotion recognition has not been 
acknowledged in the literature on emotion recognition thus far. However, studies 
on the importance of context e"ects are prominent in social cognition research. 
For example, it has been demonstrated that category activation and automatic re-
sponses towards social categories are susceptible to contextual in$uences (e.g. Wit-
tenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995). #e demon-
stration that comparative context moderates emotion recognition e"ects is an 
important contribution to the !eld of social categorization and emotion research.
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS FOR APPLYING
CATEGORY-EXPRESSION ASSOCIATIONS
Having demonstrated evidence concerning the relation between emotional 
expressions and categories, the boundary conditions of this relation remain to be 
studied. For example, it is unclear whether evaluative and stereotype e"ects could 
occur spontaneously, or whether they strongly depend on the speci!c context in 
which the relation was studied. In other words: is the salience of both social cate-
gory membership and emotional expressions a necessary condition for application 
of group-emotion associations? #is is an important question because in experi-
mental research on the relation between expressions and categories, a speci!c cate-
gory context is always activated by the experimenter. For example, in our emotion 
recognition studies (Chapters 2 & 3) we asked participants to classify emotional 
expressions displayed by men and women (or Moroccan and White men). #us, 
participants’ attention was always directed to both group membership and emo-
tional expressions of targets. Consequently, no conclusions about the spontaneity 
of category-expression associations can be drawn. Furthermore, are these e"ects 
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generalizable outside the experimental context in which they were studied? Do 
people spontaneously apply category-expression associations?
In order to investigate spontaneous use of category-expression associations, 
we argue that a research paradigm is needed that separates emotional expressions 
from social category membership. !eoretically, this could be done by asking par-
ticipants how they represent a discrete emotional expression. We expect that peo-
ple, when thinking of an emotional face, spontaneously use gender information. 
We saw with our example at the beginning of this chapter, that participants were 
more likely to think of a male angry person than a female angry person. However, 
practical issues arise. For instance, asking participants about the gender of their 
visualization, automatically implies that the researcher presents participants with 
a category-expression context. Moreover, if we could visualize participants’ repre-
sentations, we would be able to investigate the extent to which mental representa-
tion of emotional expressions overlap with mental representations of social cate-
gories. However, asking participants to describe how they represent an emotional 
expression leads to questions of whether people are consciously aware of each de-
tail of their mental representation. To overcome these issues, a research paradigm 
is needed in which (a) the experimenter presents participants with stimuli that 
do not intentionally represent the concept of interest and (b) the extent to which 
representations of discrete expressions are confounded with category information 
is inferred a"erwards.
One way to visualize mental representations, is to employ reverse correlation 
(RC) techniques (Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, van Knippenberg, 2008; Mangini 
& Biederman, 2004). RC provides a data-driven approach to model mental repre-
sentations (for a review on data-driven methods in social perception, see Todorov, 
Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Said, 2011), and enables researchers to visualize someone’s 
mental representation without making a priori assumptions in selecting stimuli. 
!is is an important task feature because it provides the opportunity to investi-
gate default associations in mental representations outside of a category-expres-
sion context, because social category membership is not necessarily mentioned 
during the task. Usually, in RC research, participants are repeatedly presented with 
a base image (i.e. face) and superimposed random noise. Adding random noise 
to a base image results in a stimulus item, which looks like a blurry image with 
di#erent parts of the face highlighted (see Figure 1). !e base face is held constant 
between trials, whereas a di#erent random noise pattern is superimposed for each 
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trial. In a RC task, participants are asked to categorize noisy images on the basis 
of the relevant construct, for example participants were tasked to select the most 
angry looking face out of two noisy images. Based on participants’ selected images, 
mental representations can be constructed a!erwards. RC techniques have been 
successfully employed in modeling mental representations of social categories 
(e.g. Moroccan Dutch men – Dotsch et al., 2008; gender – Mangini & Biederman, 
2004), personality traits (e.g. trustworthiness & dominance – Dotsch & Todorov, 
2012) and emotional expressions (Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Jack, Caldara, & 
Schyns, 2011). In sum, RC is a perfect candidate for investigating spontaneous cat-
egory-expression associations because no experimenter biased selection of stimuli 
is required and at the same time it enables us to separate expression representations 
from category representation.
Figure 1. Stimulus examples from Chapter 4, displaying the base face with random noise. 
Now we have selected a suitable research paradigm, the question emerges of 
whether people spontaneously use stereotype or evaluative associations when vi-
sualizing an emotional face. In order to create mental representations of discrete 
emotions and social categories, participants in Study 4.2 (Bijlstra, Dotsch, Holland, 
& Wigboldus, in prep.; Chapter 4) were asked to complete a RC experiment. "e 
rationale behind this study was to #rst create the necessary visualizations of the 
relevant mental representations (male, female, angry, and sad) and then test these 
images on their mutual similarities. For this set of studies we chose gender as a ba-
sis for social categorization because, by de#nition, each person can be categorized 
as either male or female, so all emotion visualizations are to some extent gendered. 
"e goal of Study 4.2 was to test whether people spontaneously use stereotype or 
evaluative gender associations within their mental representation of discrete emo-
tional expressions. 
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During the RC task, participants were presented with two noisy images and 
tasked to repeatedly select either the most angry, sad, male, or female looking face 
out of these stimuli options. By averaging all selected stimuli per condition we were 
able to model group based mental representations (or classi!cation images, CIs) 
of the relevant concepts. Important for the purpose of this study was that gender 
was not mentioned when participants constructed emotional expressions, or vice 
versa. "e modeled emotion CIs were tested for similarities with the gender CIs. 
Similarities between faces were tested by correlating the noise patterns between 
CIs (following the procedure of Dotsch & Todorov, 2012). We hypothesized that 
participants would either use evaluative or stereotype associations in their mental 
representations of sadness and anger. From both associative processes we expected 
that anger would convey signs of masculinity. "e critical test, however, considers 
mental representations of sadness; From an evaluative perspective sadness should 
convey masculinity, whereas from a stereotype perspective sadness should convey 
signs of femininity.
"e results of this study demonstrated that mental representations of both 
negative emotional expressions contained more masculine than feminine features 
(Figure 2). Both emotional expressions correlated positively with the male CI. Fur-
thermore, we found a negative correlation for the relation between sadness and 
the female CI, re#ecting opposite instead of greater physical similarities between 
CIs. Taken together, these results suggest that spontaneous use of gender-emo-
tional expression associations was a$ected by evaluative-congruency. Similarities 
between both expressions and men could only partially be explained by a stereo-
type-congruency processes. "at is, from a stereotype-congruency perspective we 
expected that anger conveyed more male features, and sadness conveyed more fe-
male features. Our !ndings are in line with research showing that compared to 
women, men are evaluated more negatively (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), and that 
these evaluations spontaneously a$ected participants’ responses in the RC task. 
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Figure 2. !e averaged classi"cation images per between-subjects condition: sadness and anger.
A!er establishing that participant spontaneously used evaluative associations 
as default association, we investigated the minimum context necessary to override 
spontaneous evaluative processes by manipulating the category-expression context 
(Chapter 4). "e question that remains unanswered here is: Is the presence of social 
category information necessary for spontaneous use of stereotype-congruent associa-
tions? We suggest that the salience of evaluative information is crucial. As with ste-
reotype-congruency e#ects in emotion recognition, we argued that a comparative 
context moderates the type of associations people use. Consistent with the results 
of our emotion recognition studies (Chapters 2 & 3), we predicted that evaluative 
associations are used when valence is made salient, whereas stereotype associa-
tions should a#ect the way in which expressions are represented when valence is 
not made salient. "is issue was addressed in Study 4.3 by combining the RC par-
adigm with a comparative emotion context manipulation adapted from Chapter 
2. Two conditions were created in which participants repeatedly classi$ed single 
noisy pictures in either a comparative context that made valence di#erences salient 
(dual-valence) or a context without valence di#erences (single-valence). 
"is procedure enabled us to calculate two personal CIs per participant and 
four aggregated CIs on the group level (anger in the context of sadness, happiness 
in the context of sadness, and sadness in the context of either anger or happiness), 
again, outside the context of gender. Of interest for our hypothesis were the indi-
vidual CIs of sadness in both comparative context conditions. "at is, di#erences 
between conditions in mental representations of sadness can occur only due to the 
speci$c context in which participants completed the RC task. We hypothesized 
that evaluative associations are used in an evaluative context and as a result sad-
ness will convey more masculine than feminine similarities, whereas in a context 
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without valence di!erences, stereotype associations would a!ect mental represen-
tations and sadness would convey less masculine than feminine similarities.
"e results of this study demonstrated that participants’ mental representa-
tions were susceptible to the salience of valance within the context. Without mak-
ing reference to gender during the experimental task, participants used di!erent 
category-expression associations depending on the emotion comparative context. 
We found that sadness in the evaluative dual-valence context conveyed similarities 
with men more than women. Furthermore, we found that sadness in the stereo-
typical single-valence context conveyed similarities with women more than men. 
Our data demonstrate that when participants’ attention was not directed to 
both the social category and the emotional expressions within the experimental 
task (Study 4.2), mental representations of negative expressions (anger & sadness) 
showed stronger similarities with male than female facial features. "is result is 
consistent with an evaluative-congruency perspective (e.g. Hugenberg & Sczesny, 
2006; Chapter 2), because men in general are seen as less positive than women 
(Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). With Study 4.3 we demonstrated that the application 
of evaluative- and stereotype-congruent associations are susceptible to an emo-
tion comparative context. Without directing participants’ attention to gender in 
the experimental task, we manipulated the emotion context in which stimuli were 
classi#ed. "e context manipulation employed seems to prime either evaluative or 
stereotypic associations that are subsequently applied to mental representations of 
discrete emotional expressions. "is procedure allowed us to successfully predict 
spontaneous use of evaluative- and stereotype-congruent associations. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 we investigated whether a gender-expression compar-
ative context indeed led to stereotype-congruency e!ects. "is was done in two 
ways. First, we asked a group of participants to rate the CIs from Study 4.2 on 
gender typicality. We argue that asking participants to rate gender typicality intro-
duced a gender-expression context, i.e. both the category and expression construct 
are presented to the participant at once. Participants’ masculinity and femininity 
ratings of the emotional expressions CIs provided results in line with a stereo-
type-congruency explanation. We found an interaction between participants’ gen-
der typicality ratings of the two emotional expression CIs. When participants rated 
gender typicality of the emotion CIs, both CIs were more masculine than feminine. 
However, the di!erence between masculinity and femininity ratings were larger for 
the anger CI than the sadness CI.
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Second, we conducted an emotion visualization experiment (Study 4.1), such 
as described at the start of this chapter. We asked participants to either visualize an 
angry or a sad face and to mentally picture this emotional face as detailed as possi-
ble for ten seconds. Next, we asked them to indicate the gender of the face they had 
visualized. !e results showed that 79% of the participants who visualized an an-
gry face thought of a male person, whereas, for sadness this was only 42%. In line 
with previous stereotype-congruency results we found that participants more o"en 
thought of men when visualizing angry faces. For sadness visualization no gender 
bias was observed. Nevertheless, the general response patterns towards anger and 
sadness di#ered. !ese two studies demonstrate that people apply stereotype-con-
gruent associations when they are asked to complete a task that combines social 
category information with discrete emotional expression information.
DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS
!e aim of the present chapter is to provide more insight into the relation 
between social categorization and emotion perception. In Chapters 2-4, I will pres-
ent our research in more detail by describing a series of studies, using a variety of 
research techniques, that provide evidence for the role of associative processes in 
recognizing discrete emotional expressions. Across the $rst two empirical chap-
ters, I provide evidence for stereotype-based e#ects in emotion recognition, using 
di#erent emotions and social categories, and employing research paradigms with 
statically (Chapter 2, Study 3.2) and dynamically (Study 3.1) displayed expressions. 
In general, participants more quickly classi$ed stereotype-consistent than stereo-
type-inconsistent negative emotional expressions. Importantly, I also provide con-
sistent evidence that participants’ stereotype associations predicted the strength 
of their stereotype e#ects in recognizing expressions (Chapter 3). Until recently, 
research has only demonstrated clear evidence for evaluative biases in classifying 
expressions (e.g. Hugenberg, 2005; Kang & Chasteen, 2009), Chapters 2 and 3, ex-
tend this knowledge by showing that perceivers’ stereotype associations predicted 
recognition of stereotypic expressions.
Another important $nding of Chapters 2 and 3 is that biases in emotion 
recognition are context dependent. In an evaluative comparative context, gener-
al evaluative connotations with social categories in%uence a#ect-based emotion 
recognition (e.g. Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; see also 
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Chapters 2 & 3). However, outside an evaluative context, stereotype associations 
in!uence recognition of discrete emotional expressions (Chapters 2 & 3). A key 
di"erence between the results of these comparative context conditions is their level 
of emotion speci#city. In a single-valence context participants distinguish one neg-
ative expression from another, whereas in a dual-valence context participants only 
distinguish negativity from positivity, independent of the speci#c type of expres-
sion. Every negative expression is simply classi#ed as being ‘negative’, and although 
only happiness was employed as positive expression, theoretically I would predict 
the same for positive expressions. $e distinction between evaluative and stereo-
type processes in emotion recognition is an important contribution to emotion 
perception literature, because it gives a more detailed picture of emotion process-
ing. Consistent with Cottrell and Neuberg (2005), I argue that distinguishing one 
discrete negative expression from another is especially important since each ex-
pression elicits speci#c behavioral tendencies, which are not necessarily captured 
by general evaluation of categories. Anger and sadness, for example, both hold a 
negative valence, but only anger o%en leads to approach behavior of the expresser 
whereas for an expression of sadness this is less likely. Although various discrete 
expressions might hold a negative valence, each discrete expression is tied to spe-
ci#c behavior, something that is not captured by evaluation of social categories.
Future research addressing social categorization and emotion recognition 
could bene#t from this framework by designing studies or explaining results from 
an evaluative and/or stereotype congruent perspective. For example, Ratcli" and 
colleagues (Ratcli", Franklin Jr., Nelson, & Vescio, 2012) recently demonstrated 
the impact of social status (‘CEO’ and ‘doctor’ versus ‘fry cook’ and ‘mechanic’) on 
anger detection. In two studies, using an adapted version of the morph movies task 
(Niedenthal et al., 2000; Chapter 3), they demonstrated that participants perceived 
anger persisting longer on high-status than low-status faces when changing from 
anger to happiness (Study 1), whereas anger was recognized sooner on high-status 
than low-status faces when changing from fear to anger (Study 2). $e authors 
explain their results by stressing the importance of anger displays for high-status 
compared to low-status people. Alternatively, based on our results I would suggest 
that because their Study 1 and Study 2 employed di"erent comparative context 
situations, anger perception was in!uenced by distinctive underlying associative 
processes; Anger detection was perhaps facilitated in Study 1 because of evaluative 
associations and in Study 2 because of stereotypic associations. Future research 
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could bene!t from our framework and disentangle underlying associative process-
es in social category and emotion perception studies.
Interestingly, the results of Chapter 4 suggest that people by default apply 
evaluative category-expression associations when mentally representing emotion-
al expressions. In an experimental situation that does not refer to gender, partici-
pants used gender information in representing negative emotional expressions. As 
mentioned before, other lines of research have shown that people automatically 
evaluate what they observe (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Os-
good, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). It could be the case 
that people initially assess general valence of what they observe and subsequently, 
whenever the situation requires it, interpret discrete emotional states. "is suggests 
that initial responses towards emotional faces represent evaluative processing of 
stimuli, and that detailed emotional information processing takes more time. Con-
sistent with this idea, we found in Chapter 2 that participants in general were faster 
in completing the emotion recognition task under dual- than single-valence con-
text conditions, suggesting that the dual-valence was easier than the single-valence 
task, perhaps because the processing of discrete emotional states require more re-
sources (in this case: time). Although this result points into the expected direction, 
this research was not aimed at testing the proposed process and future research 
should investigate this issue more thoroughly.
Furthermore, I would like to note that the results of Study 4.3 not necessar-
ily suggest that each single-valence context activates stereotype associations. "e 
speci!c expressions used in this study can be seen as a stereotype single-valence 
context, rather than a mere single-valence context. In other words, the emotion-
al expressions employed in this experimental design may be of great importance. 
For example, asking participants to rate each noisy image on a scale ranging from 
disgust to anger, instead of sadness to anger, may not activate gender-speci!c ste-
reotypic associations, because disgust is neither associated with men or women. 
"e importance of a speci!c gender-related single-valence comparative context 
needs further investigation in order to draw !rm conclusions about this context 
manipulation.
"e results of Chapter 4 contribute in another way to the !eld of social cat-
egorization and emotion research. Although social categorization and emotion 
perception is a well-studied area (e.g. Becker et al., 2007; Fischer, 1993; Fischer 
et al., 2004; Hess et al., 2009; Hugenberg, 2005), thus far, no research tested the 
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spontaneity of group-expression associations. !erefore, the occurrence of prior 
category-expression e"ects may strongly depend on the speci#c context in which 
the relation was studied, and nothing was clear about what happens when no such 
context is present. !is is of importance because it is informative to know more 
about the external validity of documented e"ects. !e results of Chapter 4 sug-
gest that distinctive predictions should be made for spontaneous and context de-
pendent application of associations between gender and emotional expressions. 
Importantly, for stereotype-congruency e"ects at least some emotion or gender 
context was necessary. !is suggests that previously observed stereotype e"ects 
may also (partially) be induced by the context in which they were studied. !e 
studies reported in Chapter 4, therefore, contribute to what is known about the ex-
ternal validity of group-expression associations outside an experimentally induced 
category-expression context.
!e #ndings of Chapter 4 also add to the development of RC-paradigms in 
face perception research. With our studies we are the #rst to combine a context 
manipulation with RC techniques. In our results, we observed di"erences in men-
tal representations of sadness depending on the categorization context provided to 
participants. Although our sad faces in Study 4.3 both seem to communicate the 
same discrete negative expression, gender similarity of these mental representa-
tions di"ered. !is result suggests that the emotion labels used in prior RC research 
(e.g. Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Mangini & Biederman, 2004) to 
some extent contributed to documented e"ects. Furthermore, the manipulation 
of context we used in our studies opens the door for further exploration of ex-
perimental manipulations in RC research. Development of RC in face perception 
research initially started with correlating mental representations with participants 
ratings (e.g. Dotsch et al., 2008) and only recently begun using quasi-experimental 
(e.g. Imho", Dotsch, Bianchi, Banse, & Wigboldus, 2011; Jack et al., 2012) and 
experimental (Karremans, Dotsch, & Corneille, 2011; Chapter 4) manipulations.
!e results of our RC studies demonstrated that mental representations of 
emotional expressions and gender overlap, however limitations to the used tech-
nique should also be mentioned. It is important to note that in RC, the visualized 
mental representations re$ect a sum of the base face, error, and signal of the in-
vestigated concept. !is implies that the mental representations we visualized to a 
certain extent re$ect choices made by the experimenter (e.g. the speci#c base face 
and noise patterns). I argue, therefore, that the visualized representations should 
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be interpreted as approximations of mental representations instead of actual men-
tal representations (for a similar statement, see Dotsch & Todorov, 2011). !us, we 
should be careful drawing too strong conclusions about what these visualizations 
represent. Nevertheless, the results showed that we can visualize meaningful vari-
ance in emotion and gender concepts when keeping stimulus presentation con-
stant and only change the selection or categorization instructions they receive.
It is important to note that our emotion recognition results apply to White 
participants decoding anger, sadness, and happiness of gender and ethnic social 
categories in the Netherlands. Future research should investigate whether these ef-
fects generalize to social categories other than gender and ethnicity, and to a broad-
er scope of emotional expressions as well. Interestingly, our evaluative-congruency 
results converge with data from studies conducted in the US with White partic-
ipants recognizing expressions on Black and White faces (e.g. Hugenberg, 2005; 
Kang & Chasteen, 2009; Becker et al., 2007). Moreover, we are the "rst to provide 
evidence for stereotype-congruency e#ects in emotion recognition, a novel e#ect 
that would bene"t from replication outside our lab. !e discussed results apply 
only to recognition of emotional expressions based on facial displays. It seems re-
dundant to mention that facial expressions are not the only way in which people 
communicate their emotional states. Future research should test whether our ideas 
apply to other sources of emotional communication as well. Interesting candidates 
for such a line of research could be perception of emotional voices or bodily cues. 
Recently Aviezer, Trope, and Todorov (2012), demonstrated that people are some-
times better able at identifying valence of emotional displays by bodily than facial 
cues. Even closer related to the topic of this dissertation, Johnson and colleagues 
(Johnson, McKay, & Pollick, 2011; see also Hinzman & Kelly, 2013) studied cate-
gory allocation on the basis of emotional body motions. In a set of studies the au-
thors provided evidence that participants applied gender stereotypes of emotion to 
infer sex categorization. !ese studies, together with the "ndings discussed in this 
chapter provide opportunities for future investigations that could lead to a broader 
picture of communication emotional expressions in daily life.
More generally, the present dissertation contributes to a developing area of 
research, showing dissociative e#ects of evaluative and stereotype processes. To 
my knowledge, as yet, only a few studies demonstrated distinctive e#ects of eval-
uation and stereotypes. In an initial demonstration of this phenomenon, Amodio 
and Devine (2006) showed that stereotypes and general evaluation lead to distinct 
C
ha
pt
er
 1
                      The Role of Social Categorization in Emotion Perception 35
consequences. To minimize the in!uence of valence, stereotype associations and 
its consequences were investigated in a relatively low impact neutral context. "e 
single-valence context manipulation employed in our research led to a similar con-
text situation suitable for investigating stereotype associations. However, we argue 
that a single-valence situational context may lead to consequences that have more 
impact than a neutral-valence context situation. Judging someone on neutral ste-
reotypic traits is without any doubt informative for person perception processes. 
Classi#cation of negative emotional expressions, however, may a$ect our behavior 
in situations that may directly ask for appropriate behavior (e.g. signals danger or 
grief). Future emotion recognition research, but also outside an emotion context, 
could bene#t from applying single-valence context situations to other areas of in-
terest in which stereotype e$ects are studied. 
"e results of the present dissertation converge with evidence for a dissocia-
tion between evaluative and stereotype associations, as proposed by Amodio and 
Devine (2006). Stereotype associations a$ect emotion recognition di$erently from 
evaluative associations. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that also an expla-
nation based purely on semantic network theorizing remains possible. Someone, 
for example, may have learned both stereotype and evaluative category-expression 
associations semantically and as a results show the e$ects reported in this chapter. 
"e present research, however, was not aimed at distinguishing between these two 
types of explanations, and future research could maybe shed more light on such a 
distinction.
Finally, the current chapter was focused on the question of whether people 
use associations between social categories and emotional expressions when rec-
ognizing emotional faces. However the observed results may also shed more light 
on the way in which perceivers maintain their stereotypical associations. For ex-
ample, if those people holding strong stereotype associations between Moroccans 
and anger more easily observe an Moroccan as angry, they may be likely to see 
more angry Moroccans in their environment. Along similar lines, if people spon-
taneously use gender information in representing emotional expressions, their 
ideas of speci#c relations between social categories and discrete emotion may be 
automatically con#rmed. In this manner, stereotypes and general evaluations may 
be self-perpetuating by in!uencing emotion recognition in a stereotype or evalua-
tive con#rming way. "is is an intriguing thought that needs further investigation, 
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both to understand whether such a process is going on, and if so, whether it is 
susceptible to change.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taken together, the research presented in this dissertation has implications 
for emotion recognition and social categorization research. We provided evidence 
that evaluative and stereotype processes are dissociated and a!ect emotion rec-
ognition di!erently and independently. Furthermore, we have shown that people 
spontaneously apply evaluative association in their mental representations of dis-
crete negative emotional expressions. People used stereotype-congruent associa-
tions only when the relevant emotion context or a gender context was provided. 
It is clear from this dissertation that the proposed distinction between evaluative 
and stereotype associations used in explaining our results may also be helpful in 
interpreting other emotion recognition e!ects. Hopefully the knowledge gained in 
this chapter could inspire future research.
THE SOCIAL FACE OF EMOTION
RECOGNITION:
EVALUATIONS VERSUS
STEREOTYPES
Abstract
!e goal of Chapter 2 was to demonstrate the in"uence of general evaluations and 
stereotype associations on emotion recognition. Earlier research has shown that 
evaluative connotations between social category members and emotional expres-
sion predict whether recognition of positive or negative emotional expressions will 
be facilitated (e.g. Hugenberg 2005). In the current chapter we tested the hypothe-
sis that stereotype associations in"uence emotion recognition processes, especial-
ly when the di#erence between valences of emotional expressions does not come 
into play. In line with this notion, when participants in the present two studies 
were asked to classify positive versus negative emotional expressions (i.e. happy 
versus anger, or happy versus sadness), valence congruency e#ects were found. 
Importantly, however, in a comparative context without di#erences in valence in 
which participants were asked to classify two distinct negative emotions (i.e. anger 
versus sadness) we found that recognition facilitation occurred for stereotypically 
associated discrete emotional expressions. With this, the current results indicate 
that a distinction between general evaluative and cognitive routes can be made in 
emotion recognition processes.
!is chapter is based on: Bijlstra, G., Holland, R.W., & Wigboldus, D.H.J. (2010). !e social face of emotion 
recognition: Evaluations versus stereotypes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 657-663.
2
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Fast and correct recognition of emotional expressions is a prerequisite for !u-
ent social interaction. A face carries a wealth of informative cues and can say more 
than a thousand words. Apart from unchangeable features in the face that carry 
information regarding identity or social category (e.g. sex or ethnicity), changeable 
features reveal how someone is feeling at that speci"c moment (e.g. happy, angry 
or sad). Previous research has shown that unchangeable features can in!uence the 
interpretation of changeable facial features in emotional recognition. More spe-
ci"cally, this research focused on the interplay between social categorization and 
recognition of emotional expressions (e.g. Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & 
Smith, 2007; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Boden-
hausen, 2003; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008).
How do social categorization processes in!uence emotion recognition? One 
route that has been recently explored is that evaluative category associations fa-
cilitate or inhibit the recognition of evaluative congruent emotions. For example, 
Hugenberg (2005) demonstrated, in line with an evaluative processes account, that 
white American participants show a recognition speed advantage when judging 
whether a white target’s face displays a positive (happy) facial expression compared 
to negative (angry or sad) facial expressions. #is phenomenon is called the happy 
face advantage (Leppänen & Hietanen, 2003). #is e$ect was found by Hugenberg 
to be reversed when the expresser of the emotion was black, with white partici-
pants showing a recognition advantage for both negative emotions (angry and sad) 
compared to the positive emotion. In a similar vein, Hugenberg and Sczesny (2006) 
found evidence for di$erences in emotion recognition depending on gender: for 
female target faces a greater happy face advantage was found than for male target 
faces. #e authors conclude that these e$ects are best explained by the spreading of 
evaluative associations: the valence of the target face, as triggered by the category, 
serves as a prime for recognizing emotional expressions independently of the dis-
crete emotion being expressed. 
However, a vast amount of research revealed evidence that social catego-
ries not only trigger evaluative associations, but also stereotype associations (e.g. 
Devine, 1989). #e latter contain speci"c traits and cognitions that are linked to the 
social category. An increasing body of evidence emphasizes the importance of dif-
ferentiating between evaluative and stereotype associations. For example, Amodio 
and Devine (2006) recently demonstrated that evaluative and cognitive processes 
di$erentially in!uence behavioral responses. Moreover, they argue that di$erent 
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neurological mechanisms underlie these e!ects. However, in emotion recognition 
literature such a distinction between processes has yet to be made.
We argue that also stereotype associations in"uence the ease of emotion rec-
ognition. Speci#cally, discrete emotions such as anger and sadness di!er from each 
other despite both having a negative valence. Similarly to traits, some discrete emo-
tional expressions are more stereotypical for some social categories than for others, 
independent of their general valence. For instance, anger is more strongly associat-
ed with men than women, while sadness is more strongly associated with women 
than men (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000; Fischer, Rodriquez Mosquera, 
Vianen, & Manstead, 2004). Although both emotions have a negative valence, they 
are associated with di!erent social categories. In this sense, emotions do not di!er 
from other stimuli or characteristics that may have a better normative #t with one 
social category than the other (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). 
Importantly, these stereotype associations may facilitate or inhibit the recognition 
of emotional expressions (e.g. sadness is recognized faster on female faces than 
on male faces). In this way, stereotypical views may con#rm themselves in biased 
emotion recognition.
Interestingly, the #ndings of Hugenberg (2005; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006) 
did not reveal any evidence of stereotype e!ects on emotion recognition. No cate-
gorical di!erences in the processing of discrete negative emotions between social 
categories were found. $erefore, their #ndings suggest that social category infor-
mation in"uences emotion recognition by means of general evaluative connota-
tions with the category, rather than by speci#c associations between the category 
(e.g. black targets) and discrete emotional expressions (e.g. anger). In our view, 
however, these null #ndings for stereotype associations could be due to the re-
search method that was employed in these earlier studies. In prior work, partic-
ipants categorized both positive and negative emotional expressions on faces of 
two distinct social categories within one task (e.g. Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg 
& Sczesny, 2006). As a result, di!erences in valence were highly salient within the 
task and participant performance was in"uenced by general a!ective reactions to-
wards the social categories under investigation. Consequently, recognition e!ects 
concerning discrete emotional expressions may have been overshadowed by gen-
eral evaluative e!ects.
$e goal of the present two studies was to demonstrate the in"uence of not 
only valence but also of stereotype associations on emotion recognition. In order 
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to do this, comparative context was taken into account. On the one hand, the ex-
perimental design employed ‘dual-valence comparative context conditions’ which 
contained a positive versus a discrete negative emotional expression. On the other 
hand, we used a ‘single-valence comparative context condition’ in which two dis-
tinct negative emotional expressions were compared. In the dual-valence compar-
ative context, participants categorized happy versus angry, or happy versus sad ex-
pressions, whereas in the single-valence comparative context, anger versus sadness 
were categorized. In the remainder of this article we will refer to these comparative 
context conditions as single- or dual-valence conditions. 
When people are asked to classify two distinctive negative emotional expres-
sions, the in!uence of valence on emotion recognition advantages is thought to be 
decreased. If category information in!uences emotion recognition only by means 
of valence, both negative emotions should be recognized faster when expressed by 
a member of a relatively negatively associated social category compared to mem-
bers of a more positively evaluated social category. However, if speci"c stereotype 
associations (or cognitive instead of a#ective processes) in!uence emotion recog-
nition speed, especially the discrete negative emotional expression most strongly 
associated with the social category should be recognized faster compared to less 
strong or unassociated negative emotional expressions. We therefore expected as-
sociated category-valence to in!uence emotion recognition speed in the dual-va-
lence conditions, while stereotype associations were expected to facilitate emotion 
recognition processes in the single-valence condition. $e social categories em-
ployed were White and Moroccan men (Study 2.1) and men versus women (Study 
2.2).
STUDY 2.1: WHITE VERSUS MOROCCAN
$e Moroccan community is currently one of the most negatively stereotyped 
groups in the Netherlands (Verkuyten & Zarembe, 2005) and is associated with 
criminality (Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, and van Knippenberg, 2008), a trait 
more strongly related to anger than to sadness. Furthermore, Otten and Stapel 
(20072) demonstrated that Dutch students perceive the Moroccan social category 
2 !is paper has been examined by the Levelt Committee and was not indicated as being based on 
fraudulent research practices.
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as more aggressive and hostile than the White Dutch social category. We expected 
that in dual-valence conditions, in general, negative emotions (both anger and sad-
ness) would be recognized faster from Moroccan compared to White faces, where-
as happy emotional expressions would be recognized faster from White compared 
to Moroccan faces. !is would be in line with earlier valence congruency "ndings 
(e.g. Hugenberg, 2005). In contrast, in the single-valence condition, we expected 
that angry emotional expressions would be recognized faster than sad emotional 
expressions when displayed by Moroccan targets. For the White target group in 
this condition, no response latency di#erences were expected. Furthermore, we 
expected that a comparison of discrete negative emotional expressions between the 
single- and the dual-valence condition3 would show similar response patterns with 
angry faces, but a change in response patterns toward sad faces between valence 
conditions. !at is, for both the single- and dual-valence conditions we expected 
that Moroccan angry faces would be recognized faster than the other emotional 
expression under investigation. In contrast, although the same sad faces were cat-
egorized in the single- and dual-valence condition, in the dual-valence condition 
we expected a recognition advantage for Moroccan faces because sadness has a 
negative valence. In the single-valence condition, an absence of such recognition 
advantage was expected, because sadness is not stereotypically associated with Mo-
roccan people.
METHOD
Participants & Design
A total of 64 White participants (56 women, Mage = 20.75) at the Radboud 
University Nijmegen were randomly assigned to one of three comparative context 
conditions4 (dual-valence: ‘happy versus angry’ and ‘happy versus sad’; single-va-
3 An analysis on happiness between the comparative context conditions is not possible because responses 
to this concrete emotional expression were only assessed in the dual-, but not in the single-valence 
condition.
4 Besides the between subjects conditions reported in Study 2.1, three other comparative context 
conditions were ran. In these conditions participants were tasked to classify disgust versus one of the 
other three emotional expressions (happiness, anger, or sadness) displayed by Moroccan and White 
models. !e response latencies in the dual-valence condition containing disgust replicate what has been 
found in the dual-valence conditions reported in this study. In the single-valence conditions containing 
disgust, no 2-way interaction between ethnicity and expression was observed. !e initial purpose of 
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lence: angry versus sad). In each condition, participants saw two emotional expres-
sions displayed by both White and Moroccan targets.
Materials & Procedure
Eight models, four White and four Moroccan, were selected from the Rad-
boud Faces Database on the basis of how well their emotional expressions were 
recognized in a validation study (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010). Pre-testing of mod-
els’ target ethnicity was done on images with a neutral expression. Fi!een white 
European volunteers rated the pictures on a 7-point Likert scale anchored from 
(1) de!nitely Moroccan to (7) de!nitely White. A paired sample t-test demonstrated 
that the White models (M = 5.28, SD = 0.64) were seen as more White and less 
Moroccan than the Moroccan models (M = 1.33, SD = 0.42), t(14) = 16.17, p < .01.
Subsequently, pictures of the three emotional expressions central to this ex-
periment were selected per model, namely happy, sad, and angry. "is resulted in a 
total of 24 pictures: 3 expressions x 2 ethnicities x 4 targets (models) per ethnicity.
Participants were seated in individual cubicles. Before the experiment, partic-
ipants were informed that their task was to categorize emotional expressions. "e 
procedure for this computerized experiment (Inquisit, Millisecond So!ware LLC, 
Seattle) was similar to Hugenberg (2005; see also Leppänen & Hietanen, 2003) and 
consisted of four blocks. Before each of the two experimental blocks, we added a 
20-trial practice block to familiarize participants with the task. Each trial consisted 
of a #xation cross presented for 1,000 milliseconds followed by one of the emotion-
al expressions for 200 milliseconds. In all blocks, participants were asked to clas-
sify pictures of White and Moroccan emotional faces, one image per trial, on the 
basis of two emotional expressions by pressing one of two buttons (‘I’ or ‘P’) with 
their preferred hand. "e order of response mapping was counterbalanced within 
participants. Each experimental block consisted of sixteen pictures randomly dis-
played #ve times, resulting in 80 trials per experimental block. 
"e type of categorization participants made depended upon their assigned 
comparative context condition. In the happy versus angry dual-valence condition 
participants saw and classi#ed happiness and anger expressions; in the happy ver-
this study was explorative and therefore we do not report these conditions in detail. Further details of 
the results in these conditions can be obtained from the !rst author of this chapter. Importantly, the 
!ndings of the present study concerning the angry versus sad single-valence context served as starting 
point for designing Study 2.2 and eventually all other experiments reported in this dissertation.
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sus sad dual-valence condition participants saw and classi!ed happiness and sad 
expressions; !nally, in the angry versus sad single-valence condition participants 
saw and classi!ed angry and sad expressions.
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Upon !nishing the experiment, participants were thanked and dismissed.
RESULTS
"e primary dependent variable in this study is the mean response time need-
ed to categorize emotional expressions. Before analyzing the data, incorrect trials 
(8.20%) and response latencies below 200 ms or above 3000 ms (<1%) were exclud-
ed. Due to the skewed distribution of the response latencies, all analyses were per-
formed on log-transformed response latencies. To facilitate the interpretation of 
our !ndings, we report mean response latencies in untransformed milliseconds. In 
order to test whether the previously !ndings of spreading of evaluative association 
e#ects (Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006) were replicated, we !rst 
analyzed both dual-valence conditions, followed by the single-valence condition 
and ending with a comparison of responses towards discrete negative expressions 
per comparative context.
Dual-valence conditions. "e mean log-transformed response latencies were 
subjected to a 2 (target ethnicity: White vs. Moroccan) x 2 (expression valence: 
positive vs. negative) x 2 (comparative context: ‘happy versus angry’ vs. ‘happy 
versus sad’) mixed design with repeated measures on the !rst two variables and 
comparative context as between participants variable. "is analysis yielded a sig-
ni!cant main e#ect of expression valence, F(1, 40) = 8.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .18. Positive 
emotional expressions (M = 474, SD = 80) were recognized faster than negative 
emotional expressions (M = 479, SD = 79). No further main e#ects were found. 
More importantly, in line with Hugenberg (2005) a signi!cant two-way in-
teraction between target ethnicity and expression valence quali!ed the expression 
valence main e#ect, F(1, 40) = 4.58, p = .04, ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 3). Responses to 
positive emotional expressions were faster than responses to negative emotional 
expressions when displayed by White targets, F(1, 40) = 10.51, p < .01, ηp2 = .21. No 
di#erence was found between the response latencies to positive and negative emo-
tional expressions displayed by Moroccan targets (F < 1). Moreover, neither the 
di#erence in classifying the positive emotional expression, F(1, 40) = 3.31, p = .08, 
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or negative emotional expressions, F(1, 40) = 2.06, p = .16, between target groups 
reached signi!cance. As expected, this two-way interaction was not quali!ed by 
the three-way interaction with comparative context as between subject variable 
(F < 1). "e data revealed no di#erence in recognition speed for angry versus sad 
expressions for Moroccan faces within dual-valence conditions, supporting earlier 
!ndings by Hugenberg (2005).
Figure 3. Mean response latencies and SD’s in milliseconds in the two dual-valence conditions together.
Single-valence condition. Mean log-transformed response latencies were sub-
jected to a 2 (target ethnicity: White vs. Moroccan) x 2 (target expression: angry 
vs. sad) within- subject analyses of variance. "is analysis yielded a main e#ect of 
target expression, F(1, 21) = 7.10, p = .01, ηp2 = .25. Angry faces (M = 643, SD = 99) 
were recognized faster than sad faces (M = 672, SD = 116). Furthermore, a two-way 
interaction between target ethnicity and target expression was found, F(1, 21) = 
12.73, p < .01, ηp2 = .38 (see Figure 4). Participants were more quickly at recogniz-
ing angry compared to sad Moroccan targets, F(1, 21) = 21.13, p < .01, ηp2 = .50. For 
White targets, no di#erence between response latencies towards target expressions 
was found (F < 1). Furthermore, Moroccan angry faces were recognized faster than 
angry White faces, F(1, 21) = 7.29, p = .01, ηp2 = .26, and sad faces were recognized 
faster when displayed by White than by Moroccan targets, F(1, 21) = 4.47, p < .05, 
ηp2 = .18.
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Figure 4. Mean response latencies and SD’s in milliseconds in the single-valence condition.
Discrete negative emotional expressions per comparative context. Another way 
to test the role of valence and stereotype associations on emotion recognition is to 
analyze response latencies for categorizing discrete negative emotional expressions 
between comparative context conditions. First, we subjected the response times for 
angry faces to a 2 (target ethnicity: White vs. Moroccan) x 2 (comparative context: 
single-valence vs. dual-valence) mixed design with target ethnicity as within par-
ticipants variable and comparative context as between participants variable. Firstly, 
response latencies for Moroccan trials were faster than for White trials, F(1, 42) = 
7.06, p = .01, ηp2 = .14. Also, a strong main e"ect of comparative context revealed 
faster response latencies in the dual-valence condition than in the single-valence 
condition, F(1, 42) = 47.14, p < .01, ηp2 = .53. No other signi#cant e"ects were 
found.
Second, response latencies towards sad emotional expressions were subjected 
to a 2 (target ethnicity: White vs. Moroccan) x 2 (comparative context: single-va-
lence vs. dual-valence) mixed design with target ethnicity as within participants 
variable and comparative context as between participants variable. $e analysis 
yielded a main e"ect of comparative context, response latencies were faster in the 
dual-valence condition than in the single-valence condition, F(1, 40) = 50.76, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .56. As expected, a signi#cant two-way interaction was obtained, F(1, 
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40) = 6.25, p = .02, ηp2 = .14. Response patterns to sad faces changed as a function 
of the target ethnicity and comparative context. In the dual-valence condition no 
di"erence between response latencies to Moroccan (M = 481, SD = 72) and White 
sad faces (M = 490, SD = 71) was found, F(1, 40) = 1.03, p = .32. More importantly, 
mean response latencies in the single-valence condition pointed out that sadness 
was faster for White faces (M = 661, SD = 116) than for Moroccan faces (M = 682, 
SD = 117), F(1, 40) = 6.54, p = .01, ηp2 = .14. Although sadness seems not strongly 
associated with White faces, these results suggest that sadness on a Moroccan faces 
is even more inconsistent with the social category.
DISCUSSION
In line with our hypotheses, a two-way interaction between target ethnicity 
and expressions valence but no three-way interaction was found in the dual-va-
lence conditions. #is suggests that the evaluative connotation with the social cat-
egory in$uences emotion recognition in situations where people have to classify 
positive and negative emotional expressions within one task. Furthermore, we 
found evidence for stereotype-congruency when judgments could not be made on 
a more general a"ective basis. In the single-valence condition, only the stereotyp-
ically associated discrete negative emotional expression – anger and not sadness – 
was classi%ed faster for Moroccan faces, suggesting that cognitive processes a"ect 
participants’ categorization of emotional expressions. Additionally, a comparison 
of discrete negative emotional expressions between comparative context condi-
tions con%rmed our predictions. No di"erence between response patterns towards 
angry faces was found between the dual- and single-valence conditions. However, 
for sad target faces the observed response pattern did di"er between the dual- and 
single-valence conditions. Although participants in both valence conditions saw 
exactly the same faces expressing sadness, response patterns changed as a func-
tion of comparative context. Furthermore, the main e"ect of comparative context 
suggests that judgments based on a"ect cost less time than judgments based on 
cognition.
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In our second study we aimed to replicate the !ndings of Study 2.1 using 
gender as social category, which allowed us to test a full design in which male 
and female participants judged male and female target faces. Research has shown 
that both men and women are evaluated positively, however, women are evaluat-
ed more positively than men (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). In the dual-valence 
conditions this should lead to a pattern of results similar to the e"ects found in 
Study 2.1. #at is, in line with earlier research directly comparing the recognition 
of positive and negative emotions, positive emotional expressions should be cate-
gorized faster than negative emotional expressions, especially for female faces. At 
the same time, however, it has been shown that people believe that men experience 
and express anger more o$en than women, whereas women experience and ex-
press sadness more o$en than men (Plant et al., 2000). #erefore, in the single-va-
lence condition, sadness should be recognized faster than anger for female faces 
and anger should be recognized faster than sadness for male faces. For the com-
parison of discrete negative emotional expressions between comparative context 
conditions we expected no di"erences for responses to angry faces between the 
dual- and single-valence conditions. A$er all, in both cases anger is more related 
to males, either because of the relatively negative valence or because of stereotype 
associations. Sadness, however, will be more quickly recognized on males in the 
dual-valence condition, whereas it will be quicker recognized on females in the 
single-valence condition.
 
METHOD
Participants & Design 
A total of 117 participants (81 women, Mage = 22.48) at the Radboud Univer-
sity Nijmegen were randomly assigned to one of three comparative context con-
ditions (dual-valence: ‘happy versus angry’ and ‘happy versus sad’; single-valence: 
angry versus sad) in which they saw male and female targets displaying two emo-
tional expressions.
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Materials & Procedure
Twelve models, six White men and six White women, were selected from the 
RaFD, again, on the basis of recognition data from a validation study (Langner et 
al., 2010). Subsequently, we selected images from these models on which anger, 
happiness or sadness was displayed. In total this resulted in 36 pictures: 3 expres-
sions x 2 target gender x 6 targets per group. Each participant categorized two emo-
tional expressions that corresponded with the speci!c comparative context in two 
experimental blocks, each comprised of 80 trials. For each trial, one of 24 pictures 
(2 expressions x 2 target gender x 6 targets per group) was randomly selected and 
displayed for 200 milliseconds. "e experimental procedure used in Study 2.2 was 
otherwise identical to the procedure used in Study 2.1. 
RESULTS
As with Study 2.1, the primary dependent variable was the mean response 
time needed to categorize the displayed emotional expressions. Incorrect responses 
(10.50%) and response latencies falling outside the range of 200 to 3000 ms (< 1%) 
were excluded from subsequent analyses. An analysis with participants’ gender in 
both, the single- and dual-valence, comparative context condition as between sub-
ject factor revealed no main or interaction e#ects and therefore is not included in 
the analyses. Similar to Study 2.1, latencies are reported in milliseconds, whereas 
analyses were done on log-transformed mean response latencies.
Dual-valence conditions. Mean log-transformed response latencies were sub-
jected to a 2 (target gender: male vs. female) x 2 (expression valence: positive vs. 
negative) x 2 (comparative context: ‘happy versus angry’ vs. ‘happy versus sad’) 
mixed design with repeated measures on the !rst two variables and comparative 
context as between participant variable. "is analysis revealed a main e#ect for ex-
pression valence, F(1, 76) = 29.05, p < .01, ηp2 = .27. Positive emotional expressions 
(M = 476, SD = 94) were more quickly recognized than negative emotional expres-
sions (M = 493, SD = 94). Furthermore, a main e#ect of target gender was found, 
F(1, 76) = 7.61, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. Latencies for responding to male targets (M = 481, 
SD = 94) were faster than for female targets (M = 488, SD = 95). 
Similar to Hugenberg and Sczesny (2006), we obtained the expected interac-
tion between target gender and expression valence, F(1, 76) = 20.38, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.21 (see Figure 5). Positive emotional expressions were recognized faster than neg-
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ative emotional expressions for female targets, F(1, 76) = 46.75, p < .01, ηp2 = .38, 
but not for male targets, F(1,76) = 2.07, p = .16. Examining the negative emotional 
expression, a di"erence for target gender was found, F(1, 76) = 24.37, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.24, with faster responses for male targets than for female targets. For the positive 
emotional expression no such di"erence was found, F(1, 76) = 2.41, p = .12. Impor-
tantly, this two-way interaction was not quali#ed by the three-way interaction with 
comparative context as between participants variable, F(1, 76) = 3.28, p = .07, 
which indicates that in line with earlier #ndings by Hugenberg and Sczesny (2006), 
response patterns in both dual-valence conditions did not di"er reliably from each 
other.5
Figure 5. Mean response latencies and SD’s in milliseconds in the two dual-valence conditions.
Single-valence condition. Mean log-transformed response latencies were sub-
jected to a 2 (target gender: male vs. female) x 2 (target expression: angry vs. sad) 
within participant analyses of variance, which yielded a two-way interaction be-
tween target gender and target expression, F(1, 38) = 42.53, p < .01, ηp2 = .53 (see 
Figure 6). Participants were faster in recognizing anger than sadness on male tar-
5 !e marginal signi"cant three-way interaction pattern suggests that there is a trend towards a larger 
response latency di#erence between happiness and anger compared to happiness and sadness for the 
female social category.
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gets, F(1, 38) = 16.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .31. For female targets the opposite was true, 
with participants recognizing sadness more rapidly than anger, F(1, 38) = 11.89, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .24. "ese #ndings are in line with the notion that stereotypically asso-
ciated emotional expressions are more easily recognized within the domain of neg-
ative emotional expressions only. Additionally, both target expressions di$ered 
signi#cantly between target gender groups. Angry male targets were recognized 
more quickly than angry female targets, F(1, 38) = 40.82, p < .01, ηp2 = .52, and sad 
female targets were recognized more rapidly than sad male targets, F(1, 38) = 
13.42, p < .01, ηp2 = .26.
Figure 6. Mean response latencies and SD’s in milliseconds in the single-valence condition.
Discrete negative emotional expressions per comparative context. Next, we test-
ed whether responses di$ered for negative emotional expressions on female ver-
sus male faces as a function of comparative context. First, we subjected the mean 
response latencies on angry target trials to a 2 (target gender: male vs. female) x 
2 (comparative context: single-valence vs. dual-valence) mixed analysis of vari-
ance with target gender as within participant variable and comparative context 
as between participant variable. "is analyses revealed two main e$ects: response 
latencies for angry male targets were faster than for angry female targets, F(1, 75) 
= 51.09, p = .01, ηp2 = .41, and responses were faster in the dual-valence compared 
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to the single-valence condition, F(1, 75) = 67.01, p < .01, ηp2 = .47, signaling a dif-
ference in response to general valence versus concrete expressions. As expected, no 
signi"cant two-way interaction was found.
Second, in contrast to the angry target trials, an interaction was predicted 
for sad target trials. To test this prediction a 2 (target gender: male vs. female) x 2 
(comparative context: single-valence vs. dual-valence) mixed analysis of variance 
was performed with target gender as within participant variable and comparative 
context as between participants variable on mean response latencies toward sad 
targets. #is analysis yielded a main e$ect of comparative context. Response la-
tencies were, again, faster in the dual-valence condition than in the single-valence 
condition, F(1, 77) = 50.76, p < .01, ηp2 = .40. Furthermore, the expected two-way 
interaction between target gender and comparative context was found, F(1, 77) 
= 23.53, p < .01, ηp2 = .23. Response latencies to sad faces changed depending on 
target gender and comparative context; in a dual-valence condition participants 
were faster in categorizing sadness for male targets (M = 492, SD = 103) than for 
female targets (M = 507, SD = 96), F(1, 77) = 7.04, p = .01, ηp2 = .08. In contrast, in 
the single-valence condition sadness was recognized more quickly for female faces 
(M = 639, SD = 113) than for male faces (M = 669, SD = 114), F(1, 77) = 17.62, p 
< .01, ηp2 = .19.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
#e results from these two studies strongly suggest that comparative context 
moderates the in%uence of social categorization on emotion recognition. #e goal 
of the present research was to show that depending on the comparative context, 
emotion recognition could be in%uenced by both spreading activation of evalua-
tive associations and by stereotypically based associations. Speci"cally, we expect-
ed and found that when positive and negative emotional expressions (dual-valence 
conditions) were contrasted in a within participants design, emotion recognition 
is biased by general a$ective connotations. Our "ndings support the spreading ac-
tivation of evaluative association as put forward by Hugenberg (2005) and Hugen-
berg and Sczesny (2006) across two studies. #ese e$ects seem to suggest that ste-
reotypes do not in%uence emotion recognition in a dual-valence condition. 
At the same time, we predicted and found evidence for the in%uence of ste-
reotype associations on emotion recognition when the comparative context had 
52 The Social Face of Emotion Recognition: Evaluations Versus Stereotypes
C
hapter 2
minimal in!uence from the general valence of discrete emotional expressions. 
Both Studies 2.1 and 2.2 provide evidence that categorization of two emotional 
expressions of similar valence (single-valence conditions) is in!uenced by associa-
tions between a social category and discrete emotional expressions. In Study 2.1 we 
found recognition facilitation for the Moroccan stereotype consistent emotional 
expression, anger. Similarly, in Study 2.2, recognition facilitation was found for 
angry male faces and for sad female faces when negative emotions were compared 
directly. Analyses on discrete negative emotional expressions between compar-
ative context conditions e"ectively illustrated the core #ndings of our research. 
Although the same sad faces were shown in both comparative context conditions, 
in the dual-valence condition we found that sadness was more quickly recognized 
for the relatively negatively evaluated male social category, whereas, in the sin-
gle-valence condition, in line with stereotype associations sadness was recognized 
faster on female faces. With these #ndings we are the #rst to show that stereotype 
associations, as triggered by racial or gender unambiguous faces, may in!uence 
categorization of emotional expressions. $is suggests a dissociation between 
general a"ective and cognitive e"ects in emotion recognition processes, which is 
supported by the notion that stereotype-related processes di"er conceptually from 
valence-based processes (Amodio & Devine, 2006).
Apart from di"erences in response patterns per comparative context, we found 
that response latencies in the single-valence condition were, in general, slower than 
those in the dual-valence conditions. Interestingly, the signi#cant di"erences in 
response latency between the single-valence and dual-valence conditions may 
reveal more about the process underlying the current #ndings. Earlier research 
demonstrated that emotional expressions could both elicit a"ective states (e.g. 
Winkielman, Berridge, & Willbarger, 2005) and communicate discrete emotional 
messages (Ekman, 1992). Murphy and Zajonc (1993), demonstrated that general 
a"ective reaction are likely to precede cognitive processes. From this point of view, 
the relatively short response latencies within the dual-valence conditions are re-
lated to judgments of general positive and negative a"ect. $e observed increase 
in response latency in the single-valence condition might re!ect the additional 
time participants need to classify discrete emotional expressions. Consequently, 
the likelihood of higher order cognitive processes tapping into the categorization 
process increases over time. Subsequently, the extent to which stereotype-consis-
tent characteristics (in this case, emotional expressions) and social categories are 
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re!ected in the perception of faces also increases with time. Importantly, however, 
future research should concentrate on "nding more direct evidence for the role of 
processing depth on the relative impact of evaluative versus stereotypical category 
associations, for example by manipulating time constraints or task di#culty.
In everyday life we o$en do not have to judge whether a face is positive or 
negative but instead have to di%erentiate between discrete emotions with the same 
valence. &e current "ndings suggest that stereotype associations might lead to 
relative quick perception of stereotype consistent emotional expressions. For ex-
ample, because women are more strongly associated with expressions of sadness 
than anger, we tend to see more sad than angry women around us. In this manner, 
stereotype associations may be self-perpetuating by in!uencing perception in a 
stereotype con"rming way.

STEREOTYPE ASSOCIATIONS 
AND EMOTION RECOGNITION3
Abstract
We investigated whether stereotype associations between speci!c emotional ex-
pressions and social categories underlie stereotypic emotion recognition biases. 
Across two studies, we replicated previously documented stereotype biases in emo-
tion recognition (Bijlstra et al., 2010) using both dynamic (Study 3.1) and stat-
ic (Study 3.2) expression displays. In general, White participants decoded anger 
more quickly on Moroccan than White faces, whereas participants more quickly 
decoded sadness on White than Moroccan faces. Importantly, we found consistent 
and novel evidence that participants’ associations between ethnicity and emotions, 
as measured with a newly developed emotion IAT (eIAT), predicted the strength 
of their ethnicity-based stereotype biases in expression recognition. In both stud-
ies, as perceivers’ level of Moroccan-anger and Dutch-sadness associations (com-
pared to the opposite) increased, so did perceivers’ tendency to decode anger more 
readily on Moroccan faces and sadness on White faces. Within a negative valence 
context, distinct e"ects were found for recognizing discrete negative emotions 
depending on the expressers’ category. #e observed stereotype e"ect seemed to 
be independent of implicit evaluations and facial features of the social categories 
(Study 3.2), suggesting dissociable e"ects of a"ective and cognitive associations in 
expression perception.
!is chapter is based on: Bijlstra, G., Holland, R.W., Dotsch, R., Hugenberg, K., & Wigboldus, D.H.J. (under 
review). Stereotype associations and emotion recognition.
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To enable smooth social communication, it is crucial to quickly and accu-
rately decode emotional expressions of others. Such communication is inherently 
dyadic – that is, it involves two people: an expresser and a perceiver. On the one 
hand, expression perception can be in!uenced by expressers’ facial characteristics, 
such as the type and intensity of expression, or the facial structure of the expresser 
(e.g. Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007; Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 
1997; Leppänen, Kauppinen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 2007; Marsh, Adams, & Kleck, 
2005; Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009). On the other hand, perceivers’ characteristics, 
such as perceivers’ expectancies, stereotypes, or prejudices can also in!uence cat-
egorization of emotional expressions (e.g. Bijlstra, Holland, & Wigboldus, 2010; 
Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Hugenberg, 2005; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008; 
Kang & Chasteen, 2009). 
Here, we expand on existing evidence concerning how perceivers’ stereotypic 
associations in!uence expression recognition. We aim to provide direct evidence 
for the in!uence of perceivers’ stereotypic associations in decoding statically and 
dynamically displayed emotional expressions of Moroccan and White males. To 
that end, we "rst brie!y discuss the existing evidence of the e#ects of perceivers’ 
stereotypes on expression recognition, and then present two studies where we "nd 
that stereotype associations between speci"c emotional expressions and social 
groups underlie stereotypic emotion recognition e#ects.
PERCEIVERS’ ASSOCIATIONS AND EMOTION RECOGNITION
Prior research on social categorization and emotion recognition has found 
evidence for an apparent stereotypic bias in the perception and categorization of 
facial expressions (e.g. Bijlstra et al., 2010; Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Boden-
hausen, 2003; Kang & Chasteen, 2009). In an initial demonstration of this phe-
nomenon, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen demonstrated that the ethnicity of a face 
interacts with perceivers’ level of prejudice to in!uence the perception of facial 
anger. In this research, participants watched Black and White faces morph from 
angry to happy expressions (Study 1) or neutral to angry expressions (Study 2). In 
both studies, as perceivers’ level of anti-Black prejudice increased, so did perceiv-
ers’ tendency to see anger more readily in Black but not White faces. High-preju-
dice perceivers saw anger lingering for longer and appearing earlier on Black faces. 
However, perceivers’ level of anti-Black prejudice had no in!uence on the percep-
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tion of anger in matched White faces. Subsequent work extended this Black-anger 
link to response latencies as well – White perceivers recognize anger more quickly 
on Black than White faces (Hugenberg, 2005). Despite the potential interest value 
of these !ndings, these initial studies do not clarify whether these results occur 
because of stereotypes (e.g., stereotypic associations between Black and anger) or 
evaluations (e.g., negative evaluations of Blacks or outgroups more generally; Dun-
ham, 2011). 
"is is an important question because research has demonstrated that ste-
reotypic and evaluative associations (or prejudice) are o#en related but empiri-
cally distinct constructs (e.g. Amodio & Devine, 2006; Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van 
Knippenberg, 2011). For example, take the demonstration of a Black-anger link in 
expression recognition. Anger signals both evaluative and more discrete emotional 
information; anger can simply be interpreted as a negative emotion, but does also 
inform people about the expresser’ speci!c internal state. "is logic applies to all 
negative expressions, however, anger seems to be stereotypically associated with 
African Americans (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004). Consequently, it is 
ambiguous whether the Black-anger link is caused by speci!c emotion-group ste-
reotypes or by broader negative evaluations of Blacks (or outgroups more general-
ly). Di$erentiating between these two underlying associative processes is especially 
important since discrete emotional expressions elicit speci!c behavioral tenden-
cies (e.g. Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). For example, although anger and sadness both 
hold a negative valence, an expression of anger o#en goes along with approach 
behavior of the expresser whereas for an expression of sadness this is less likely.
Amodio and Devine (2006) have recently emphasized the importance of dis-
tinguishing evaluative from cognitive processes. In three studies they provided ev-
idence for a dissociation between evaluative and stereotypic associations and their 
independent consequences. Stereotypic associations predicted participants’ stereo-
type expectancy judgments. Participants who held strong implicit stereotypes of 
African Americans, for example, ascribed traits that were associated with Black 
stereotypes more strongly in these judgments. In contrast, implicit evaluative asso-
ciation scores were related to interpersonal behavior, for example seating distance. 
Seating distance between participants and a chair with belongings ostensibly to an 
African American co-participant increased when implicit negative associations got 
higher.
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Interestingly, stereotype and evaluative processes may also a!ect emotion 
recognition independently. Bijlstra and colleagues (2010) recently provided evi-
dence for this idea. "at is, biases in expression recognition were demonstrated 
to be dependent on the speci#c comparative context in which emotional expres-
sions were presented. When valence was made salient by the experimental context, 
evaluative-congruent expressions recognition e!ects were observed. In contrast, 
when valence was not made salient by the experimental context, evidence for ste-
reotype-congruency e!ects was found.
Perceivers in the Bijlstra et al. studies (2010) completed an expression recogni-
tion task in which members of two di!erent social categories (Moroccan and White 
men, Study 2.1; men and women, Study 2.2) displayed emotional expressions. "e 
speci#c expressions displayed di!ered between conditions. In a so-called dual-va-
lence comparative context, perceivers categorized a positive expression (happiness) 
and a negative expression (anger or sadness), whereas in a single-valence compar-
ative context only negatively valenced expressions were categorized (anger and 
sadness). In line with Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003; see also Hugenberg, 
2005; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006), results consistent with an evaluative-congru-
ency perspective were found in a dual-valence comparative context. An interaction 
pattern between valence of expressions and social category indicated that positive 
expressions were more quickly categorized on the relatively positively evaluated 
social category, whereas negative expressions were more quickly categorized on 
the relatively negatively evaluated social category. Additionally, novel evidence was 
provided for stereotype-congruency e!ects when participants completed the sin-
gle-valence expression recognition task. For example, in line with common cultur-
al stereotypes about men and women (e.g. Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000), 
the negative emotional expression anger was recognized faster on male than female 
faces, whereas sadness was more quickly recognized on female than male faces.
In sum, Bijlstra et al. (2010) provided evidence that biases in emotion recogni-
tion are context dependent. "is strongly suggests that ‘evaluative-congruency’ is a 
better explanation than stereotyping for Hugenberg and Bodenhausen’s (2003) and 
related #ndings. "e evaluative component of social categorization, or more specif-
ically anti-Black associations, signi#cantly predicted the perception of facial anger 
on Black and not White faces. "ereby showing direct evidence of evaluative as-
sociations on decoding anger when valence is made salient. "is is consistent with 
research showing that an evaluative context facilitates the processing of evaluative 
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judgments (e.g., Spruyt, De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 2007). Although Bijlstra 
et al. showed that stereotype and evaluative-congruent e!ects should be treated as 
distinct e!ects, as yet, no direct evidence for stereotype associations underlying 
stereotype-congruency e!ects in emotion perception has been documented.
PRESENT RESEARCH
"e current research sought to address two open questions in the research 
on the context dependency of stereotype associations in expression recognition. 
Although Bijlstra and colleagues (2010) provided preliminary evidence for the 
context dependency of stereotypic versus evaluative biases in expression decoding, 
this case is far from complete. In two studies we investigated whether the previous-
ly observed context dependency of stereotypic biases in emotion recognition (1) 
generalizes to dynamic facial expressions and (2) is directly related to perceivers’ 
strength of stereotype associations. 
Past research on the context dependency of stereotypic biases in expression 
recognition has been conducted exclusively with static faces. "ere is increasing 
evidence that the time course of facial expressions plays a potent role in decoding 
of and responding to expressions (e.g., Recio, Sommer, & Schacht, 2011; Sato, Fu-
jimura, & Suzuki, 2008; Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004), 
that dynamic expressions rely in part on di!erent neural mechanisms (e.g., Recio 
et al., 2011) and elicit more intense activation of emotion-speci#c neural networks 
(Trautmann, Fehr, & Herrmann, 2009), and that dynamic expressions are simply 
more ecologically valid (see Ishii, Miyamoto, Niedenthal, & Mayama, 2011; Nied-
enthal, Halberstadt, Margolin, & Innes-Ker, 2000). To this end, Study 3.1 employed 
a modi#ed morph movies task (see Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Niedenthal 
et al., 2000) where perceivers viewed and responded to dynamic expressions (i.e., 
expressions changing over time from one expression to another) rather than static 
images of expressions. Using this new technique, within a single-valence compara-
tive context adapted from Bijlstra and colleagues (2010), Study 3.1 aims to provide 
novel evidence for stereotype application in recognizing emotions from dynamic 
facial displays.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the current research also seeks to pro-
vide direct evidence for e!ects of stereotypes on expression recognition biases. Past 
research has only indirectly demonstrated this, by inferring the di!erential in$u-
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ence of group-based stereotypes and evaluations from participants’ di!erential re-
sponses to faces based on context (Bijlstra et al., 2010). By using an individual dif-
ference measure of perceiver prejudice, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) have 
provided direct evidence for prejudice e!ects on expression recognition (Hugen-
berg & Bodenhausen, 2003). However to date, no one has yet demonstrated direct 
relationships between individual di!erences in stereotypes of target groups and 
purported stereotype-based biases in expression recognition. If emotion recogni-
tion in a single-valence comparative context is in"uenced by stereotypes (Bijlstra 
et al., 2010), the e!ect should depend on the strength of perceivers’ stereotypic 
associations. Stronger stereotypic associations among perceivers should lead to 
stronger stereotypic e!ects in expression categorization biases.
In both of the current studies, we address this troubling gap in the literature, 
providing novel evidence that individual di!erences in stereotypic associations 
predict the strength of the stereotypic bias in emotion recognition. Further, Study 
3.2 is aimed at showing that individual di!erences in stereotypic associations a!ect 
expression recognition in di!erent ways from individual di!erences in evaluative 
associations. 
STUDY 3.1
In Study 3.1 we sought to provide direct evidence for the earlier indirectly 
inferred e!ects of stereotypes on expression recognition (Bijlstra et al., 2010). To 
this end, participants completed a morph movies task (Niedenthal et al., 2000) 
wherein expressions on both Moroccan and White faces changed over time be-
tween sad and angry. #is sad-to-angry dimension was selected for two reasons. 
First, it creates a single valence comparison, in which valence remains negative, 
but the stereotypicality of the expressions can change. Second, because anger is 
stereotypic of Moroccans but sadness is not (Bijlstra et al., 2010), this creates an ex-
perimental context in which stereotyping e!ects are most likely to occur. #us, the 
(negative) valence is held constant within each trial but the expressions change be-
tween a Moroccan stereotypic expression (anger) and a non-stereotypic expression 
(sadness). A pilot-experiment in our lab revealed initial evidence that previously 
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found evaluative- and stereotype-congruency e!ects could be replicated employ-
ing a morph movies task6.
A"er participants #nished the morph movies task, they also completed a 
newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998) to assess their implicit associations of Dutch7 versus Moroccan people with 
discrete emotions (anger; sadness). Originally the IAT was designed to index the 
association between target concepts (e.g. two social categories) and an attribute 
dimension (e.g. positive versus negative; Greenwald et al., 1998). In our new emo-
tion IAT (eIAT) we assessed participants’ individual associative strengths between 
social categories (Moroccan and Dutch), and two discrete emotional expressions 
(anger and sadness). $us, we replaced the evaluative dimension of the original 
IAT with the discrete emotional expression attributes anger and sadness. Note that 
these discrete emotional expressions are both negatively valenced and therefore 
responses are not likely to be strongly in%uenced by general evaluative associations 
(see Amodio & Devine, 2006). 
Of particular interest in the current study was whether individual di!erences 
in emotion-ethnicity associations predicted ethnic-based emotion recognition bi-
ases. Speci#cally, participants’ implicit stereotype association should be re%ected in 
participants’ responses in our eIAT measurement, with greater eIAT scores re%ect-
ing stronger anger-Moroccan and sadness-Dutch (relative to sadness-Moroccan 
and anger-Dutch) associations. More importantly, we hypothesized that these ste-
6 A pilot study was conducted to test whether we could replicate the dissociation between evaluative and 
stereotype processes in expression decoding (Bijlstra et al., 2010) using a morph movie task. Sixty-nine 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two dual-valence conditions (n = 44, happy and angry 
or happy and sad) or the single-valence condition (n = 22, angry and sad) in which Moroccan and 
White faces gradually change from one expression into a second expression. In order to test whether 
prior !ndings of general evaluative and stereotype associations were replicated, we analyzed both dual-
valence conditions together, followed by the single-valence condition. In line with previous work, we 
predicted and found a two-way interaction of expression valence and ethnicity of models in the dual-
valence conditions, F(1, 42) = 33.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .44. Replicating Bijlstra et al., this interaction was not 
quali!ed by the three-way interaction including context (F<1), re#ecting that two-way interactions did 
not di$er between dual-valence conditions. Furthermore, in the single-valence condition, we predicted 
and observed a two-way interaction of emotional expression and ethnicity of models, F(1, 21) = 9.00, p 
= .007,  ηp2 = .30. %ese !ndings con!rm our predictions that both evaluative and stereotype e$ects in 
emotion recognition can be discriminated when processing dynamically displayed expressions.
7 Within the IAT’s used in the present research we presented our participants with Dutch and Moroccan 
names. We chose to refer to Dutch instead of White within the IAT because the names are typical 
Dutch and therefore better re#ect this response category than White names in general.
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reotype associations would underlie emotion recognition e!ects obtained in previ-
ous research (Bijlstra et al., 2010). Extending this logic, we predicted that the eIAT 
should predict the emotion recognition stereotype e!ect in this emotion categori-
zation task. "at is, participants with stronger anger-Moroccan and sadness-Dutch 
associations should recognize anger more readily on Moroccan than White faces, 
and sadness more readily on White than Moroccan faces.
METHOD
Participants & Overview
One-hundred-and-three Radboud University Nijmegen students (83 women, 
Mage = 22) completed a single-valence (sad versus angry) emotion morph movies 
task, in which participants watched short #lm clips of Moroccan and White fac-
es changing from anger (sadness) into sadness (anger). Subsequently, participants 
completed an implicit association test to measure their discrete emotion associa-
tions (eIAT) with the two social categories central in this study.
Materials & Procedure
Morph movies task. We created short #lm clips in which White and Moroccan 
models gradually change from one expression into a second expression. To cre-
ate these clips, we used FaceGen (Singular Inversions, www.facegen.com) to #rst 
import neutral expression faces (using FaceGen’s PhotoFit procedure) and sub-
sequently to create sad and angry expressions for all models. We imported the 
neutral expression of ten models, #ve White and #ve Moroccan faces, from the 
Radboud Faces Database (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010). Using FaceGen, we were 
able to systematically alter emotional faces by changing exactly the same parame-
ters for each face, see Figure 7 for an original Moroccan RaFD image (a), the same 
neutral face in FaceGen (b), and the angry face we created from this (c).
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Figure 7. An original Moroccan RaFD image (a), the same neutral face in FaceGen (b), and the created 
angry version of this face (c).
 
Next, for every model, we created !lm clips by morphing two emotional faces 
using MorphX (Norrkross, www.norrkross.com), with a duration of eight seconds 
per clip, each containing 240 frames. We created 2 !lm clips (sad-to-angry; angry-
to-sad) for each of the 10 models (5 White; 5 Moroccan), for a total of 20 !lm clips. 
Additionally 2 !lm clips were created and used to familiarize participants with the 
experimental task in a preliminary practice block.
Participants were seated in individual cubicles and informed that they would 
be presented with short !lm clips of faces displaying an emotional expression that 
changed into a second emotional expression. "is morph movies task was adapted 
from Niedenthal and colleagues (2000) and Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003). 
We instructed participants to watch each !lm clip and to press spacebar the mo-
ment they detected the onset of a new expression on a face. "e experiment con-
sisted of a 2-trial practice block, followed by two 20-trial test blocks. "ere was a 
one second inter trial interval. Each clip was shown ones per test block and presen-
tation order of !lm clips was randomized for each participant8.
Emotion implicit association test. Upon !nishing the morph movies task, par-
ticipants completed the eIAT. In the eIAT participants were asked to categorize 
8 Between the morphed movies task and the eIAT we instructed participants to rate emotional intensity 
of the begin states of the used !lm clips, using a 7-point Likert scale anchored from (1) not intense to 
(7) very intense. Subsequently they were asked to judge an image for purposes unrelated to this Study. 
Per image we calculated an average intensity score and tested whether the 5 Moroccan images di"ered 
from the 5 White images. No signi!cant di"erences were found between the four groups, F<1 (MMoroccan-
angry = 4.71, SD = .88, MMoroccan-sad = 4.48, SD = 1.21, MWhite-angry = 4.38, SD = .89, MWhite-sad = 4.65, SD = .54).
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words into four distinct categories: Moroccan names, Dutch names, and words 
associated with sadness or anger. We assumed the eIAT to measure the strength of 
an individual’s association between these two social categories and the two discrete 
emotional expressions.
In total, the eIAT consisted of !ve blocks: three practice and two test blocks. 
First participants performed two 20-trial practice blocks to familiarize the response 
mapping; in the !rst block they categorized names typical for the social categories 
Moroccan and Dutch – !ve Moroccan (e.g. Ibrahim, Achmed) and !ve Dutch (e.g. 
Johan, Karel) names – by pressing one of two response keys (A - le" and 6 - right). 
In a second practice block, participants categorized emotion words associated with 
sadness (verdriet) and anger (boos). #e !ve words we used for the sadness catego-
ry were: crying (huilen), weeping (wenen), sadly (droevig), sad (treurig), and tears 
(tranen); the !ve words we used for the anger category were: furious (furieus), up-
set (kwaad), outrageous (laaiend), rage (woest), and mad (razend).
A"er !nishing the two practice blocks, the four categories were combined in 
the !rst 40-trial test block. For all participants, this led !rst to a block in which they 
categorized anger words and Moroccan names by pressing one key and sadness 
words and Dutch names by pressing the other key (stereotype-congruent block). 
Participants then completed a social category practice block, in which the social 
category labels switched sides (no emotion words were presented in this block). 
Subsequently, all participants categorized anger words and Dutch names with one 
response key and sadness words and Moroccan names with the other response key 
(stereotype-incongruent block). Shorter response latencies in the congruent block 
than the incongruent block were assumed to re$ect stronger automatic associa-
tions between anger with Moroccans, and sadness with the Dutch social category 
compared to the opposite emotion-ethnicity combinations.
In this study, the eIAT was used as individual di%erence measures for pre-
dicting participants’ performance on the morph movies task. In order to minimize 
between participants di%erences in IAT scores due to order e%ects, blocks as well 
as words were presented in a !xed pseudo-random order.
RESULTS
#e primary dependent variable in the present study was the average response 
time to detect the onset of the second emotional expression in the !lm clips. Before 
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analyzing, data of thirteen participants were excluded because the median of their 
response latencies on the emotion morph movies task fell outside the duration of 
the !lm clips (>8 sec.). Furthermore, for each of the remaining participants we ex-
cluded response latencies above 8 seconds (20.6%) and those trials di"ering more 
than three standard deviations from the overall mean (0.6%). #ree more partici-
pants were excluded from the analyses because of an eIAT score that di"ered more 
than 3 SD’s from the overall mean eIAT score.9
Emotion implicit association test
Using the algorithm of Greenwald et al. (1998) we calculated a measure of 
associative strength between social categories and discrete emotional expressions 
(eIAT score) separately for each participant. Incorrect responses (7.9%), practice 
blocks, and the !rst two trials of all test blocks were excluded from analysis; re-
sponse latencies smaller than 300 ms were recoded to 300 ms and those bigger 
than 3000 ms to 3000 ms. Analyses were performed on log-transformed response 
latencies, but untransformed latencies are reported for ease of interpretation.
In the eIAT, people generally responded faster during the stereotype-congru-
ent block (M = 589, SD = 87) than during the stereotype-incongruent block (M = 
666, SD = 109), F(1,86) = 130.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .60. #is indicates that, on aver-
age, our participants associated anger more with Moroccan and sadness more with 
Dutch people, than sadness with Moroccan and anger with Dutch people.
Morph movies task
Because the design of the current study involved a conceptual replication of 
the single-valence condition of Bijlstra et al. (2010), we predicted a replication of 
the Ethnicity x Expression interaction previously observed in a single-valence con-
dition. Of primary interest, however, was whether the eIAT scores predicted the 
magnitude of the ethnicity-based bias in expression recognition. 
To investigate this question, we subjected the mean response latencies to a 
2 (Ethnicity: White vs. Moroccan) x 2 (Expression: angry vs. sad) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA with standardized eIAT scores as continuous factor. #is analysis 
revealed a main e"ect of Ethnicity, F(1,85) = 12.82, p = .001, ηp2 = .13. Emotional 
expressions were detected more quickly on Moroccan (M = 5747, SD = 769) than 
9 A di!erent pattern of results was obtained when leaving these trials and/or participants in our data.
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White faces (M = 5900, SD = 835). Furthermore, the expected two-way interaction 
between Ethnicity and Expression was signi!cant, F(1,85) = 18.99, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.18, see Figure 8. In line with Bijlstra and colleagues (2010) we found that anger 
was detected more quickly on Moroccan (M = 5667, SD = 807) than White faces 
(M = 5978, SD = 913), F(1,85) = 25.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .23. No di#erence in detecting 
sadness on the two social categories was found (F<1). Comparing response laten-
cies of detecting Expressions within the Ethnicity groups we found that sadness (M 
= 5835, SD = 893) was detected more quickly than anger on White faces, F(1,85) = 
4.62, p = .03, ηp2 = .05. In contrast, anger was detected more easily than sadness (M 
= 5841, SD = 859) on Moroccan faces, F(1,85) = 6.78, p = .011, ηp2 = .07.
Figure 8. Mean response latencies and SD’s in milliseconds as a function of 
ethnicity and expression measured with the morph movies task.
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Figure 9. !e relationship between participants’ eIAT score and
their stereotype bias in emotion recognition.
Most importantly, the predicted three-way interaction between Ethnicity, Ex-
pression, and eIAT score was also observed, F(1,85) = 4.13, p = .045, ηp2 = .05, see 
Figure 9. "e stronger participants associated anger with Moroccan and sadness 
with Dutch men, compared to the opposite, the stronger their stereotype e#ect in 
detecting emotional expressions10.
DISCUSSION
"e results of Study 3.1 replicated the indirectly inferred stereotype e#ect of 
Bijlstra et al. (2010) using dynamic facial stimuli. More importantly, we found that 
this e#ect was correlated with individuals’ associations between discrete emotional 
expressions and social groups. To our knowledge, this is $rst direct evidence of ste-
reotype associations predicting the recognition of emotional expressions: the new-
ly developed eIAT signi$cantly predicted participants’ stereotype e#ect. With this 
10 A!er calculating participants’ stereotype e"ect, one participant scored more extremely than other 
participants (+3 SD). However, none of the mean group-emotion response latencies of this participant 
could be detected as an outlier (all mean response latencies fell inside the -3/+3 SD range). Cook’s 
distance of the stereotype e"ect for this particular participant is .19, scoring below the cut-o" of 1 and 
above the cut-o" of 4/n. Excluding this participant from analysis revealed a non signi#cant three-way 
interaction, F(1, 84) = 2.525, p = .116, ηp2 = .029.
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result the eIAT shows to be a good predictor of face processing strategies. Prior re-
search (e.g. Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008; 
Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van Knippenberg, 2011) has already demonstrated that per-
ceivers’ beliefs or associations, as measured with IAT’s, can bias face processing. 
However, the current study expands upon previous research by demonstrating that 
speci!c stereotypic content, rather than general evaluations, can directly bias ex-
pression perception processing. 
Following this logic, we would expect that implicit measurements of stereo-
type associations should, and general evaluative associations should not predict 
the stereotype e"ect. In short, if this is a stereotyping and not a prejudice e"ect, 
this inference would be made much more strongly by including a discon!rmatory 
test as well. Study 3.2 was designed to address this question by including a measure 
of prejudice along with a measure of stereotypes. #us, to see whether we could 
replicate the initial evidence of Study 3.1 and to test the discriminant validity of 
the emotion IAT compared to a traditional evaluative IAT, we included both mea-
surements in our second study. In addition to the single-valence emotion catego-
rization task (anger vs. sadness) we asked participants to complete two implicit 
association tasks measuring prejudice (IAT) and stereotype (eIAT) associations 
with Moroccan versus Dutch men.
STUDY 3.2
Given that Study 3.1 did not include an evaluative IAT, Study 3.1 could not 
demonstrate that our measure of stereotypes is discriminable from prejudice. Study 
3.2 seeks to !ll this gap by demonstrating that individual di"erences in stereotypic 
associations predict responses over and above evaluative responses. To address this 
issue directly, Study 3.2 employed a speeded categorization task wherein partici-
pants saw a series of still-frame angry and sad Moroccan and White faces (again, 
a single-valence condition, Bijlstra et al., 2010), and were tasked with categorizing 
each face by expression as quickly as possible. A$er this task, participants complet-
ed both the emotion IAT employed in Study 3.1, as well as the traditional evaluative 
IAT, which was used as an index of overall evaluation of Moroccan versus Dutch.
Furthermore, a potential lingering concern with both Study 3.1 and Bijlstra 
et al. (2010) is that the results may have been biased by the di"erential facial struc-
ture of the Moroccan and White faces. Indeed, recent research has demonstrated 
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that an overlap between expressers’ facial features and emotional expressions can 
in!uence emotion recognition (e.g. Becker et al., 2007; Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009; 
Zebrowitz, Kikuchi, & Fellous, 2010). For example, facial masculinity (e.g., Becker 
et al., 2007) and facial maturity (e.g., Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009) are naturalistically 
confounded with the facial signal of anger; conversely facial immaturity is natu-
ralistically confounded with the facial signal of fear. "us, it is possible that the 
observed stereotyping e#ect is in!uenced by systematic facial-structural di#erenc-
es between White and Moroccan faces. If ethnicity is confounded with anger (i.e., 
Moroccan’s have more mature facial structures), anger expressed by Moroccan fac-
es could be experienced as a more intense signal (due to facial-structural di#erenc-
es) than anger expressed by White faces. One way to address this issue is to control 
for the intensity of emotional expressions by including ratings of perceived intensi-
ty in statistical analyses. Including observer ratings, however, could be problematic 
because these ratings may in part be biased by observers’ stereotype associations. 
"erefore, in Study 3.2, we decided to employ objective (i.e. computer generated) 
intensity ratings. To control for emotional intensity across Moroccan and White 
faces, we submitted each stimulus to a computer program that provides an objec-
tive index of expression intensity using an algorithm designed to identify emotion-
al expressions and to quantify its emotional intensity (FaceReader; Den Uyl & van 
Kuilenberg, 2005; Noldus Information Technologies, 2008). FaceReader estimates 
emotional expression intensity (sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust, happiness, 
and neutral) of faces using 55 key facial landmarks. To examine emotional inten-
sity the algorithm tests the ‘input face’ against an arti$cial neural network, trained 
to identify emotional faces. "e so%ware has been shown to be highly successful 
in accurately detecting emotional expressions11 (Den Uyl & van Kuilenberg, 2005).
11 Because of the novelty of the FaceReader computer algorithm in social psychological research, we !rst 
ran an analysis on the 36 Moroccan and White males (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010) used in the present 
research with expressions corresponding to the seven emotional expressions as can be classi!ed by 
FaceReader. Overall FaceReader was able to !t 99% of the faces with one of the emotional expressions. 
An ANOVA on the classi!cation data per Ethnicity (White vs. Moroccan) and Intended Expression 
(Neutral, Happy, Anger, Sad, Fearful, Surprised, and Disgusted) as between subject factor yielded no 
di"erences between Ethnicity, Intended Expression or the interaction between these two factors (F’s < 
1.65, p = n.s.). Independent of Intended Expression or Ethnicity, a total 91% (SD = 2%) of the pictures 
was classi!ed correctly. #is analysis demonstrated the quality of FaceReader in detecting emotional 
expressions. Furthermore, most important for the current research, the analysis shows no di"erences 
in classi!cation performance between pictures of our White and Moroccan social categories.
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!e goals of Study 3.2 were twofold. First we sought to replicate and extend 
the "ndings that the eIAT predicts the biasing e#ects of stereotypes on expression 
recognition, even controlling for overall evaluations (IAT) of the groups. Second, 
we sought to rule out the possibility that stereotype e#ects in emotion recognition 
can be explained only by structural di#erences in faces that signal di#erences in 
emotional intensity between groups. To that end, we statistically controlled for the 
emotion signaled by the faces themselves, quanti"ed using an objective computer 
algorithm.
METHOD
Participants & Overview
Seventy-four Radboud University Nijmegen students (59 women, Mage = 22) 
participated in an emotion categorization task and two implicit association tests. 
First, during the emotion categorization task participants classi"ed sad and angry 
emotional expressions displayed by both White and Moroccan males. Subsequent-
ly, participants completed two implicit association tests to measure their discrete 
emotion associations (eIAT) and evaluative associations (IAT) with the two social 
categories central in this study. !e eIAT employed in this experiment was identi-
cal to the eIAT used in Study 3.1.
Materials & Procedure
Pictures. !irty-six models, 18 White and 18 Moroccan, were selected from 
the RaFD (Langner et al., 2010). Of these models, we used the pictures of two 
emotional expressions: sad and angry. !is resulted in a total of 72 pictures: 2 ex-
pressions x 2 ethnicities x 18 models per ethnicity.
Emotion categorization task. !e emotion categorization task was adapted 
from Bijlstra et al. (2010). Participants were asked to categorize emotional expres-
sions of angry and sad faces presented on a computer screen as quickly and ac-
curately as possible. Each trial consisted of a "xation cross, presented for 1,000 
ms, followed by a face displaying one of the emotional expressions for 200 ms. 
Participants were asked to indicate the emotional expression displayed in pictures 
of White and Moroccan emotional faces, one picture per trial, by pressing one 
of two keys (‘I’ or ‘P’), corresponding to either angry or sad. Response mappings 
reversed across blocks, whereas starting order of response mapping was counter-
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balanced between participants. !e task consisted of "ve blocks: two practice and 
three experimental blocks. A 20-trial practice block to familiarize participants with 
the task preceded the "rst and second experimental blocks. No practice block was 
included before the third experimental block because the response mapping used 
here was identical to the one used in experimental block one. Each experimental 
block consisted of all 72 pictures displayed one time in random order.
Implicit association tests. A#er the categorization task all participants "rst 
completed an eIAT as described in Study 3.1. Finally, participants completed an 
evaluative IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). !e procedure of this IAT was identical to 
the procedure we described for the eIAT with the exception that the two discrete 
emotions were replaced by positive and negative as attributes. As stimuli we used 
"ve positive words: love (liefde), peace (vrede), healthy (gezond), nice (leuk), and 
safe (veilig); and "ve negative words: hate (haat), war (oorlog), torture (marteling), 
cancer (kanker), and accident (ongeluk).
!e IAT measures general evaluative associations with Moroccan relative to 
Dutch people. In this study the eIAT and the IAT were used as individual di$erence 
measures for predicting participants’ performance on the emotion categorization 
task. In order to minimize between participants di$erences in IATs due to order 
e$ects, words were presented in "xed pseudo-random order.
RESULTS
To test whether objectively measured emotional intensity in our stimuli dif-
fered between social categories, we will "rst report analyses performed on the emo-
tional intensity scores per picture. Second, analyses of both individual di$erence 
measures for associative strength are described. Finally, we report the analyses test-
ing the primary goal of the current chapter, namely, the in%uence of participants’ 
individual stereotype associations on recognizing emotional faces.
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Objective emotional intensity
We applied the FaceReader algorithm to every RaFD picture used in the pres-
ent experiment12, resulting in an emotional intensity score per picture within the 
range of 0 ‘extremely weak anger/sadness signal’ and 1 ‘extremely strong anger/sad-
ness signal’. To test whether objective emotion intensity di!ered between social 
categories, we ran analyses of variance (ANOVA’s) on the FaceReader emotion in-
tensity scores per emotional expression with Ethnicity (White vs. Moroccan) as 
between model factor. "ese analyses yielded no di!erences between social groups 
(F’s < 1, p = n.s.), indicating that the sad (M = .74, SD = .30) and angry (M = .83, SD 
= .19) Moroccan faces, and sad (M = .82, SD = .24) and angry (M = .85 SD = .21) 
White faces in our experiment are matched on objective intensity scores.
Additionally, we validated the FaceReader emotional intensity scores by cor-
relating them with the (log transformed) mean time it took participants to rec-
ognize the expression on each picture. To minimize individual di!erences in re-
sponse latencies between participants, response latencies were standardized per 
participant and then averaged per picture. A signi#cant correlation (r = -.50, p < 
.01) showed that with increasing FaceReader emotional intensity scores the aver-
age recognition latencies indeed declined.
Implicit association tests
Using the algorithm of Greenwald et al. (1998) we calculated two measures of 
associative strength per participant: one for the association between social catego-
ries and discrete emotional expressions (eIAT score) and the other for the associa-
tion between social categories and general valence (IAT score). Incorrect responses 
(6.5% eIAT, 6.7% IAT), the practice blocks, and the #rst two trials of all test blocks 
were excluded from analysis; response latencies smaller than 300 ms were recoded 
to 300 ms and those bigger than 3000 ms to 3000 ms. Analyses were performed on 
log-transformed response latencies, but untransformed latencies are reported. One 
participant was excluded from the analyses because of an IAT score that di!ered 
more than 3 SD’s from the overall mean.
In the eIAT, people generally responded faster during the stereotype-congru-
ent block (M = 613, SD = 107) than during the stereotype-incongruent block (M 
12 One angry Moroccan picture was excluded form further analysis because FaceReader failed to !t the 
face to the algorithm.
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= 700, SD = 128), F(1,72) = 125.00, p < .01, ηp2  = .64. "is indicates that our par-
ticipants on average associated anger more with Moroccan and sadness more with 
Dutch people, than sadness with Moroccan and anger with Dutch people.
A similar analysis on the IAT data yielded a signi#cant IAT e$ect, F(1,72) = 
252.06, p < .01 ηp2 = .78. Again, participants were faster in the congruent block (M 
= 581, SD = 105) than in the incongruent block (M = 725, SD = 145). "is result 
indicates that participants on average associated negative words with Moroccan 
and positive words with Dutch people more strongly than positive words with 
Moroccan and negative words with Dutch people. In short, overall our partici-
pants showed a negativity bias toward Moroccan and/or a positivity bias toward 
Dutch people. A modest correlation between the eIAT and the IAT (r = .26, p = .03) 
showed that both implicit association tests largely measured di$erent constructs.
Emotion categorization task
In line with Bijlstra et al. (2010), incorrect trials (17%) and response laten-
cies below 200 ms or above 3000 ms (<1%) were excluded from analysis. Next, 
we log-transformed and standardized response latencies per participant to min-
imize individual di$erences in overall response latencies between participants. 
Due to the skewed distribution of the response latencies all analyses were per-
formed on log-transformed response latencies; untransformed latencies are pre-
sented herein for ease of interpretation. In line with Study 3.1, we again predicted 
a two-way interaction of Expression and Ethnicity, signaling a stereotype-driven 
ethnicity-based bias in emotional expression recognition. More importantly, to test 
whether the eIAT predicted the stereotype e$ect di$erent from the IAT, analyses 
were performed with individual di$erence scores of both the eIAT and the IAT as 
covariates. We hypothesized that especially the eIAT would predict the Expressions 
x Ethnicity interaction e$ect.
Mean log-transformed response latencies were subjected to a 2 (Ethnicity: 
White vs. Moroccan) x 2 (Expression: angry vs. sad) within-subjects ANOVA with 
standardized eIAT and IAT scores as covariates. "is analysis yielded a two-way 
interaction between Ethnicity and Expression, F(1, 69) = 12.98, p < .01, ηp2  = .16, 
see Figure 10. With this, we replicated the stereotype e$ect of Study 3.1 and Bijlstra 
et al. (2010), demonstrating faster recognition of angry Moroccan (M = 682, SD = 
130) than angry White (M = 695, SD = 129) faces, F(1, 69) = 7.42, p < .01, ηp2  = .10, 
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and slower recognition of sad Moroccan (M = 694, SD = 120) than sad White (M = 
681, SD = 121) faces, F(1, 69) = 9.05, p < .01, ηp2  = .12.
Figure 10. Mean response latencies and SD’s in milliseconds as a function of ethnicity and expression 
measured with a still-frame emotion recognition task.
More importantly, the ANOVA also yielded the predicted three-way interac-
tion between Ethnicity, Expression and eIAT, F(1, 69) = 5.30, p = .02, ηp2  = .07 (see 
Figure 11). Stronger anger-Moroccan and sadness-Dutch associations (compared 
to the opposite) were related to a stronger emotion recognition stereotype e"ect, 
conceptually replicating the eIAT moderation of Study 3.1.
Additionally, a non-predicted three-way interaction with Ethnicity, Expres-
sion, and IAT scores was also observed, F(1, 69) = 4.16, p = .04, ηp2  = .06 (see 
Figure 12). Importantly, this interaction pattern di"ered from the previous one. 
Participants low in prejudice showed stronger emotion recognition stereotype 
e"ects than highly prejudiced participants. No 4-way interaction or main e"ects 
were found.
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Figure 11. !e relationship between participants’ eIAT score and their 
stereotype bias in emotion recognition.
Figure 12. !e relationship between participants’ IAT score and 
their stereotype bias in emotion recognition.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
!e goal of the present research was to investigate whether stereotype associ-
ations between speci"c emotional expressions and social categories underlie ste-
reotypic emotion recognition biases. Across two studies, we replicated a recently 
reported stereotyping e#ect in emotion recognition (Bijlstra et al., 2010) using re-
search paradigms with dynamically (Study 3.1) and statically (Study 3.2) displayed 
expressions. In general, participants decoded anger more quickly on Moroccan 
than White faces, whereas participants more quickly decoded sadness on White 
than Moroccan faces.
More importantly, the current work extends previous "ndings by showing 
novel evidence that stereotype associations (eIAT) predict the biasing e#ects of 
stereotypes on expression recognition. We found consistent evidence that partic-
ipants’ stereotype associations predicted the strength of their stereotype e#ects in 
recognizing expressions. In both studies, as perceivers’ level of Moroccan-anger 
and Dutch-sadness associations (compared to the opposite) increased, so did per-
ceivers’ tendency to decode anger more readily on Moroccan faces and sadness 
on White faces. !is "nding provides direct evidence that stereotype associations 
underlie the e#ects found in earlier research by Bijlstra and colleagues (2010). !e 
single-valence comparative context manipulation seems to serve as a prime for 
using stereotype associations in recognizing discrete emotional expressions. With-
in this context, recognition of emotions that are stereotypically related to a social 
category is facilitated, but only to the extent that these stereotype associations are 
present in the perceiver.
In order to show the moderation of stereotype association on emotion recog-
nition, we developed the emotion IAT. Based on the data from Study 3.2, it seems 
clear that this measure taps into distinctive emotion related associations, while 
yielding only modest overlap with the evaluative IAT (in Study 3.2, r = .26). Fur-
ther, the two implicit measures were di#erentially predictive of the stereotype ef-
fect, demonstrating discriminant validity of the two implicit association measures. 
To our knowledge only Becker and colleagues (2007) used an IAT with emotional 
expressions as categories. However, they reported an eIAT using happiness and 
anger as emotion concepts, which in our view may be confounded with general 
valence e#ects. !e purpose of the eIAT in the current research was to measure 
speci"c stereotypical associations between groups and emotions. Measuring im-
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plicit associations within a single valence domain (or neutral valence, see Amodio 
& Devine, 2006) might be better suited to tapping into these speci!c stereotype 
associations. We should, however, not draw too strong conclusions about the exact 
constructs measured by the eIAT. Future research would bene!t from investigating 
whether the rationale behind and !ndings demonstrated by this new eIAT gen-
eralizes to other target groups and expressions as well, and further investigate its 
predictive value.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the evaluative IAT score did predict the 
emotion recognition e"ect, albeit in an unexpected direction. At !rst blush, this 
seems somewhat surprising because the emotion recognition task involved two 
negative emotions: anger and sadness. #erefore, valence was not expected to play 
a role in this speci!c comparative context. Moreover, the e"ect indicated that the 
stronger the IAT e"ect (i.e., the stronger the negative associations with Moroccan 
people and positive associations with Dutch people), the weaker the emotion rec-
ognition e"ect. #e data suggested that relatively highly prejudiced participants 
experience di$culties categorizing negative emotional expressions in general, at 
least within the studied comparative context. Notably, because both the lack of 
statistical evidence for a four-way interaction, and the reversed pattern of what one 
might predict indicate that these data cannot explain the eIAT e"ect, however, this 
pattern of data is intriguing and worthy of consideration. One possibility might be 
that these participants ascribe negativity in general to the Moroccan social catego-
ry and therefore do not distinguish one negative expressions from the other (i.e., 
increased heterogeneity among negative expressions). For relatively low prejudice 
participants, there seems to be more room for distinctive, discrete negative emo-
tion e"ects to show up. Of course, this potential explanation needs additional in-
vestigation in future research, but if supported could be a valuable insight into how 
perceptions of group homogeneity versus heterogeneity might be driven at least in 
part by our evaluative associations with target groups. 
With the present research, we contribute to a growing body of expression rec-
ognition and social categorization research. However, thus far, research has only 
demonstrated clear evidence for evaluative biases in decoding expressions (e.g. 
Hugenberg, 2005; Kang & Chasteen, 2009), showing that perceivers’ evaluative as-
sociations predicted the strength of evaluative-congruency e"ects (Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004). With the present studies, we extend this knowledge by 
showing that perceivers’ stereotype associations predicted recognition of stereo-
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typic expressions when decoded in a context where stereotyping e!ects are likely 
(i.e., a single-valence context). "us, within a negative valence context, distinct 
e!ects were found for recognizing discrete negative emotions displayed by social 
category members. "e observed stereotype e!ect seems to be independent of gen-
eral evaluations of social categories (Study 3.2), suggesting dissociable e!ects of 
a!ective and cognitive processes in expression perception. A dissociation between 
stereotyping and evaluative processes has already been demonstrated by Amodio 
and Devine (2006), and was recently suggested in emotion recognition research 
(Bijlstra et al., 2010). However, as yet, no direct test of stereotype biases in ex-
pression recognition was carried out. With the present research we are the #rst to 
show that stereotypic group-expression associations a!ect expression decoding in 
a stereotype congruent way. For participants who associated anger with Moroccan 
and sadness with Dutch people (compared to the opposite) we found congruent 
expression recognition e!ects. Participants that showed these associations to a 
lesser extend also demonstrate less strong stereotype emotion recognition e!ects.
Another purpose of Study 3.2 was to rule out the possibility that stereotype 
e!ects in emotion recognition can be explained by structural di!erences in faces 
between groups. Prior research has shown that an overlap between expressers’ fa-
cial features and emotional expressions can in$uence emotion recognition (e.g. 
Becker et al., 2007; Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009; Zebrowitz, Kikuchi, & Fellous, 2010; 
see also Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009). Structural di!erences in facial features could 
potentially in$uence the experienced intensity signal of emotional expressions. 
Here, we demonstrated that objectively measured intensity could not fully explain 
previously found expression recognition e!ects. Using a computer algorithm we 
showed that there were no objective stimulus biases inherent in our stimulus ma-
terials. Our Moroccan and White models displayed equivalent levels of objective 
anger and sadness. "is suggests that di!erences in emotion recognition between 
groups cannot be explained by structural di!erences in facial features between Mo-
roccan and White group members. However, by using this computer algorithm 
we successfully replicated earlier found evidence that increasing intensity scores 
facilitate emotion recognition (e.g. Hess et al., 1997; Leppänen et al., 2007). "e 
advantage of a computer algorithm is that it provides researchers with an objec-
tive index of expression intensity that is not in$uenced by perceivers’ associations 
about the expressers’ social group. "erefore, this particular computer algorithm, 
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FaceReader, seems to be a very helpful tool in objectively analyzing information 
from emotional faces.
 Together with prior evaluative-congruency !ndings (e.g. Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003), the present results provide direct evidence for distinct as-
sociations underlying di"erent emotion recognition e"ects. Ideally, in future re-
search these e"ects are investigated within a full design, testing both evaluative- 
and stereotype-congruency at once. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
results of our research apply to White participants decoding anger and sadness of 
two social groups present in #e Netherlands. Future research should investigate 
whether these e"ects generalize to other social groups and emotional expressions 
as well. We would, for example, predict that similar e"ects could be obtained by 
using two other social categories in a single-valence comparative context, as long 
as perceivers stereotypically associate the expressions with the categories used. #e 
results of our studies support the idea that participants’ stereotype associations are 
indicative for their stereotype e"ects in recognizing emotional expressions. 
Finally, the current work was focused on the e"ects of stereotype associations 
in expression perception, whereas the observed recognition results could contrib-
ute also to the way in which perceivers maintain their stereotype associations. For 
example, those people holding strong stereotype associations between Moroccans 
and anger more easily observe an angry Moroccan and potentially therefore see 
more angry Moroccans around them. By this manner, stereotypes may be self-per-
petuating by in$uencing emotion recognition in a stereotype con!rming way. 
In sum, we aimed at providing direct evidence for the in$uence of perceiv-
ers’ stereotypic associations in decoding emotional expressions of Moroccan and 
White males. In two studies we replicated Bijlstra and colleagues (2010) and ex-
tended these !ndings to dynamic facial displays. Most importantly, we showed that 
stereotype associations underlie emotion recognition e"ects obtained when people 
decode stereotype expressions and valence is not made salient. Given the fact that 
discrete emotional expressions elicit speci!c behavioral tendencies, it is especially 
important to di"erentiate one negative expression from an other.

SPONTANEOUS AND
CONTEXT DEPENDENT
USE OF GENDER-EXPRESSION
ASSOCIATIONS
4
Abstract
Prior group-expression research revealed evidence for the in!uence of evaluative 
and stereotype associations on emotion perception. However, in these studies, per-
ceivers’ attention was always explicitly directed to both the group and emotional 
expressions. "erefore, it is unclear whether associations in!uence emotion pro-
cessing of groups on a spontaneous or context dependent level. "is was tested 
on gender-expression associations, by employing mental visualization and reverse 
correlation techniques. We found evidence for evaluative-congruency e#ects when 
no gender-expression context was experimentally induced. Mental representations 
of negative expressions (anger and sadness) both conveyed physical similarities 
with men and not women (Study 4.2). Conversely, we found support for stereo-
type-congruency e#ects when a gender comparative context was made salient 
(Studies 4.1 & 4.2). Participants more o$en thought of men when visualizing angry 
faces, whereas for sadness no di#erence was observed. In Study 4.3, we combined 
reverse correlation with an emotion comparative context and demonstrated a dis-
sociation between evaluative- and stereotype-congruency e#ects. When valence 
was made salient we found evaluative-congruency e#ects, whereas evidence for 
stereotype-congruency was found when valence was not made salient. "ese re-
sults demonstrate the great impact of context in using evaluative- or stereotype 
based group-expression associations.
!is chapter is based on: Bijlstra, G., Dotsch, R., Holland, R.W., & Wigboldus, D.H.J. (in prep.). Spontaneous
and context dependent use of gender-expression associations.
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Faces convey information crucial for social interaction. Imagine yourself in-
teracting with a man who is getting slightly angry. It is essential to rapidly perceive 
this emotional state in order to properly adapt your behavior towards this person. 
His face increasingly shows visual signs of anger, with narrowed eyes, compressed 
lips, and lowered eyebrows. Additionally, your perception of the face may be in-
!uenced by knowledge about this person. For example, you know this person gets 
angry very easily, which may facilitate the ease of decoding the facial expression 
of anger. Consequently, emotion perception is both in!uenced by facial features 
you perceive (bottom-up processes), and accessible knowledge about the perceived 
person (top-down processes).
Even in situations where we do not know the expresser of an emotion, top 
down knowledge may in!uence expression perception. Perceivers spontaneous-
ly categorize other people into social categories (e.g. sex, race, nationality). As a 
result, knowledge about social categories (e.g. stereotypes, general evaluations) is 
activated and may bias expression perception. "is link between facial emotion-
al expressions and social categories has been a central topic of investigation in 
the last few decades (e.g. Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Becker et al., 2007; Fischer, 
1993; Fischer, Rodriquez Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Hess, Adams, 
Grammer, & Kleck, 2009; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; Hutchings & 
Haddock, 2008; Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000). However, a common fea-
ture of this research is that perceivers’ attention was always explicitly directed to 
both the social category and emotional expressions. Consequently, no conclusions 
about the spontaneity or context dependency of these associations can be drawn. 
"is is problematic, because it might be the case that these earlier results are strictly 
bounded to a speci#c experimental situation. Here, we address these shortcomings 
by testing spontaneous and context dependent use of group-emotion associations. 
We use two research paradigms, mental visualization and reverse correlation, to 
investigate group-emotion associations without directing participants’ attention to 
the social category and emotional expressions within the experimental task.
TOP-DOWN PROCESSES IN EMOTION PERCEPTION
Evidence for the in!uence of bottom-up and top-down processes on emotion 
perception is abundant in the literature. For example, speci#c facial characteristics 
like the shape of someone’s eyes or eyebrows in!uence categorization of expres-
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sions in a bottom-up fashion (e.g. Becker et al., 2007; Marsh, Adams, & Kleck, 2005; 
Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009; Zebrowitz, Kikuchi, & Fellous, 2010). Sacco and Hugen-
berg, recently demonstrated that the size of eyes, supposedly a signal of mature 
versus babyish facial features, in!uences recognition of anger and fear. Faces with 
narrow eyes were more quickly categorized as angry, whereas faces with wider eyes 
were more quickly categorized as fearful.
Categorizing people into social groups has been found to guide emotion per-
ception in a top-down fashion (e.g. Bijlstra, Holland, & Wigboldus, 2010; Hugen-
berg, 2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006; Plant 
et al., 2000). Hugenberg (2005), for example, demonstrated that evaluative conno-
tations of social groups a"ected emotion categorization. White participants were 
asked to categorize two emotional expressions, one with a positive (happiness) and 
the other with a negative (anger or sadness) valence. Computer generated Black 
and White faces were used to rule out bottom-up processes as an alternative expla-
nation. Participants more quickly categorized a positive expression on White than 
on Black faces. In contrast, negative expressions were more quickly categorized 
on Black than on White faces. Furthermore, Hugenberg & Bodenhausen (2003) 
demonstrated that participants’ level of implicit prejudice, re!ecting evaluative as-
sociations with the Black and White categories, predicted the tendency to decode 
the negative expression anger on Black, but not on White, faces. Perceivers holding 
more negative implicit evaluation of African Americans more quickly decoded an-
ger on Black than on White faces. Together, these studies provide strong evidence 
for evaluative-congruency e"ects in emotion perception.
In addition to general evaluations, social categories are associated with stereo-
typical information (Devine, 1998). Among this stereotypical knowledge, informa-
tion about discrete emotional expressions may be stored. As stereotypical beliefs 
frequently have a strong evaluative connotation, general evaluative associations 
and stereotypical associations are o#en confounded. However, the two kinds of 
associations di"er in their level of emotion speci$city. For example, two distinct 
emotional expressions, despite both being negative, may signal distinct emotion-
al states. Although a particular social group (for example Moroccan men) may 
in general be evaluated negatively, some discrete negative expressions (e.g. anger) 
might be more stereotypically related to that category than other discrete nega-
tive expressions (e.g., sadness, fear). In line with this idea, Bijlstra and colleagues 
(2010) provided evidence for top-down stereotype-congruency e"ects in emotion 
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perception. !is suggests that evaluative and stereotype processes independently 
a"ect emotion recognition in a top-down fashion.
Recently, Amodio and Devine (2006) provided evidence for the dissociation 
between stereotypes and general evaluations (also see Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van 
Knippenberg, 2011) and demonstrated distinct consequences for judgments, and 
interpersonal behavior. What determines whether evaluative or stereotype pro-
cesses in#uence emotion perception? One important factor may be the context in 
which emotions are perceived. !e in#uence of context e"ects has been prominent 
in social cognition research. For example, it has been demonstrated that category 
activation and automatic responses towards social groups are susceptible to con-
textual in#uences (e.g. Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & 
Milne, 1995). Within the domain of emotion recognition, Bijlstra and colleagues 
(2010) provided evidence for the context dependency of stereotypic versus evalua-
tive associations in expression decoding. Participants were asked to categorize faces 
of two social groups (Moroccan vs. White men, Exp. 1; men vs. women, Exp. 2) in 
two emotion categories. !e comparative context in which participants completed 
this task was either dual- or single-valence. In the dual-valence condition, posi-
tive (happiness) and negative (anger or sadness) facial expressions were present-
ed, whereas in the single-valence condition only negatively valenced expressions 
(anger and sadness) were shown. !e dissociation between top-down processes 
is nicely illustrated by responses towards sad faces. In the dual-valence compara-
tive context sadness was categorized more quickly when displayed by male faces 
than when displayed by female faces, supposedly because of the relatively negative 
evaluation of males compared to females. In contrast, in the single-valence com-
parative context the exact same sad pictures were categorized more quickly for 
females than males, re#ecting stronger stereotypic associations between sadness 
and females than sadness and males. !ese results demonstrate the link between 
groups and discrete emotional expressions, as well as the important role of context 
on categorizing emotional expressions.
Although ample research demonstrated the relation between emotional ex-
pressions and groups, the boundary conditions of this relation remains unclear. 
In fact, it is unclear whether evaluative and stereotype e"ects could occur spon-
taneously, because in prior research, participants’ attention was always directed 
to both group membership and emotional expressions of targets (e.g. Bijlstra et 
al., 2010; Hugenberg, 2005; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006; Plant et al., 2000). Con-
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sequently, results are limited to a speci!c explicit group-emotion context. "is 
raises the question whether the salience of social category membership and emo-
tional expressions within one task is a necessary condition for group-emotion ef-
fects to occur. Here, we tested whether in the absence of an experimenter induced 
group-expression context, evaluative or stereotype processes guide spontaneous 
use of group-emotion associations. Furthermore, once we established what type of 
associations are used by default, we investigated the minimum context necessary to 
override spontaneous top-down processes by manipulating the group-expression 
context.
PRESENT RESEARCH
 In three studies we adopted a multi-method approach to investigate the spon-
taneous use of associations between social categories and discrete emotional ex-
pressions. To our knowledge, as yet, only one paper (Becker et al., 2007) studied the 
link between gender and emotional expressions employing a paradigm without di-
recting participants’ attention to both constructs. Becker and colleagues instruct-
ed participants to mentally picture happy or angry expressions. A#erwards, they 
asked participants what gender the face they thought of belonged to. Participants 
more o#en visualized men when they thought of an angry face, whereas a trend 
towards the reverse pattern was found for happy faces. "ese results demonstrated 
!rst evidence for spontaneously activated or default gender-emotional expression 
associations.
However, the Becker et al. (2007) results could be explained by either stereo-
type-congruency, evaluative-congruency or facial characteristics similarities be-
tween gender and emotional expressions. Happy expressions are more stereotypic 
for females than males, while anger is more stereotypic for males than females 
(Plant et al., 2000). At the same time, females are evaluated more positively than 
males (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). Following this logic, it is possible that Becker et 
al’s e$ects arose because of the female happiness association and the male anger 
association, or because of the female positivity association and the male negativity 
association. Furthermore, Becker et al. (2007; see also Hess et al., 2009) demon-
strated the confounded nature of features belonging to angry and happy expres-
sions with facial features of men and women, which might add to the observed 
e$ect. Lowered eye-brows belonging to an angry face are more similar to male 
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than female facial features, whereas smiling faces contain feature overlapping with 
females and not males. Consequently, no conclusions about the type of gender-ex-
pression associations that caused the e!ects can be drawn from the visualization 
study of Becker and colleagues.
In Study 4.1 we used a mental visualization task (see Becker et al., 2007) to test 
whether participants systematically think of a male or female face when mentally 
visualizing emotional expressions. We focused on anger and sadness, instead of 
anger and happiness, to rule out the possibility that only facial feature similarities 
could explain the results. More speci"cally, facial feature overlap between men and 
anger has been demonstrated (e.g. Becker et al., 2007), however, no systematic re-
semblance between facial features of sad faces and gender has been documented. 
#erefore, we argue that any e!ects here are more likely to re$ect gender-emo-
tion associations than facial feature similarities. Furthermore, to avoid confounds 
between an evaluative and a stereotype explanation we employed a paradigm 
comparing visualizations of negative expressions only. Having established default 
stereotypical gender-emotional expression associations using a visualization task 
without previous confounds, in Studies 4.2 and 4.3 we investigated the context 
dependency of these associations, using a data-driven approach to visualize men-
tal representations (reverse correlation, e.g. Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Dotsch, 
Wigboldus, Langner, & van Knippenberg, 2008).
STUDY 4.1
In Study 4.1 we asked participants to either think of an angry or a sad face. 
We predicted that people spontaneously use gender information associated with 
emotional expressions when mentally visualizing emotional faces. #e associated 
information may either be of an evaluative or stereotypical nature. #at is, if e!ects 
are driven only by evaluative connotations with men and women, participants in 
both conditions should more o%en visualize men than women, because both emo-
tional expressions are negative, and men are more negative than women. However, 
if e!ects are driven by stereotypical information, participants should visualize an-
gry faces more o%en as male than female, and sad faces more o%en as female than 
male, because of stereotype gender-expression associations.
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METHOD
Participants & Procedure
Fi!y-four Radboud University Nijmegen students (27 female) were recruited 
on university campus and asked to either visualize an angry (n = 28) or a sad (n = 
26) face and to mentally picture this emotional face as detailed as possible for ten 
seconds. Next, we asked participants to indicate the gender of the face they had 
visualized.
RESULTS
"e results showed that 79% of the participants who visualized an angry face 
thought of a male person, whereas, for sadness this was only 42%, X2 (1) = 7.46, p 
< .01. "e odds that participants thought of a male person was 5.03 times higher 
when they were instructed to think of an angry face than when they were instruct-
ed to think of a sad face. Finally, we tested whether the individual percentages dif-
fered signi#cantly from chance (50%) using binomial tests. Participants visualized 
an angry face as male above chance (p = .004) but were equally likely to visualize a 
sad face as male or female (p = .557). No e$ects of participants’ gender were found.
DISCUSSION
In line with previous stereotype-congruency results (Bijlstra et al., 2010) we 
found that participants more o!en thought of men when visualizing angry fac-
es. For sadness visualization no gender bias was observed. Nevertheless, the gen-
eral response patterns towards anger and sadness di$ered. "is study is the #rst 
to demonstrate spontaneous use of stereotypic gender-expression associations in 
visualizing emotional faces. Consistent with Becker and colleagues (2007) partici-
pants more o!en thought of men when they were instructed to visualize an angry 
face. For sadness, the link with gender seems to be less strong. Together these re-
sults support an explanation based on cultural stereotypes more than an explana-
tion based on evaluation between expressions and gender. 
We should, however, be careful in interpreting these results as strong evi-
dence for stereotype-congruency as default gender-emotion associations. "at is, 
although we asked participants to mentally picture a sad or an angry face as de-
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tailed as possible, participants may have applied gender to the visualized face not 
earlier than the moment that they read our question regarding gender of the face. It 
is possible that the question itself activated a gender-emotional expression context, 
resulting in a stereotype-congruency e!ect.
To avoid this potential experimental limitation we employed reverse correla-
tion (RC) techniques in Studies 4.2 and 4.3. RC provides a data-driven approach 
to model mental representations (for a review on data-driven methods in social 
perception, see Todorov, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Said, 2011). Most importantly 
for the current research, the advantage of RC is that it enabled us to investigate 
default associations in mental representations outside of a gender-emotional ex-
pression context, because gender is not mentioned during the task. RC techniques 
have been successfully employed in modeling mental representations of social 
categories (e.g. Moroccan Dutch men – Dotsch et al., 2008; gender – Mangini & 
Biederman, 2004), personality traits (e.g. trustworthiness & dominance – Dotsch 
& Todorov, 2012) and emotional expressions (Mangini & Biederman, 2004; Jack, 
Caldara, & Schyns, 2011).
In the RC task of Study 4.2 we asked participants to select either the most 
angry, sad, male, or female looking face out of two stimuli options. "e stimuli all 
consisted of the same face with random noise superimposed, which resulted in two 
stimuli with di!erent parts of the face highlighted. By averaging all selected stimuli 
per condition we were able to model group based mental representations (or clas-
si#cation images, CIs) of anger, sadness, men, and women. In the remainder of this 
chapter we will refer to the expression CIs as target CIs, whereas the gender CIs are 
referred to as criterion CIs.
"us, in Study 4.2 we used a RC task to model mental representations of gen-
der (men, women) and emotional expressions (anger, sadness). A$erwards, the 
modeled target CIs were tested for similarities with the criterion CIs. "is was done 
by using a subjective and objective measurement. Subjective scores were collected 
by asking an independent sample of participants to rate gender typicality of the 
four CIs. Because these ratings might be in part in%uenced by participants’ ste-
reotype associations, we tested the objective physical similarity between faces by 
correlating the noise patterns between CIs. 
We hypothesized that participants spontaneously used gender information 
in visualizing emotional faces. "is should be re%ected in raters’ gender typicality 
scores and correlations between the target CIs and criterion CIs. If the results of 
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Study 4.1 re!ect spontaneous usage of stereotypical gender-emotional expression 
associations, these should generalize to the current study. As a result the angry CI 
should be more similar to the male CI, whereas the sad CI should be more similar 
to the female CI. 
STUDY 4.2
METHOD
Participants & Design
Eighty-four Radboud University Nijmegen students (73 female, Mage = 20) 
participated in a two images forced choice (2IFC) RC experiment (e.g. Dotsch et 
al., 2008). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in which 
they were instructed to choose the most angry, sad, male, or female looking face 
of two presented stimuli. We then created four CIs, representing a group-averaged 
visualization of each between-subjects condition, and tested for similarities and 
di"erences between CIs.
Materials & Procedure
#e 2IFC RC task was adapted from Dotsch et al. (2008). Participants were 
asked to select either the most angry, sad, male, or female looking face out of two 
stimuli on each trial. #e stimuli all consisted of a face with random noise su-
perimposed. For each trial the exact same base face was used, which was a grey 
scale average of all male and female faces of the Karolinska Directed Face Database 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998), see Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Grey scale average of all male and female faces of the Karolinska Directed Face Database used 
in all RC Studies we report in the current chapter.
One random noise pattern was generated for each trial (for details, see Dotsch 
& Todorov, 2012; Mangini & Biederman, 2004). For one stimulus we superim-
posed the original noise pattern onto the base face and for the other we superim-
posed the negative of the noise, resulting in two noisy pictures (512 x 512 pixels 
each) per trial (see Figure 14). In total, we generated 500 random noise patterns 
with which we created 1000 stimuli (500 with the original noise patterns and 500 
with the negative noise patterns superimposed). 
Figure 14. Two stimuli examples, one displaying the base face with the original noise (le!) and one with 
the negative of the noise pattern (right) added.
We told participants that in this task they would be presented with two pic-
tures per trial and that on every trial one face looked, for example, more angry than 
the other. Next, we instructed them to select the most ‘angry’ looking face. We told 
them that we added noise to the pictures to make this seemingly easy task more 
di!cult. Participants indicated their choice by pressing one of two buttons (‘A’ or 
‘6’) corresponding to either the le" or right stimulus. In total, participants com-
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pleted 500 trials distributed over 5 blocks of 100 trials each. Between every block 
we added a pause of 20 seconds. All participants were presented with the same 
stimuli in identical order, but screen placement (original le! and negative right vs. 
negative le! and original right) was randomized. 
RESULTS
We excluded the data of two participants based on their low median response 
latency13 (< 350 ms). For each participant, we calculated the mean of all selected 
noise patterns, which, superimposed on the original base face, resulted in a per-
sonal CI. We then generated aggregated CIs for each between-subjects condition 
by averaging all personal classi"cation noise patterns within the respective condi-
tion and superimposing those on the original base face (see Figure 15).
Figure 15. !e averaged classi"cation images per between-subjects condition: Female (top le#), male (top 
right), sadness (bottom le#), and anger (bottom right).
13 We realize that the choice for this exact cut-o! criterion is rather arbitrary. "e range of median 
response latencies without the excluded participants is 725 to 2983 milliseconds. We believe that a 
median response below 350 milliseconds signals that participants did not seriously participate in the 
current experiment. Leaving these participants in our data sample, however, yielded similar e!ects as 
reported in this study.
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To test whether di!erences between CIs were present, and more importantly 
to what extent they contained similarities to men and women, we asked a group 
of independent participants to rate all CIs on masculinity and femininity. Further-
more, physical similarity ratings were calculated to test spontaneous use of gen-
der-emotion associations outside of an experimenter induced gender context.
Participants’ ratings
We asked twenty Radboud University Nijmegen students (18 female, Mage = 
23) to rate the four CIs on masculinity and femininity. Participants "rst rated, in 
random order, the target CIs and subsequently were asked to rate the criterion 
CIs in random order, using a slider ranging from not at all (0) to extremely (100) 
masculine/feminine. 
Gender classi!cation images. We ran a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with CI gender (Male vs. Female) and Gender rating (Masculine vs. 
Feminine) as within-subjects variables. #e predicted 2-way interaction between 
CI Gender en Gender rating was found, F(1, 19) = 131.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .87. #e 
male CI was rated as more masculine (M = 82.05, SD = 29.28) than feminine (M = 
17.50, SD = 28.89), F(1, 19) = 48.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .72. #e female CI was rated as 
more feminine (M = 95.15, SD = 8.17) than masculine (M = 12.05, SD = 28.37), 
F(1, 19) = 166.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .90, see Figure 16. #ese analyses establish that the 
male and female CI visualize a male and female face successfully.
Figure 16. Participants’ femininity and masculinity ratings including SD’s of the Gender CIs. Note that 
some SD’s may fall outside of the scale range.
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Emotional expression classi!cation images. To test to what extent raters evalu-
ated the emotional expression CIs images as masculine and feminine we ran a re-
peated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Emotional Expression (angry 
vs. sad) and Gender rating (Masculine vs. Feminine) as within-subjects variables. 
!is analysis revealed a main e"ect of Gender rating, F(1, 19) = 37.63, p < .001, ηp2 
= .66. Both emotional expression CIs were rated as more masculine than feminine.
More importantly, the predicted 2-way interaction between Gender and 
Emotional Expression was also signi$cant, F(1, 19) = 4.94, p = .039, ηp2 = .21, see 
Figure 17. Speci$cally, the angry CI was rated more masculine (M = 75.85, SD = 
19.88) than feminine (M = 21.05, SD = 24.47), F(1, 19) = 53.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .74. 
Furthermore, the sad CI was also rated more masculine (M = 59.80, SD = 25.38) 
than feminine (M = 31.05, SD = 26.61), F(1, 19) = 7.87, p = .011, ηp2 = .29, but this 
di"erence was smaller than for the angry CI, as indicated by the signi$cant inter-
action e"ect. Furthermore, the angry CI was rated as more masculine than the sad 
CI, F(1, 19) = 5.53, p = .030, ηp2 = .225. No di"erence was found on the femininity 
ratings between these two CIs (F < 1.6, p = ns.).
Figure 17. Participants’ femininity and masculinity ratings including SD’s of the Emotional expression 
CIs. Note that some SD’s may fall outside of the scale range.
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!cation noise patterns (excluding base face), following the procedure of Dotsch 
and Todorov, 2012. Since we were particularly interested in the face area of the 
image, we masked the image with an oval revealing only the face area and leaving 
out the background. Correlations were calculated using pixels in the unmasked 
area only14. Due to the large amount of pixels for every CI (n = 152,639), most 
correlations reached a signi!cance level of p < .001. "erefore, p-values are less 
informative and we focused on correlation strength only. Consistent with Cohen 
(1988, 1992) we classi!ed correlations as small (r = .10), medium (r = .30), or large 
(r = .50). Higher positive correlations mean greater physical similarities between 
faces, higher negative correlations mean opposite similarities, and zero correla-
tions mean no similarities.
As predicted, the angry CI correlated medium positive with the male CI (r = 
.35), and small negative with the female CI, (r = -.07), indicating that participants’ 
mental representation of an angry face conveys male features, but not female fea-
tures. Inconsistent with the stereotype-congruency e#ects of Study 4.1, the sad CI 
and the male CI correlated medium positive (r = .25), while the sad CI and the 
female CI correlated medium negative (r = -.21). "is indicated that participants 
spontaneously used male facial features, and no female features, indicative for a sad 
face15. Furthermore, the angry and sad CIs correlated strongly positive (r = .47), 
whereas the male and female CIs correlated strongly negative (r = -.69).
14 Correlations for unmasked images were slightly lower than the correlations for the masked images, but 
they revealed identical (signi!cant) patterns of results.
15 In an additional Study 85 participants completed a within-subjects version of the 2IFC RC tasks: 
containing one anger and one sadness RC task, in counter-balanced order. We used the same 1000 
stimuli as in Study 2 and in addition we generated 200 extra images (100 with original noise and 100 
with the negative noise superimposed). "e stimuli were presented in two blocks of 300 trials (one 
block for each RC task). In total 1200 images were used for 600 trials. Apart from the number of 
trials and the within-subjects design, materials and the experimental procedure was identical to Study 
2. Block 1 successfully replicated the e#ects of Study 2. However, Block 2 revealed overall smaller 
correlations (range: r = .01 to r = .11) and a pattern that di#ered somewhat from the e#ects of Study 
2. A post hoc explanation for the inconsistent results of Block 2 could possibly be found in the lack 
of motivation of our participants for this second part of the task. "e data of Block 2 might therefore 
represent less consistent participants’ judgments, which could explain the smaller and inconsistent 
correlations. Importantly, the procedure and results of Block 1 best represent what has been used and 
demonstrated in Study 2.
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DISCUSSION
!e results of Study 4.2 demonstrated that mental representations of both 
emotional expressions contained more masculine than feminine features. Partic-
ipants rated the angry and sad CI as more masculine than feminine. Importantly, 
this di"erence was larger for the angry than the sad CI. In addition, we calculated 
physical similarity by correlating the noise pattern pixels of CIs. Both emotional 
expressions correlated positively with the male CI. Furthermore, we found a nega-
tive correlation for the relation between sadness and the female mental representa-
tion, re#ecting opposite instead of greater physical similarities between CIs.
Mental representations for both negative expressions objectively and subjec-
tively conveyed more masculine than feminine features. !is is in line with re-
search showing that men are in general evaluated more negatively than women 
(Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). Taken together, these results suggest that spontaneous 
use of gender-emotional expression associations was more strongly a"ected by 
evaluative-congruency than stereotype-congruency. Similarities between both ex-
pressions and men could only partially be explained by a stereotype-congruency 
processes. !at is, from a stereotype-congruency perspective we expected that an-
ger conveyed more male features, and sadness conveyed more female features. A 
prediction that was in line with the interaction between participants’ gender typi-
cality ratings of the two emotional expression CIs. When participants rated gender 
typicality of the emotion CIs, the di"erence between masculinity and femininity 
ratings were larger for the anger CI than the sadness CI. !ese results could be due 
to an emotion-gender comparative context created by the gender-rating question. 
!is might explain the di"erences between participants’ ratings of the sad CI and 
the objectively measured physical similarity.
!e similarity $ndings on the subjective measure add to the idea that the ste-
reotype-congruency results of Study 4.1 were to some extent caused by the gender 
question, which might have introduced a gender-emotion comparative context. In 
Study 4.2 we showed that when no reference is made to either gender (in modeling 
emotional expressions) or emotional expressions (in modeling gender), objectively 
measured similarities were found between the noise patterns of both emotional 
expression CIs and the male CI. In contrast, opposite similarities were found be-
tween the female CI and the emotional expression CIs. !is suggests that when no 
reference to gender is made, evaluative congruent associations are used as default 
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associations, whereas for stereotype-congruency e!ects, a comparative context, 
such as provided to the raters seems to be needed. 
"e stereotype results found in Studies 4.1 and 4.2 are in line with prior re-
search showing stereotype e!ects when the experimental context contained both 
gender and emotional expressions (Bijlstra et al., 2010). However, the current re-
search sought to provide evidence for spontaneous use of gender-emotion associa-
tions when participants’ attention is not directed towards the gender and emotion-
al expression of stimuli. "e objective similarity results of Study 4.2 suggest that no 
stereotype associations were re#ected in mental representations. "e question that 
remains unanswered here is: What is the minimum context necessary for stereo-
type e!ects to occur spontaneously? We suggest that pitting two discrete emotional 
expressions against each other is enough context. In line with Bijlstra et al. (2010) 
we predict that the comparative context moderates spontaneous use of evaluative 
or stereotype congruent associations. "e goal of Study 4.3 is addressing this issue 
by combining the RC paradigm with a comparative emotion context manipulation 
adapted from Bijlstra and colleagues. Two conditions were created in which par-
ticipants repeatedly classi$ed single noisy pictures in either a dual- or single-va-
lence comparative context. Importantly, this context manipulation di!ers from the 
unintended gender context manipulation in Study 4.1, and the gender context in 
which participants rated CIs in Study 4.2, because we presented participants with 
an emotion comparative context without referring to gender.
In each between-subjects condition participants repeatedly classi$ed single 
noisy stimuli on a scale ranging from one emotional expression (anger or happi-
ness) to a second emotion expression (sadness). "e type of rating participants 
made depended on the comparative context condition they were assigned to. Using 
this procedure we calculated two personal CIs per participant and four aggregated 
CIs on the group level (anger in the context of sadness, happiness in the context 
of sadness, and sadness in the context of either anger or happiness). Of interest 
for our hypothesis were the individual CIs of sadness in the context of anger (sin-
gle-valence comparative context) and sadness in the context of happiness (dual-va-
lence comparative context). In line with Study 4.2, we predicted that sadness in 
the evaluative dual-valence context represents mental representations of men more 
than women, as women are more strongly associated with positivity than men (Ea-
gly & Mladinic, 1989). Furthermore, in line with Bijlstra et al. (2010), we predicted 
that sadness in the stereotypical single-valence context represents mental represen-
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tations of women more than men, as within common cultural stereotypes anger is 
more strongly associated with men and sadness more strongly with women.
!us, Study 4.3 employs a RC paradigm in combination with a comparative 
emotion context manipulation to test spontaneous use of gender-expression asso-
ciations without referring to gender. By manipulating the emotion context, instead 
of the gender context, we sought to investigate the minimum context necessary to 
override spontaneous evaluative processes.
STUDY 4.3 
METHOD
Participants & Design
A total of "#y-seven Radboud University Nijmegen students (45 female, Mage 
= 22) participated in this RC experiment. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of two Comparative context conditions (dual-valence: ‘happy versus sad’; 
single-valence: ‘angry versus sad’) in which they repeatedly classi"ed single noisy 
stimuli on a scale from 1 to 4, ranging from one emotional expression (happiness 
or anger) to a second emotion expression (sadness).
Materials & Procedure
!e RC task used in this Study was adapted from Mangini and Biederman 
(2004). Participants were repeatedly presented with one stimulus, displaying a con-
stant base face with random noise superimposed on it. We instructed participants 
that on every trial the face was expressing a subtle emotion and that it was their 
task to judge this expression. Depending on the assigned comparative context con-
dition, participants either classi"ed the stimuli on a 4-point scale ranging from 
angry to sad (single-valence) or from happy to sad (dual-valence). For every trial 
we asked them to select one of four responses: (1) ‘probably angry [happy]’, (2) 
‘possibly angry [happy]’, (3) possibly sad, (4) probably sad. 
Stimulus items in this study consisted of a base face superimposed with the 
original noise pattern and were identical to those used in Study 4.2. All partici-
pants were presented with the same 500 trials in identical order. !e maximum 
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task duration was !xed to 23 minutes16. Seven participants did not complete all 500 
trials within the allotted time (ranging from 285 to 484), on average participants 
completed 485 trials. We included all participants in data analysis, regardless of the 
number of completed trials. 
RESULTS
We excluded data of two participants based on their low median response la-
tency (< 350 ms) in the RC task17. We calculated noise patterns both at a group 
level and a participant level. For each participant we calculated the mean of all 
noise patterns judged as belonging to the happy (or angry) and sad category (this 
included the ‘probably’ as well as the ‘possibly’ response options18). Superimposing 
those mean classi!cation noise patterns on the original base face resulted in per-
sonal CIs on the participant level. We then generated aggregated CIs for each be-
tween-subjects condition by averaging all personal classi!cation noise patterns 
within the respective condition and superimposing those on the original base face. 
"is resulted in four group-level CIs: happy, angry, sad in the context of happy, and 
sad in the context of angry (see Figure 18).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 We chose to use a RC task of 23 minutes because an extra task, not central to the purpose of the current 
study with a total duration of approximately 7 minutes was added.
17 Including these two participants in our analysis did not change the results of this study.
18 !is procedure di"ered from the original Mangini and Biederman (2004) in the sense that we combined 
the ‘probably’ and ‘possibly’ choice-options for modeling mental representations. !is was done to 
minimize di"erences in number of judgments between CIs. Participants more o#en used the possibly 
than the probably option, in total the percentages of sadness judgments for dual- and single-valence 
conditions respectively 55% and 51%. !e strongest e"ects in this study were found for the possibly 
option judgments. !is could, on the one hand, be due to the fact that people base their judgments on 
social category information when stimuli ambiguity gets higher. On the other hand, a lower number of 
judgments also contributes to less stable modeling of mental representations.
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Figure 18. !e averaged classi"cation images per between-subjects condition: Angry (top le#), sadness in 
the context of anger (top right), happiness (bottom le#), and sadness in the context of happiness (bottom 
right).
First we correlated the averaged happy and angry noise patterns with the male 
and female noise patterns from Study 4.2. As expected the angry CI correlated 
positively with the male CI of Study 4.2 (r = .08) and negatively with the female CI 
of Study 4.2 (r = -.02). In contrast, the averaged happy CI correlated positively with 
the female CI of Study 4.2 (r = .10) and negatively with the male CI of Study 4.2 (r = 
-.14). All correlations in this study were smaller than in Study 4.2, due to the lower 
amount of trials used to create the CIs.
Secondly, correlations between participants’ personal sad CIs (in the context 
of either happiness or anger, respectively dual-valence or single-valence compara-
tive context) and the aggregated male and female CIs of Study 4.2 were calculated. 
Because these correlations serve as dependent variable in subsequent analyses and 
to ensure normality, we transformed the correlations using Fisher’s r-to-z. How-
ever, in order to facilitate the interpretation of our !ndings, we will report mean 
correlations. To test whether these transformed correlations between the sad CIs 
and the gender CIs of Study 4.2 di"ered as a function of comparative context, a 
Gender (sadness-male vs. sadness-female) X Comparative context (dual-valence 
task duration was !xed to 23 minutes16. Seven participants did not complete all 500 
trials within the allotted time (ranging from 285 to 484), on average participants 
completed 485 trials. We included all participants in data analysis, regardless of the 
number of completed trials. 
RESULTS
We excluded data of two participants based on their low median response la-
tency (< 350 ms) in the RC task17. We calculated noise patterns both at a group 
level and a participant level. For each participant we calculated the mean of all 
noise patterns judged as belonging to the happy (or angry) and sad category (this 
included the ‘probably’ as well as the ‘possibly’ response options18). Superimposing 
those mean classi!cation noise patterns on the original base face resulted in per-
sonal CIs on the participant level. We then generated aggregated CIs for each be-
tween-subjects condition by averaging all personal classi!cation noise patterns 
within the respective condition and superimposing those on the original base face. 
#is resulted in four group-level CIs: happy, angry, sad in the context of happy, and 
sad in the context of angry (see Figure 18).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 We chose to use a RC task of 23 minutes because an extra task, not central to the purpose of the current 
study with a total duration of approximately 7 minutes was added.
17 Including these two participants in our analysis did not change the results of this study.
18 !is procedure di"ered from the original Mangini and Biederman (2004) in the sense that we combined 
the ‘probably’ and ‘possibly’ choice-options for modeling mental representations. !is was done to 
minimize di"erences in number of judgments between CIs. Participants more o#en used the possibly 
than the probably option, in total the percentages of sadness judgments for dual- and single-valence 
conditions respectively 55% and 51%. !e strongest e"ects in this study were found for the possibly 
option judgments. !is could, on the one hand, be due to the fact that people base their judgments on 
social category information when stimuli ambiguity gets higher. On the other hand, a lower number of 
judgments also contributes to less stable modeling of mental representations.
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vs. single-valence) repeated measures ANOVA was performed with Gender as 
within-subjects and Comparative context between-subjects variables. !is analysis 
revealed a main e"ect of Comparative context, F(1, 53) = 23.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. 
!is main e"ect was quali$ed by a two-way interaction between Gender and Com-
parative context, F(1, 53) = 27.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .34, see Figure 19. In the dual-va-
lence condition, a small positive correlation between the sad CI and the male CI 
(M = .07, SD = .05) was found, whereas a small negative correlation was observed 
between the sad CI and the female CI (M = -.06, SD = .08), F(1, 53) = 20.20, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .28. In contrast, in the single-valence condition, a small positive correla-
tion was found between the sad CI and the female CI (M = .01, SD = .08), and a 
small negative correlation between the sad CI and the male CI (M = -.07, SD = .09), 
F(1, 53) = 8.39, p = .005, ηp2 = .14.
Figure 19. Averaged correlations and SD’s between the sadness CI’s and the criterion CI’s per be-
tween-subjects condition.
DISCUSSION
!e results of this third study demonstrated that participants’ mental repre-
sentations were susceptible to a manipulation of context. Without making refer-
ence to gender during the experimental task, participants used di"erent top-down 
associations depending on the emotion comparative context. !e sadness CIs were 
predicted to show signals of either masculinity or femininity depending on the 
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emotion comparative context. We found that when participants were asked to 
classify noisy images on a dual-valence scale (happy-sad), participants’ sadness CI 
conveyed physical similarities to our male and not to our female CI. !is result 
is consistent with an evaluative-congruency account. Importantly, this pattern of 
results reversed when participants were asked to classify noisy images on a sin-
gle-valence scale (anger - sad). Within this context, we found evidence for a stereo-
type-congruency e"ect such that mental representations of sadness did not convey 
male facial features as in the dual-valence condition, but conveyed female facial 
features. With these results we have shown that an emotion comparative context is 
su#cient for spontaneous stereotype e"ects to emerge.
Furthermore, consistent with Studies 4.1 and 4.2, and both an evaluative- and 
stereotype-congruency perspective, we found that the averaged anger CI conveyed 
more male than female facial features. In contrast, participants spontaneously used 
female facial features in modeling happiness, which is consistent with an evalua-
tive-congruency perspective stating that women are evaluated more positively than 
men (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). However, these results could also be explained by 
facial feature overlap only, as male faces contain features consistent with anger ex-
pressions and female faces consistent with happy expressions (Becker et al., 2007). 
For sadness, such a facial feature explanation is not supported by the literature. 
!erefore, the results of our sadness mental representations were most indicative 
for the underlying associative processes.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
!e goal of the current research was to test spontaneous and context depen-
dent use of group-emotion associations. When participants’ attention was not di-
rected to both the social category and the emotional expressions within the exper-
imental task (Study 4.2), mental representations of negative expressions (anger & 
sadness) showed stronger similarities with male than female facial features. !is 
result is consistent with an evaluative-congruency perspective (e.g. Hugenberg & 
Sczesny, 2006), because men in general are seen as less positive than women (Eagly 
& Mladinic, 1989). When a gender comparative context was salient, in Studies 4.1 
and 4.2, gender stereotype-congruency e"ects were observed. Gender comparative 
context was activated either by asking for gender of a visualized face or when par-
ticipants rated gender typicality of emotional expression CIs. 
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However, a gender comparative context might not even be a necessary precon-
dition for stereotype-congruency e!ects to occur. With Study 4.3 we demonstrated 
that evaluative- and stereotype-congruency e!ects are susceptible to an emotion 
comparative context. Without directing participants’ attention to gender in the ex-
perimental task, we manipulated the emotion context in which stimuli were classi-
"ed. #is procedure allowed us to successfully predict spontaneous use of evalua-
tive- and stereotype-congruent associations. We replicated evaluative-congruency 
e!ects when valence was made salient (dual-valence), and provided novel evidence 
for spontaneous stereotype-congruency e!ects when di!erences in valence were 
not made salient (single-valence).
TOP-DOWN PROCESSES
#e current research addresses the use of top-down processes in mental rep-
resentation of emotional expressions. Recently, Amodio and Devine (2006; see 
also Dotsch et al., 2011) demonstrated that evaluative and stereotype processes can 
operate independently and have distinct consequences. In line with this idea Bijls-
tra and colleagues (2010) showed that both type of top-down processes also a!ect 
emotion perception di!erently. #e current research expands on this knowledge by 
testing spontaneous use of associations in visualizing emotional expressions when 
no group-expression context is induced.
Across three studies we found evidence for the usage of both types of top-
down processes in mental representations of emotional expressions. Consistent 
evidence for the relation between anger and men was found, whereas for sadness 
the relation with gender was more complex. #e results of Study 4.2 provided novel 
evidence that the evaluative dimension was used by default when no group-emo-
tional expression context was induced. In line with research showing that women 
are evaluated more positively than men (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), we observed 
more similarities between negative expressions (anger & sadness) and men than 
women. #is suggests that the relatively negative evaluative connotation of men 
and mental representations of negative emotional expressions converged. #is re-
sults is consistent with prior research demonstrating that negative expressions in 
general are recognized more quickly on male than on female faces (Bijlstra et al., 
2010; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006). With the present research, however, we are the 
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induced group-expression context. By default, people spontaneously evaluate faces 
on a positive versus negative dimension, which is consistent with research demon-
strating that evaluations play a dominant role in person perception (Osgood, Suci, 
& Tannenbaum, 1957; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993).
Moreover, a moderation of the type of associations participants used was 
found when we experimentally induced a comparative context. Introducing a gen-
der comparative context instigated the use of stereotype-congruent associations. 
Although we found in Study 4.2 that negative emotional expression CIs in general 
were rated as more masculine than feminine, the data revealed a smaller di"er-
ence between masculinity and femininity scores for the sad than the angry CI. 
#is suggests that raters used their stereotypical associations between gender and 
expressions in rating expression CIs on gender typicality. In sum, participants in 
Study 4.2 by default created faces in line with an evaluative-congruency perspec-
tive, whereas raters used stereotype-congruent associations in judging gender typ-
icality of these faces.
When, instead of a gender context, the emotion comparative context was 
manipulated (Study 4.3), we found dissociable e"ects of evaluative- and stereo-
type-congruent associations in participants’ mental representations of anger, hap-
piness and sadness. Support was found for evaluative-congruency e"ects when 
stimuli were classi!ed on a dual-valence (happy-sad) scale. In contrast, stereo-
type-congruency e"ects were found when the same stimuli were classi!ed on a 
single-valence (angry-sad) scale. #e di"erences in mental representation of sad-
ness is most illustrative of the observed dissociation. Although our participants 
classi!ed the exact same stimuli in both conditions, the emotion comparative con-
text guided participants’ use of evaluative- or stereotype-congruent associations in 
rating stimuli. #is resulted in two sadness CIs both expressing sadness, but one 
containing more male and the other more female facial features. Evaluative-con-
gruency between males and sadness was used in a dual-valence condition, whereas 
stereotype-congruency between females and sadness was used in a single-valence 
context.
In sum, with the present studies we add to an increasing body of research 
demonstrating a dissociation of top-down associations (Amodio & Devine, 2006; 
Dotsch et al. 2011; Bijlstra et al., 2010). By default our participants used evaluative 
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associations in modeling negative emotional expressions, whereas a manipulation 
of the context led to either evaluative- or stereotype-congruent e!ects. With these 
results, we support prior research showing a dissociation between top-down pro-
cesses and extend these "ndings by demonstrating that evaluative-congruent asso-
ciations are used by default.
Alternatively, one could argue for a third type of top-down processes explain-
ing the male associations participants used when no group-expression context was 
used. It could be that, in general, participants were more likely to think of male 
than female faces. Prior research demonstrated that people tend to think of men 
when stimuli are gender ambiguous (e.g. Merrit & Harrison, 2006; Zarate & Smith, 
1990), suggesting that the prototype for a person is male. Following this logic, it 
is obvious that participants modeled male looking emotional faces in Study 4.2. 
Presenting participants with a gender ambiguous base face superimposed with 
random noise, instigated the use of prototype male associations. As a results, both 
expressions, independent of their valence, conveyed male facial features. Although 
this might explain the results of Study 4.2, the results of Study 4.3 cannot be ex-
plained by this third type of top-down processes. If in general people more o#en 
think of men when gender is ambiguous, then one would also expect that mental 
representations of happiness in Study 4.3 contain more male than female similari-
ties. $e results, however, are inconsistent with this prediction and instead show a 
positive correlation between the happy CI and our female CI, whereas the male CI 
correlated negatively with the happy CI. $erefore, we think that the results of the 
present studies can best be explained with evaluative- and stereotype associations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FACE PERCEPTION RESEARCH
$e results of our studies are an important contribution to the "eld of social 
categorization and emotion research. Although a large body of research demon-
strated the link between emotional expressions and groups (e.g. Becker et al., 2007; 
Fischer, 1993; Fischer et al., 2004; Hess et al., 2009; Hugenberg, 2005; Plant et al., 
2000), thus far, no research disentangled spontaneous and context dependent use 
of group-expression associations. $erefore, the occurrence of prior group-expres-
sion e!ects may strongly depend on the speci"c context in which the relation was 
studied, and nothing was clear about what happens when no such context is pres-
ent. With the current studies we demonstrated that distinctive prediction should 
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be made for spontaneous and context dependent use of associations between gen-
der and emotional expressions. Importantly, for stereotype-congruency e!ects at 
least some emotion or gender context was necessary. "is suggests that previous 
found stereotype e!ects were also (partially) induced by the context in which they 
were studied. "e present studies, therefore, contribute to the external validity of 
group-expression associations outside an experimentally induced group-expres-
sion context.
Our #ndings also contribute to the development of RC-paradigms in face 
perception research. With our studies we are the #rst to combine a context ma-
nipulation with RC techniques. Moreover, we demonstrated that using more than 
one category label in rating stimuli could lead to di!erences in participants’ mental 
representations. In our results, we observed diversity in sadness mental representa-
tions depending on the categorization options provided to participants. Although, 
our sad faces in Study 4.3 both communicate the same expression, the gender sim-
ilarity of these mental representations di!er. "is result suggests that the emotion 
labels used in prior RC research (e.g. Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; 
Mangini & Biederman, 2004) to some extent contributed to the found e!ects.
In sum, based on the present results we conclude that people spontaneously 
use gender-expression associations outside a gender-expression or a gender con-
text. Importantly, our results demonstrate that evaluative-congruency between ex-
pressions and gender is used as a default association when no comparative context 
is induced. Mental representations of negative expressions contain more male than 
female facial features. In contrast, for spontaneous use of stereotype-congruent as-
sociations, some context is required; either valence di!erences between emotions 
should not be salient or a clear male versus female context is needed.
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NEDERLANDSE
SAMENVATTING - 
DUTCH SUMMARY
Graag wil ik beginnen met u een vraag te stellen zoals ik dat ook deed aan 
deelnemers in één van mijn experimenten. Ik zou u willen vragen om een voor u 
typisch boos gezicht in gedachten te houden. Probeer, voordat u verder leest, een 
duidelijk beeld te vormen van dit boze gezicht dat u aankijkt.
...
Hoe zag het gezicht dat u zich voorstelde eruit? Vertoonde het speci!eke 
gelaatstrekken zoals samengeknepen ogen en gefronste wenkbrauwen die typer-
end zijn voor boze emotionele uitdrukkingen? Belangrijker nog voor het huidige 
proefschri": Behoorde het gezicht waaraan u dacht toe aan een man of een vrouw? 
Uit de resultaten van ons onderzoek blijkt dat de meeste mensen - 79 procent - in 
deze situatie aangeven aan een man te denken. Zou u aan een persoon van het-
zelfde geslacht hebben gedacht wanneer ik u had gevraagd om aan een verdrietig 
gezicht te denken?
Op basis van eerder onderzoek over stereotype emotionele gelaatsexpressies 
uitgebeeld door mannen en vrouwen (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000) ver-
wachtte ik in ons onderzoek dat na de instructie om aan een verdrietig gezicht te 
denken er meer deelnemers aan een vrouw dan aan een man zouden denken. In 
lijn met deze verwachting was het percentage deelnemers dat aan een vrouw dacht 
58 procent na deze vraag. Deze resultaten suggereren dat mensen de neiging heb-
ben om stereotypen te gebruiken wanneer ze over emotionele gezichten nadenken. 
In het onderzoek dat beschreven staat in mijn proefschri" probeer ik ant-
woord te vinden op de vraag of een koppeling (associatie) tussen een sociale 
categorie (zoals sekse of etniciteit) en speci!eke emoties emotieherkenning kan 
beïnvloeden. In deze samenvatting zal ik eerst een uiteenzetting geven van het 
onderzoek dat is uitgevoerd in deze onderzoekstraditie. Daaropvolgend zal ik de 
bevindingen van onze experimenten toelichten.
SOCIALE CATEGORISATIE EN EMOTIEHERKENNING
Tijdens dagelijkse sociale interacties is het van belang om goed en snel waar 
te nemen hoe mensen zich voelen. Gezichtsuitdrukkingen spelen hierbij een be-
langrijke rol en worden gebruikt als informatiebron voor hoe je je passend kunt 
gedragen. Wanneer iemand verdrietig is dan kun je deze persoon troosten door 
naar haar (of hem) toe te gaan. Wanneer de persoon die je waarneemt boos is dan 
zou je daarentegen eerder geneigd zijn om hem (of haar) te vermijden. Hoewel 
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beide emotionele expressies negatief van aard zijn, zijn ze duidelijk verschillend in 
betekenis en worden ze gekoppeld aan verschillende gedragstendenties (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005). 
Het proces dat zich tijdens emotieherkenning afspeelt verloopt snel en wordt 
beïnvloed door zowel de persoon die de emotie vertoont als door de persoon die 
de emotie waarneemt. Zo is bijvoorbeeld de intensiteit van een emotie belangri-
jk voor het gemak van herkenning (Leppänen, Kauppinen, Peltola, & Hietanen, 
2007), evenals het in meer of mindere mate bezitten van speci!eke eigenschappen 
in het gezicht die gelijkenis hebben met speci!eke emotionele expressies (bv. zware 
wenkbrauwen in boze gezichten: Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 
2007; of grote van de ogen zoals in angstige gezichten: Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009).
Naast deze gezichtseigenschappen spelen associaties die de waarnemer hee" 
bij de persoon een rol (bv. Hugenberg 2005; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; 
Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006; Kang & Chasteen, 2009). De kern van de bevindin-
gen in deze lijn van onderzoek was dat evaluatieve associaties over leden van een 
sociale categorie (ook wel vooroordelen genoemd) de herkenning van positieve 
en negatieve emoties beïnvloedt. Ter illustratie het volgende onderzoek: Hugen-
berg (2005) presenteerde deelnemers kort met plaatjes van computer geanimeerde 
Blanke en Zwarte gezichten die een positieve emotie (blijdschap) of een negati-
eve emotie (boosheid of verdriet) uitbeelden. De vraag aan deelnemers was om zo 
snel mogelijk de emotie te categoriseren als blijdschap of boosheid (of verdriet). 
Hoewel de emotionele expressies op Blanke en Zwarte gezichten identiek waren, 
werden er verschillen in de snelheid van emotieherkenning gevonden. Blijdschap 
werd sneller op Blanke dan op Zwarte gezichten herkend. Voor beide negatieve 
emoties werd het omgekeerde gevonden, zowel boosheid als verdriet werden 
sneller op Zwarte dan Blanke gezichten herkend. De onderzoekers concludeerden 
dat vooroordelen die mensen hebben interfereren met de herkenning van emo-
tionele expressies. De positiviteit (of negativiteit) die wordt geassocieerd met een 
sociale categorie werd door deelnemers gebruikt als prime voor het herkennen van 
positieve (of negatieve) emoties.
Verdriet en boosheid zoals gebruikt in het onderzoek van Hugenberg (2005, 
zie ook Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006) zijn beiden negatief en daarom waarschijn-
lijk sterker geassocieerd met een relatief negatieve dan positieve sociale categorie. 
Echter, dit hoofdstuk begon met een demonstratie dat speci!eke negatieve emoties 
eveneens worden geassocieerd met speci!eke sociale categorieën. Je zou bijvoor-
beeld kunnen zeggen dat verdriet niet stereotypisch is voor Zwarte Amerikanen, 
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terwijl boosheid dit wel is. Beïnvloeden dergelijke stereotypen eveneens de herken-
ning van emotionele uitdrukkingen? 
In drie hoofdstukken (Hoofdstukken 2-4) wordt onderzoek beschreven dat 
ik in samenwerking met mijn co-auteurs heb uitgevoerd naar de invloed van as-
sociaties tussen sociale categorieën en emoties op de waarneming van emotionele 
uitdrukkingen. Wij hebben ons allereerst gericht op het onderscheiden van de in-
vloed van twee type associaties op emotieherkenning, namelijk vooroordelen en 
stereotypen (Hoofdstuk 2). Daarna hebben we onze bevindingen aangaande de 
invloed van stereotypen op de herkenning van boosheid en verdriet uitgebreid 
door naar bewegende gezichten te kijken en in te zoomen op het onderliggende 
associatieve proces (Hoofdstuk 3). In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk presenteren 
wij onderzoeksbevindingen naar de spontaniteit waarmee associaties tussen emo-
tionele expressies en sociale categorieën worden naar voren komen in mentale rep-
resentaties van emoties.
STEREOTYPEN VERSUS VOOROORDELEN
In het onderzoek dat beschreven staat in Hoofdstuk 2 (Bijlstra, Holland & 
Wigboldus, 2010) is onderzocht of stereotype associaties, naast evaluatieve asso-
ciaties, van invloed zijn op de snelheid van emotieherkenning. Eerder onderzoek 
hee! laten zien dat sociale categorieën niet alleen evaluatieve, maar ook stereotype 
associaties activeren (Devine, 1998). Amodio en Devine demonstreerden in lijn 
hiermee dat mensen zowel evaluatieve (vooroordelen) als cognitieve (stereotypen) 
associaties hebben met sociale categorieën en dat deze verschillende associaties tot 
uiting kunnen komen in gedrag of keuzes die gemaakt worden (2006).
In lijn met deze resultaten werd verondersteld dat het onderzoeksparadigma 
dat gebruikt werd in eerder onderzoek bijgedragen hee! aan het vinden van evalu-
atieve in plaats van stereotype-e"ecten in emotieherkenning. In eerder onderzoek 
naar de invloed van sociale categorie lidmaatschap op emotieherkenning werd 
deelnemers gevraagd een positieve en een negatieve emotionele uitdrukking te 
categoriseren in een binnen-proefpersonen design (bv. Hugenberg, 2005; Kang & 
Chasteen, 2009). In deze - dubbele-valentie - vergelijkingscontext zouden reacties 
ten opzichte van discrete emoties kunnen worden overschaduwd door de saillan-
te valentie (positief versus negatief) verschillen tussen emoties. Echter, wanneer 
valentie geen rol speelt in het categoriseren van emotionele uitdrukkingen, zoals 
bij het indelen van boosheid en verdriet, verwachtten wij dat stereotypen een rol 
zouden spelen. In deze - enkele-valentie - vergelijkingscontext zouden in dat geval 
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stereotype-consistente emoties sneller worden herkend dan stereotype-inconsis-
tente emoties.
In Hoofdstuk 2 werd met behulp van twee experimenten de invloed van so-
ciale categorie lidmaatschap op emotieherkenning getest in zowel een dubbele- als 
enkele-valentie vergelijkingscontext. In de dubbele-valentie context kregen deel-
nemers plaatjes te zien van een positieve emotie (blijdschap) en plaatjes van één 
negatieve emotie (boos of verdriet). In de enkele-valentie context werd de snelheid 
van herkenning van twee negatieve emoties, boos en verdriet, direct tegenover 
elkaar getest. Proefpersonen in onze experimenten kregen kort (200 millisec-
onden) een plaatje te zien waarop een categorie lid een emotie uitbeeldde. De 
opdracht die proefpersonen kregen was om zo snel en accuraat mogelijk deze emo-
tie te categoriseren. Tussen proefpersonen werd gevarieerd of zij in een enkele- of 
dubbele-valentie conditie deze taak uitvoerden. In lijn met eerder onderzoek (bv. 
Hugenberg, 2005) werd verwacht dat in de dubbele-valentie context, deelnemers 
gebruik zouden maken van evaluatieve associaties bij het categoriseren van gelaat-
sexpressies. In de enkele-valentie context, daarentegen, werd verondersteld dat 
stereotype associaties een rol zouden spelen aangezien een categorisatie op basis 
van evaluatie minder waarschijnlijk is (beide emoties die getoond werden waren 
immers negatief van aard).
In lijn met deze verwachtingen is in twee experimenten bewijs gevonden voor 
het sneller herkennen van stereotype-consistente dan stereotype-inconsistente 
emoties in een onderzoeksparadigma waar geen valentieverschillen zijn tussen 
de te categoriseren emoties. Daarnaast repliceerden wij de eerder gevonden val-
entie congruente e!ecten (bv. Hugenberg, 2005) wanneer er een positieve versus 
een negatieve emotie gecategoriseerd diende te worden. Het onderscheid tussen 
deze e!ecten valt het beste te illustreren aan de hand van reacties ten opzichte van 
verdriet plaatjes uitgebeeld door mannen en vrouwen (Experiment 2.2). Verdriet 
in de context van blijdschap werd sneller herkend wanneer deze was uitgedrukt 
door een mannelijk dan vrouwelijk model. Dit is in lijn met het idee dat vrouwen 
over het algemeen positiever worden geëvalueerd dan mannen (Eagly & Mladinic, 
1989). Echter wanneer verdriet werd gecategoriseerd in de context van boosheid 
dan werd verdriet, in lijn met stereotype associaties (Plant et al., 2000), sneller her-
kend op een vrouwelijk dan mannelijk gezicht. 
De resultaten in deze twee experimenten suggereren dat de vergelijkings-
context het e!ect van sociale categorisatie op emotieherkenning modereert. De 
in Hoofdstuk 2 beschreven experimenten zijn echter geen directe toets van de ve-
ronderstelling dat stereotype associaties de verschillen in emotieherkenning verk-
122 
N
ederlandse sam
envatting
laren. Voor een directe toets van deze veronderstelling is een meting nodig van de 
sterkte van stereotype associaties die de mate voorspelt waarin stereotype e!ecten 
worden vertoond door proefpersonen op de emotieherkenningstaak. Met andere 
woorden, als stereotype associaties ten grondslag liggen aan de gevonden e!ecten 
dan zou een meting van deze associaties samen moeten hangen met het eerder 
gevonden stereotype e!ect.
Het doel van Hoofdstuk 3 (Bijlstra, Holland, Dotsch, Hugenberg, & Wigbol-
dus, under review) was om te toetsen of de sterkte van stereotype associaties de ste-
reotype e!ecten gevonden in Bijlstra et al. (2010) kunnen voorspellen. Daarnaast 
werd er in dit onderzoek gebruik gemaakt van een onderzoeksparadigma waarin 
deelnemers werd gevraagd om korte "lmfragmenten, de morph movies task (Nie-
denthal, Halberstadt, Margolin, & Innes-Ker; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, 
2004) te beoordelen. In deze taak bekeken deelnemers korte "lmfragmenten van 
Nederlandse en Marokkaanse mannelijke gezichten die langzamerhand van emo-
tie veranderen. De taak van de proefpersoon was om aan te geven wanneer ze de 
tweede emotie die werd uitgedrukt duidelijk zichtbaar vonden. In dit onderzoek 
werd wederom gekozen voor de emoties boosheid en verdriet. Het mannelijke deel 
van de Marokkaanse gemeenschap is een van de meest negatief gestereotypeerde 
groepen in Nederland (Verkuyten & Zarembe, 2005) en wordt geassocieerd met 
criminaliteit (Dotsch, Wigboldus, Langner, & van Knippenberg, 2008) wat sterker 
gerelateerd is met uitingen van boosheid dan van verdriet. Daarom werd verwacht 
dat boosheid sneller werd waargenomen op een Marokkaans dan Nederlands 
gezicht, wanneer deze van verdriet naar boosheid veranderde. Anderzijds zou een 
Marokkaans gezicht langer boosheid uitbeelden dan een Nederlands gezicht wan-
neer het veranderd van boosheid in verdriet.
Om te kunnen testen of stereotype associaties samenhangen met deze emotie 
waarnemingen werden emotie-speci"eke associaties met Marokkanen en Neder-
landers gemeten. In Hoofdstuk 3 is gebruik gemaakt van een nieuw ontworpen 
impliciete associatie taak (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), de emo-
tie-IAT (eIAT). De eIAT meet de sterkte van associaties tussen speci"eke emoties en 
sociale categorieën en is gebaseerd op reactietijden. Proefpersonen werd gevraagd 
om met behulp van twee knoppen zo snel en correct mogelijk woorden die verschi-
jnen op het computerscherm in te delen op basis van twee categorieën: etniciteit 
en emotie. Hoe sneller deelnemers zijn in het reageren van boosheid-woorden met 
Marokkaanse namen op één knop en verdriet-woorden met Nederlandse namen 
op de andere knop (in vergelijking met het tegenovergestelde), hoe sterker de mate 
van stereotype-consistente emotie associaties. 
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In Experiment 3.1 werd deelnemers gevraagd om een morph movies task en 
een eIAT uit te voeren. Verwacht werd dat de emotie-speci!eke associaties van 
deelnemers voorspellend zijn voor het stereotype e"ect in emotieherkenning. Al-
lereerst werd gevonden dat deelnemers over het algemeen sterkere boosheid-Ma-
rokkaan en verdriet-Nederlander associaties hadden dan verdriet-Marokkaan 
en boosheid-Nederlander associaties. Daarnaast werd gevonden dat we met de 
morph movies task in staat waren om de in Hoofdstuk 2 gevonden stereotype ef-
fecten conceptueel te repliceren. Als laatste, en belangrijkste, vonden wij de door 
ons voorspelde samenhang tussen het stereotype e"ect en emotie-speci!eke asso-
ciaties van deelnemers met Nederlanders en Marokkanen. Hoe sterker proefper-
sonen boosheid met Marokkanen en verdriet met Nederlanders associeerden, hoe 
sterker zij het stereotype e"ect in emotieherkenning lieten zien. 
In het Experiment 3.2 werd een directe replicatie uitgevoerd van het in Hoofd-
stuk 2 gebruikte onderzoekparadigma in combinatie met de eIAT. Daarnaast is 
om uit te sluiten dat evaluatieve associaties de stereotype e"ecten evengoed zoud-
en kunnen voorspellen, eveneens een ‘klassieke’ evaluatieve impliciete associatie 
taak (IAT) meegenomen. Allereerst repliceerden we het in Hoofdstuk 2 gevon-
den stereotype e"ect. Daarnaast voorspelden zowel de eIAT als de IAT de sterkte 
van dit stereotype e"ect. Hoe sterker proefpersonen boosheid met Marokkanen 
en verdriet met Nederlanders associeerden, hoe sterker zij het stereotype e"ect 
in emotieherkenning lieten zien. De IAT daarentegen voorspelt in tegengestelde 
richting het stereotype e"ect. Dit e"ect was vooraf niet verwacht, maar het lijkt al-
sof deelnemers met negatieve vooroordelen het lastig vinden om speci!eke negati-
eve emoties van elkaar te onderscheiden.
In het laatste deel van dit proefschri# hebben we de grens van deze emotie-
hekenningse"ecten proberen op te zoeken. Opvallend is bijvoorbeeld dat in al het 
uitgevoerde onderzoek naar associaties en emotieherkenning de relatie tussen cat-
egorieën en emotionele uitdrukkingen overduidelijk onderdeel is van de taak van 
de proefpersoon. Zo werden bijvoorbeeld zowel sekse als speci!eke emoties benad-
rukt in emotieherkenningstaken (bv. Plant et al., 2000; Hugenberg & Sczesny, 2006; 
Bijlstra et al, 2010). Wellicht is deze expliciete benadering een voorwaarde voor het 
vinden van emotie-speci!eke stereotype e"ecten. Hoofdstuk 4 had ten doel het 
spontane gebruik van associaties tussen leden uit sociale categorieën en speci!eke 
emoties te toetsen. 
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SPONTAAN GEBRUIK VAN EMOTIE-SEKSE ASSOCIATIES
Experimenten 4.2 en 4.3 werden opgezet om te toetsen of mensen spontaan 
gebruikmaken van emotie-sekse associaties in mentale representaties van typische 
emotionele expressies. Om dit te meten en voorbij te gaan aan het expliciete karak-
ter van eerder onderzoek werd er gebruik gemaakt van een data gedreven onder-
zoeksmethode genaamd reverse correlation (RC; Dotsch, Langner, van Knippen-
berg, & Wigboldus, 2008; Mangini & Biederman, 2004). Eerder onderzoek hee! 
laten zien dat deze methode in staat is om een indicatie van visuele stereotypen te 
meten. Dotsch en collega’s (2008) hebben succesvol gebruik gemaakt van RC par-
adigma’s om te laten zien dat hoger bevooroordeelde deelnemers een criminelere 
mentale representatie van Marokkaanse gezichten hebben dan lager bevooroor-
deelde deelnemers. Een belangrijk voordeel van deze taak ten opzichte van eerder 
gebruikte taken is dat het de mogelijkheid biedt om te onderzoeken hoe mensen 
denken over een speci"ek concept (bv. een emotie), zonder daarbij noodzakelijk 
een ander sociaal concept (bv. een sociale categorie) te hoeven noemen. Bijvoor-
beeld in het onderzoek van Dotsch en collega’s werd onderzoek gedaan naar het 
stereotype dat Nederlandse deelnemers hebben van Marokkanen met deze RC taak 
zonder dat proefpersonen het woord criminaliteit te zien kregen.
Het onderzoek dat in Experiment 4.2 is uitgevoerd bestond uit twee verschil-
lende stappen. In stap 1 werd een eerste groep deelnemers gevraagd om een RC 
taak uit te voeren. Tijdens deze taak kregen zij herhaaldelijk twee met ruis bedekte 
gezichten te zien. De taak die we deelnemers gaven was om aan te geven welk van 
de twee gezichten bijvoorbeeld het meest boos op hen overkwam. Feitelijk werd 
telkens hetzelfde gezicht getoond met willekeurige ruis eroverheen geprojecteerd. 
De ruis vertekent de gezichten zo dat het lijkt alsof er twee verschillende gezichten 
worden aangeboden (voor een voorbeeld zie Figuur 1, p. 26). Op basis van alle 
keuzes die een proefpersoon maakt, kan herleid worden hoe een typisch boos 
gezicht is gerepresenteerd voor deze persoon. De uitkomst van deze taak is een 
plaatje, classi!cation image (CI), dat wij in dit onderzoek zien als een indicatie van 
het visuele component van emotie-sekse associaties. In Experiment 4.2 vroegen 
wij vier verschillende groepen deelnemers deze taak uit te voeren. Alle deelnemers 
kregen dezelfde plaatjes met ruis te zien, maar de instructie was verschillend tussen 
de groepen. Groep 1 gaf telkens aan welk van de twee gezichten het meest boos 
was, Groep 2 welk gezicht het meest verdrietig, Groep 3 welk gezicht het meest 
mannelijk en Groep 4 welk gezicht het meest vrouwelijk. Aan de hand van deze 
indeling was het mogelijk om het typische emotie of sekse gezicht per groep te 
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visualiseren. In stap 2 van dit experiment werd de gelijkenis tussen de gezichten ge-
toetst. De gelijkenis kan worden getoetst door naar de objectieve gelijkheid tussen 
CIs te kijken, met behulp van correlatie tussen pixels van twee plaatjes. Daarnaast 
hebben we de emotie CIs door een tweede groep proefpersonen laten beoordelen 
op mannelijkheid en vrouwelijkheid (subjectieve gelijkheid).
Gevonden werd in Experiment 4.2 dat CIs van boosheid en verdriet objectief 
meer overeenkomsten hadden met mannen dan vrouwen. De gemiddelde CIs van 
typisch boze en typisch verdrietige gezichten correleerden beiden hoger met het 
typisch mannelijke dan vrouwelijke CI. In lijn met het idee dat vrouwen positiever 
worden beoordeeld dan mannen (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989) lijkt het alsof deelne-
mers evaluatieve associaties hebben toegepast in hun representaties van negatieve 
emotionele expressies. Anderzijds, wanneer deelnemers in stap 2 werd gevraagd 
om de mannelijkheid en vrouwelijkheid van de emotie CIs in te schatten vonden 
wij een patroon dat in lijn is met stereotype associaties. Hoewel ook hier beide 
plaatjes meer mannelijk dan vrouwelijk werden ingeschat, was dit verschil groter 
voor het boosheid dan voor het verdrietige plaatje. Wij concludeerden, in lijn met 
de objectieve gelijkenis resultaten, dat deelnemers ‘by default’ evaluaties gebruiken 
wanneer ze emoties mentaal representeren. Echter, wanneer een sociale categorie 
context (in dit geval sekse context) wordt aangeboden bij het beoordelen van de 
plaatjes (subjectieve gelijkenis) dan spelen stereotypen een rol.
Met het laatste experiment dat beschreven is in dit proefschri! is getoetst of 
het mogelijk is om met een emotie-context, zoals gebruikt in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3, de 
invloed van evaluatieve-stereotype associaties of stereotype associaties in mentale 
representatie te manipuleren. Deelnemers voerden een RC taak uit in een enkele- 
of dubbele-valentie context. In de dubbele-valentie context beoordeelden deel-
nemers ’ruizige’ plaatjes op een evaluatieve schaal (van vrolijk tot verdriet) en in 
de enkele-valentie context op een niet-evaluatieve schaal (van boos tot verdriet). 
Verwacht werd dat de evaluatieve context zou leiden tot het gebruik van evalu-
atieve associaties. Anderzijds, verwachtten wij dat in een enkele-valentie context 
stereotype associaties naar voren komen. De resultaten in dit onderzoek worden 
het best geïllustreerd door de objectieve gelijkenis van de verdriet plaatjes tussen 
de twee condities. Deze resultaten laten zien dat het verdrietige plaatje dat werd ge-
maakt in de dubbele-valentie context mannelijker is dan het verdrietige plaatje in 
de enkele-valentie context. Dit bevestigt onze verwachting dat de emotie-context 
(enkele-valentie versus dubbele-valentie) de invloed van evaluatieve of stereotype 
associaties kan modereren. In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we hiermee allereerst bewijs 
gevonden voor het spontaan gebruiken van evaluatieve associaties in mentale rep-
126 
N
ederlandse sam
envatting
resentaties van emoties. De invloed van stereotype associaties komen enkel naar 
voren wanneer er een speci!eke emotie of sociale categorie context wordt geïntro-
duceerd. 
CONCLUSIE
Met het onderzoek in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 hebben wij als eerste bewijs gevon-
den voor de invloed van stereotype associaties op de herkenning van emotionele 
expressies. Met behulp van verschillende onderzoeksparadigma’s is laten zien dat 
evaluatieve en stereotype associaties ten opzichte van sekse en etniciteit emotie-
herkenning beïnvloeden. Daarnaast blijkt de vergelijkingscontext een modere-
rende rol te spelen in dit proces; een dubbele-valentie leidt tot het gebruik van 
evaluatieve associaties en een enkele-valentie leidt tot het gebruik van stereotype 
associaties. Het onderscheid dat gemaakt wordt tussen deze associatieve processen 
in consistent met eerder onderzoek (Amodio & Devine, 2006).
Hoewel wij in ons onderzoek hebben laten zien dat stereotypen een rol spel-
en in de herkenning van emoties, kunnen wij tot nu toe alleen uitspraken doen 
over de herkenning van een beperkt aantal emoties die worden uitgedrukt door 
leden van sociale categorieën in Nederland. Verder onderzoek is nodig om de 
generaliseerbaarheid te toetsen naar andere emoties en sociale categorieën. De 
huidige resultaten nodigen uit tot verder onderzoek naar stereotype e"ecten in 
emotie-communicatie. Gedacht zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen worden aan onderzoek 
naar de communicatie van emoties via emotionele lichaamstaal. Recentelijk is er 
meer aandacht gekomen voor onderzoek naar de e"ecten van emotionele lichaam-
staal op het toewijzen van sociale categorieën (Johnson, McKay, & Pollick, 2011). 
Voor de invloed van sociale categorisatie op de herkenning van lichaamstaal is tot 
dusverre geen onderzoek bekend.
Tot slot, de resultaten uit het laatst deel van dit proefschri# suggereren dat 
mensen ‘by default’ gebruik maken van evaluatieve associaties bij het nadenken 
over negatieve emotionele uitdrukkingen. Deze bevindingen sluiten aan bij ee-
rder onderzoek dat hee# laten zien dat mensen automatisch wat ze observeren 
evalueren op basis van valentie (bv. Bargh, Chaiken, Raymon, & Hymes, 1996). 
Voor de toepassing van stereotype associaties in representaties van emotionele uit-
drukkingen is een manipulatie van de context noodzakelijk. Wanneer een sociale 
categorie context (Experiment 4.1 en 4.2) of een enkele-valentie emotie context 
(Experiment 4.3) wordt geïntroduceerd, dan gebruiken deelnemers stereotype as-
sociaties in de representaties van emotionele uitdrukkingen. Met behulp van dit 
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onderzoek is meer duidelijk geworden over de spontaniteit waarmee associaties 
gebruikt worden. De resultaten bevestigen dat eerder gevonden stereotype emotie-
herkenning resultaten (gedeeltelijk) verklaard worden door de context waarin deze 
zijn onderzocht. 
In het huidige proefschri! heb ik mij gericht op de invloed die associaties tus-
sen sociale categorieën en emoties hebben op de waarneming van emotionele uit-
drukkingen. Echter, de gevonden e"ecten zouden ons mogelijkerwijs eveneens iets 
kunnen leren over het in stand houden van evaluatieve en stereotype associaties. 
Het zou kunnen zijn dat door het hebben van stereotype associaties (zoals tussen 
Marokkanen en boosheid of vrouwen en verdriet) dat mensen het gemakkelijker 
vinden om boze Marokkanen of verdrietige vrouwen waar te nemen. Indien dit 
het geval is dan zou het hebben van stereotype associaties wellicht genoeg zijn om 
stereotype beelden in stand te houden. Toekomstig onderzoek is nodig om te ki-
jken of dergelijke processen inderdaad plaatsvinden en of het mogelijk is om deze 
vicieuze cirkel te doorbreken.
